Louisiana State University Law Center

LSU Law Digital Commons
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1998

Portia Goes to Parliament: Women and Their Admission to
Membership in the English Legal Profession
Christine Corcos
Louisiana State University Law Center, christine.corcos@law.lsu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Corcos, Christine, "Portia Goes to Parliament: Women and Their Admission to Membership in the English
Legal Profession" (1998). Journal Articles. 240.
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/faculty_scholarship/240

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at LSU Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of LSU Law Digital Commons.
For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

PORTIA GOES TOPARLIAMENT:
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This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood;
The words expressly are "a pound offlesh:"
Then take thy bond, take thou thy pound offlesh;
But, in the cutting it, if thou dost shed
One drop of Christian blood, thy lands and goods
Are, by the laws of Venice, confiscate
Unto the state ofVenice.1
I. INTRODUCTION
By pleading for the literal application of the law in The Merchant of
Venice, Portia hopes to avoid the bloody result of a bad bargain. In
pointing out that Shylock is entitled to "a pound of flesh," but nothing
more, she identifies the justice that an advocate requests and a judge
grants in applying the law, if the parties are willing to accept the foresee
able result of that application. Perhaps believing that with admission
would come acceptance,2 the would-be Portias of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries pied for the literal application of the laws that
would have allowed them to appear as attorneys in the English courts.3
While their own lawyers desired the literal outcome of the applicable
statutes, the judges and the official representatives of the organized bar
did not.4 Their reluctance to accept the legitimate outcome of properly
drawn and enacted legislation allowed them to formulate a legal theory
that successfully prevented the admission of women to the English legal
profession for nearly fifty years after Parliament decreed that the status
quo should be changed.s
The character of Portia in Shakespeare's The

Merchant of Venice is

one of the most familiar figures to be classed as a "woman lawyer" in
literature or in life, even though she is not a member of the bar.6 The ref
erence is so common that Horace Rumpole' s dubbing of Phyllida Trant
Erskine-Browne as "the Portia of our Chambers" is immediately under
standable to English-speaking readers.1 Yet, any recognition of the right

1.

Wn..UAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4,

SC.

1, lines 307-1 3 (William

Lyon Phelps ed., Yale University Press 1923).

2. The literature makes it clear that this was not the case. See infra notes 17, 443-64 and
accompanying text.
3.

See ALBIE SACHS & JOAN HOFF WILSO N, SEXISM AND THE L A W: A STUDY OF MALE

BELIEFS AND LEGAL BIAS IN BRITAIN AND TifE UNITED STATES 27-33 (1978) (discussing cases
where women applied for positions of law agent, barrister and solicitor in the English courts).

4.

See id.

5.

See id. at

40-53 (discussing the "myth of judicial neutrality" and how the fact that the

judiciary was exclusively male made judicial neutrality towards women's involvement virtually a
myth).
6.

See SHAKESPEARE, supra note

1, act 4, sc. 1, line 170. Portia's famous scene begins here.
21 CASE & COM 353 (1914) (discussing

See generally Isabel Giles, The Twentieth Century Portia,

.

the future of women attorneys in the twentieth century).
7. Jmm MORTIMER, Rumpole and the Right to Silence, in RUMPOLE A LA CARTE 103, 121
(1990); see Giles, supra note 6, at 352 (providing a reproduction of an oil painting by Sir John
Millais titled "Portia"); David Cuthbert, Last Call For Rumpole: Tonight's 'Mystery!' Marks the
Beginning of the End for Leo McKem' s Turn as the Wiley Old Barrister of the Old Bailey, NEW
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of women to be admitted to the English legal profession �as a rarity until

�tates,' an d
�ps �1s de��y is.

the late nineteenth century, after various states of the Umted

?

then the provinces of Canada,9 admitte

women. Per

understandable in a country whose nat10nal symbol 1s a ht1gant.

�

Re

cently, contemporary women lawyers hav� becom� a su jec � of � uch
1
study, in both serious historical and legal literature, and m d1scuss1ons
.
of popular culture. 12 Their problems with the male-dommated legal cul
ture continue to occupy o ur attention.

ORLEANS TrMEs-PICAYUNE, Apr. 13, 1995. at El (discussing a television show based on John
Mortimer's Rumpole). Patricia Hodge, an actress who plays Phyllida in the show, bean an uncanny
resemblance to the model in Millais's painting.

8.

See infra notes

255, 371 and accompanying text. 1lte battle was won state by state,

however, and admission to the practice of law did not imply that states were willing to admit women
to ancillary professions such as notary public. See Bickett v. Knight, 85 S.E. 418 (N.C. 1915)
(holding that women are ineligible for the public office of notary public since women are not voters
in the state); see also Recenr Cases: Public Office---Can a Woman Be a Notary Public?. 64 U. PA. L.
REV. 95, 105 (1915) (examining cases prohibiting women from public office positions and
discussing the theory behind the restriction of women from the position of notary public).

9.
10.

See infra Part ill. A. I.

"John Bull" is the main character in the political allegory and satirical pamphlets written

by John Arbuthnot and published in 1712 by John Morphew. &e JOHN ARBUTHNOT, THE HISTORY

OF JOHN BULL (Alan W. Bower & Robert A. Erickson eds., 1976). In the pamphlets, Bull sues Lewis
Baboon, where the lawsuit represented the war with France.
11. See CYNTHIA FuCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN L A W (1981) {analyzing the ways in which
women attorneys are treated by their colleagues and their families, the pressures they face, and the
manner in which they deal with p roblems); Christine Haight Farley, Confronling Expectations:
Women in the Legal Academy,

8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 333 (1996) {providing an extensive

bibliography for U.S. materials); see also ROB ERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS

OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND (1992) (detailing legal education at Harvard Law School and its
effect on ideals); LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAw SCHOOL. AND
INSTITimONAL CHANGE 103-69 (1997) (providing important bibliographic information); Robert
Granfield, Contextualizing the Diffe rent Voice: Women, Occupational Goals, and Legal Education,

16

LAW & PoL'Y 1 (1994) (examining gender differences among students attending Harvard Law

School).

12.

See, e.g., Christine A. Corcos, Women Lawye r s , in PRIME TIME LAW (Robert Jarvis and

Paul Joseph eds., 1998); Diane M. Glass, Portia in Primetime: Women Lawyers, Television, and LA.
Law,

2 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 371 (1990) (examining the image of women lawyers in the television

drama, L.A. Law, viewed in the historical context of women's depiction on television); Louise
Everett Graham & Geraldine Maschio, A False Public Sentiment: Narrative and Visual Images of
84 KY. L.J. 1027 (1966) (exploring cinematic images of women lawyers);

Women Lawyers in Film,

Judith Mayne, L.A. Law and P rime-Time Feminism, 10 DISCOURSE 30 (1988) (discussing the
depiction of female attorneys on television); Carolyn Lisa Miller, "What a Waste. Beautiful, Sexy
Gal. Hell of

a

Lawyer.": Film and the Female Attorney,

4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 203 (199 4)

(analyzing films which feature female attorneys); Carole Shapiro, Women Lawyers in Celluloid:
Why Hollywood Skirts the Truth, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 955 (1995) (examining women lawyers in film
because they illustrate the way visual images help maintain gender roles); Ric Sheffield, Taking
Exception to Six Decades on Film: A Social History of Women Lawyers in Popular Culture 1930 to

1990, 14 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 73 (1993) (suggesting that stereotypical depictions of women lawyers
in film may influence or reinforce the stereotypes about female attorneys in practice to the detriment
of society and the legal profession); Elaine Weiss, Who's Missing in This Picture?, BARRISTER

MAG., Winter 1989-90, at 4 (reviewing the treatment of women lawyers in film and television).
The "double standard" which continues to confront women professionals generally has also
been explored humorously in films and television broadcasts. See, e.g. , BABY BOOM (United Artists
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The question of admission of women to the English Bar is not sim
ply an interesting side issue in legal history. It illustrates the familiar
battle of an excluded group for inclusion in a larger society that has tra
ditionally maintained control by becoming self-defining.13 In the case of
barristers, this self-definition was exacerbated by the fact that only the
Inns of Court were authorized to bestow the designation of "barrister"
and the Inns of Court, because they were self-regulating, insured their
control of the profession. In addition, judges were chosen from the bar
rister class, and judgeships were for life barring gross misconduct.14 An
early twentieth century American woman attorney made the point elo
quently:
It is a well known fact that no man really understands a woman, and
yet

until recently we have had only men to decide what is right and

wrong as far as we are concerned. Is it not only natural that men,
looking at things from their standpoint, will often make mistakes? If

there is one place where women ought to be it is in law. Our laws for
women are made by man. How can man do justice to a creature

which he frankly admits no man ever understands?15

Much of the discussion on the fitness of women to practice law in
England parallels contemporaneous discussion of the actual performance
of female attorneys in countries that had already admitted women, nota
bly France and the United States. The English Bar thus demonstrated that
while it followed certain peculiarities of thought on the subject, most
dictated by the structure and history of the English common law, the
quality of its debate reflected the spirit an d the style of its brethren in
other lands.
Because the battle is for inclusion into the legal profession, that is,
the profession that decides what issues are properly the focus of the law
and what issues are not, participation in it represents an essential goal for
any marginalized group. "Medicine, Science, Arts, had all been thor-

1987); Baby Boom (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 1986-Jan. 1989); TOOTSIE (Columbia 1982);
VICTOR/VICTORIA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1982). For a discussion of the double standard in

English legal history, see Ann Sumner Holmes, The Double Standard in the English Divorce Laws,
1857-1923, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 601 (1995). The 1987 film ADAM'S RIB (MGM/UA Home
Video 1987) is primarily about the legal double standard.
13. See generally Daniel Duman, Pathway to Professionalism: The English Bar in the
Eighteenth and Niru!teenth Centuries, 13 J. Soc. HIST. 615 (1980) (discussing the mechanics of self
definition).
14. See 15 SIR WILLIA!d HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 244 (A.L. Goodhart &
H.G. Hanbury eds., 1965).
15. Women in the Law, 58 Omo L. BULL. 133, 134 (1913). Some male lawyers are still not
trying very hard to understand women's frustrations. See generally Elizabeth A. Delfs, Foul Play in
Courtroom: Persistence, Cause and Remedies, 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 309 (1996) (analyzing the
parameters of foul play). However, one popular commentator asserts that laws and society in general
benefit women more than men. WARREN FARRELL, WHY MEN ARE TIIE WAY THEY ARE 161-68
(1986). While Farrell's reasoning fails to take into account the historical and cultural reasons for
what he sees as .favoritism, his position illustrates the anger and confusion that many men, not just
professionals, feel toward the "mixed messages" that they believe women send.
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oughly explored before Law was thought of. This was probably

?ue in

.
part to the fact that the Law itself prevented women from entenng its

precincts, and numerous initial difficulties had to be remo ved ... "16 As
.
.
women admitted to the bar in England and other countnes discovered,
·

however, the right of admission was not a guarantee of social or profe1:.
s1on al acceptance.17
Thus, the nature of the anti-feminist argument over the admission of
women bears scrutiny. It expresses the understandable fears and resent
ments of men who had labored for centuries, taken economic, social and
political chances, and sometimes risked their lives to acquire certain
rights and positions in the political and legal system. A group which de
manded inclusion in that system but which had not, as men saw it, "paid
its dues," was making excessive and unacceptable demands. Many male
"gatekeepers" of the system saw attacks on all fronts, including the pro
fession of law, and were offended and dismayed. They shared and ex
pressed, along with their male colleagues in other countries, a concern
that women were not, indeed could not be, adequately socialized or edu
cated to be members of a profession that formulated and interpreted soci
ety's rules.
' The battle over women's admission to the bar in England also illus
.
trated the willingness of the English judiciary to make law while it de
nied that it was doing so. By placing the interpretation of what it deemed
to be custom and the common law above the plain meaning of certain
relevant statutes, the English judges involved forced Parliament to con
sider an issue that it thought it h a d already settled. By redefining the
question as one that the appellant really did not present and asserting that
they were asked to decide it, the judiciary both trivialized the issue and
temporarily redirected the attention of the profession. The attempt to
repel women from the profession was only temporarily successful, how
ever, because it failed to take into account both the political and philo
sophical strength of the women's movement and support for that move
ment from men for whom the equity arguments outweighed fears about
either the inadequacy or potential competition from women. Further, by

16.
(1909).
17.

G. Flos. Greig, The Law as a Profession for Women, 6 COMMONWEALTH L. REV.

145, 147

The literature on the marginalizatio n of women attorneys continues to grow. Apart from

the extensive "glass ceiling" studies that

are

available, some writers have begun to study the

situation of women law school academics. See Farley, supra note

11.

The phenomenon has even

begun to engender its own jurisprudence. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open
Doors:

��men's �dv�ncement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1995) (exploring

women s mtegratlon mto large corporate law practices and their mobility within firms); Marie s.

Kende, Shattering the Glass Ceiling: A Legal Theory for Attacking Discrimination Against Women
Partners, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 17

(1994)

(examining, in part, the glass ceiling that women law partners

face). On English women attorneys, more specifically, see David Podmore & Anne Spencer, Women
.
wyer� m England: The Experience of Inequality, 9 WORK & OcCUPATIONS 337, 339-42 (1982)

La_

(discussing the entry of women into the profession and the reactions of opponents).
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refusin � to acc��t � e plain meaning of the statute a t bar, the judges in

volved m the htigallon over the admission of women to the bar denied
these Portias the outcome obtained by their namesake, a literal interpre

tation of the law.
Although several writers have produced exhaustive (and exhausting)
histories of the English legal profession, the question of women's admis
sion is disposed of in a few pages or worse yet, paragraphs.18 Contempo
rary writers are more concerned with the current status of women law
yers; 19 yet, much of the discrimination today's female attorneys experi
ence is rooted in the reluctance of many male barristers and solicitors to
welcome them to begin with, or work with them to make those accom
modations necessary to encourage their full participation in the profes
sion . Continued acceptance of traditional gender roles is a major barrier
to many women attorneys. Yet, an understanding of its origins is neces
sary to its effective neutralization. Otherwise women attorneys will con
tinue to be shunted into those legal specializations deemed "appropriate"
for females.
A

1985

survey of the members of the Association of Women Solici

tors found that the proportion temporarily retired from practice in or
der to raise children ranged from
to

17.4 per cent of those 3 1-35.

8.6 per cent of those 36-40 years old

Furthermore, those in private practice

took short maternity leaves (an average of
months for partners), and though

8 7.2

job, only 53.7 per cent kept the same hours;
private practice were working part time, and
children

thought
20

their

career

5.2

months, but only

2.4

per cent returned to the same

22.7 per cent of those in
34 per cent of those with

prospects

were

changed

by

motherhood.

18. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES 172-76
(1988); MICHAEL BIRKS, GENTLEMEN OF THE LAW 276-78 (1960); cf Norman St. John-Stevas,
Women in Public Law, in A CENTURY OF FAMILY LAW: 1857-1957, at 256, 276-78 (R.H. Graveson
& F.R. Crane eds., 1957) (providing a more in-depth discussion of women in the legal profession).
Some may question the importance of studying or writing legal history. For those for whom the
answer is not intuitive, we should remember that much of present day law is based on assumptions,
sometimes mistaken ones, about the past. Challenging those assumptions in an intellectually honest
way will make the present more comprehensible and the future, possibly, more just. John Orth offers
a practical reason that will be persuasive to those for whom the Whig interpretation of history is
most comfortable. See John V. Orth, Thinking About Law Historically: Why Bother?, 10 N.C. L.
REV. 287 (1991 ) Orth writes: "The obvious reason for thinking about law historically is that it helps
.

us to solve problems in the present." Id. at 287. The rest of his essay points out more subtle but
powerful reasons for studying history, not the least of which is to learn in what cases we make
decisions or write policy based on biased or incorrect information. Id.

19. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 18, at 173-76; David Podmore & Anne Spencer, The Law as a
Sex-Typed Profession, 9 J.L. & Soc'Y 21 (1982) (offering a careful analysis of the consequences to
the legal profession of overidentification with one sex).

20. ABEL, supra note 18, at 174 (citing Pauline Molyneux, Association of Women Solicitors Membership Survey, 83 LAW Soc'Y GAZETIE 3082 (1986)). Molyneux's survey does not reveal
whether married male solicitors made any changes in their work schedules to accommodate child
rearing. See Molyneux, supra. Molyneux's advice to ambitious female lawyers is to "delay starting a
family until they are partners." Id. at 3084.
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Women solicitors tend to concentrate their practices in the areas of
probate and trust, family law, and domestic conveyancing, although liti
gation is by far the most popular area,21 possibly because of its high visi
bility .22 A 1982 study suggests that this "bunching " in specializ ations is at
least partly due to "conceptions of the appropriate roles and qualities of
women in the labour force .... The 'servant' image inhibits the promo
tion of women to 'master' positions whilst the image of women as sex
objects militates against their being taken seriously as persons in their
own right."23 Neither the authors of this study nor a 1986 survey24 explain
why litigation, one of the more aggressive specializations, is so popular;
although the litigator's easily recognizable image as a dominant figure in
law may be part of the attraction.

21.

See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 18, at 175 (citing Molyneux, supra note 20). Other

commentators have stated:
Just as women police officers (until relatively equal work was recently introduced in
return for equal pay) found that little work came their way besides "women's" offences
(prostitution, shop-lifting) and "juveniles," so women lawyers are disproportionately
involved in family and divorce work, or "back room" routinized work.. ..The over
representation of women lawyers in "back room" work has also been justified by the
claim that "clients would object" to dealing with a woman.
Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 27. Note that in some cases, a woman lawyer may provide a
stronger symbol than a man.In the film, Jagged Edge, lawyer Teddi Barnes points out that the jury
will be influenced by seeing her client, an accused wife-murderer, carrying her briefcase and taking
her advice.JAGGED EDGE (RCA/Columbia Pictures Home Video 1985).
22. See Molyneux, supra note 20, at 3083.
23. See Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 24. The perception that women are much more
likely than men to leave the workplace for the demands of childrearing also figure into the
disinclination to promote them into positions of authority.The statutory period for maternity leave is
generous: "(A)n employee's maternity leave period continues fo r the period of fourteen weeks from
its commencement or until the birth of the child, if later." Employment Rights Act of 1996, ch.18,
pt.VIII, § 73 (Eng.).Employees with two years or longer also have "the right to return to work at
any time during the period beginning at the end of her maternity leave period and ending twenty
nine weeks after the beginning of the week in which childbirth occurs." Id. § 79.
It might in fact create serious business problems for an employer who makes the effort to hire
women as fifty percent of its staff if, for example, a substantial part of half of the workforce were to
take maternity leave on a rotating basis every few years.
�y senior partners will express reluctance to employ a woman solicitor because of
the likelihood that she will have children and consequently the finn will suffer either by
losing the solicitor altogether or by her taking time off to have the baby.It may be of
some consolation to such senior partners that the average length of leave from the date of
leaving until the date of return was only 5.24 months.For those respondents who were
partners at the date of maternity leave, the period was much shorter being only 2.43
months.It should be borne in mind however that the employment protection legislation
d�s not cover partners and in such cases the length of time off and arrangements for
.
domg work dunng that period were matters for negotiation between the individual partner
and her firm.
Molyneux, supra note 20, at 3083-84. From the employer's point of view the female employee
covered by relevant legislation is taking nearly as much time as she is entitled to, without regard for
the convenience of the employer. From the employee's point of view, she is attempting to fulfill the
expecta on of th her employer (faithfully returning to work when required) and of society (staying
home with her mfant and proving herself a "good mother'').Thus,
the situation seems to become
uch
mo
re
adversarial
than
perhaps
needs
it
.
to be This issue clearly needs more objecti ve
?1
.
mvest:J.gallon .
24. See Molyneux, supra note 20.

�
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II . THE STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE LATE

NINETEENTH AND EARLY TwENTIETH CENTURIES

A. In General
The Engli h
in e late sev �nteenth century was, as it is today, a
.
bifurcated
bar. D1v1ded mto the twm professions of solicitor and barris

! �� �

ter, the bar established and maintained a careful and rigorous distinction
between the non-litigious role of the lawyer, eventually taken by the so
licitor, and the litigious aspects, eventually taken by the barrister.26
We have seen that the distinction between the attorney who repre
sents a person for the purposes of litigation, and the pleader who
speaks for a litigant in court, is fundamental in early law. The idea
that one man can represent another is foreign to early law. When first
it is introduced it is regarded as an exceptional privilege, and the rep
resentative must be solemnly appointed. On the other hand, the idea
that a litigant may get assistance from his friends or others to conduct
his case in court is known to and recognized by early law. Thus the
appointment by a litigant of an attorney, and the obtaining by the liti
gant of the assistance of a pleader, are two very different things; and
so the class of attorneys and the class of pleaders naturally tended,

25.

See generally BIRKS, supra note 18 (discussing history of the legal system); 6 W.S.

HOI.DSWORTII, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 431-81 (1924) (discussing the general history of the

English Bar in the latter half of the seventeenth century); T'HEOOORE F.T. PLUCKNETI, A CONCISE

HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW pt. II (1929) (discussing the history of the law courts and the legal
profession). For a discussion of the English Bar in the Jacobean and early modem period, see C.W.

BROOKS, PElTYFOGGERS AND VIPERS OF THE COMMONWEALIB: THE 'LoWER BRANCH' OF TIIE

LEGAL PROFESSION IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1986); J.S. COCKBURN, A

HlsTORY OF ENGLISH AssIZES: 1558-1714 (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1986); DA YID LEMMINGS, GENILEMEN

AND BARRISTERS: THE INNS OF COURT AND THE ENG LISH BAR: 1680-1730 (1990); BRIAN P.

LEvACK, THE CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLAND: 1603-1641, A PoLmCAL STUDY (1973). For a
discussion of the Victorian period, see RAYMOND COCKS, FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN BAR

(1983). See also, e.g., Daniel Duman, Pathway to Professionalism: The English Bar in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 13 J. Soc. HIST. 615 (1980) (suggesting that the bar developed

its own model of professionalism before other occupations); W. Wesley Pue, In Pursuit of Better

Myth: Lawyers' Histories and Histories of Lawyers, 33 ALT A . L. REV. 730 (1995) (advancing the

view that lawyers, Canadian lawyers in particular, are enamoured with history because it allows
them to create and recreate more flattering images of themselves).

Currently, some movement is underway to change the sttucture of the E nglish Bar. This

discussion is not new. Some of the commentators who favored the admission of women into the
profession also favored a dismantling of the distinction between solicitor and barrister,

as

had

already been done in some other countries in the Commonwealth, as well as in the United States. On

the structure of the legal profession in the Commonwealth during the period discussed in this essay,
see C.E.A. Bedwell, Conditions of Admission to the Legal Profession Througlwut the British

Empire, 12 J. Soc'y COMP. LEG. 209 (1912) (discussing the conditions of admission to the legal
profession within the Commonwealth); Holford Knight, The Organisation of the Bar in the British
Empire, 15 J. Soc'Y COMP. LEG. 161 (1915) (examining the structure of the Bar in the British
Empire).

26.

See 6 HOI.DSWORTH, supra note 25, at 432, 504-05.
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from a very early period, to become quite distinct English law has
retained this distinction throughout its history.27
.

For the most part, the profession in the British Empire was closed to
women; although a few Commonwealth jurisdictions such as New
Brunswick28 and Newfoundland29 in Canada, and Queensland30 (which
eliminated the bifurcated bar in 188 1),11 Tasmania,32 and Victoria11
Australia admitted women during the period.
B.

m

Other Countries of the Union
1. Scotland
In 1900, eighteen-year-old Margaret Hall requested permission to sit

for the first of two required examinations given by the Examiners of
Law-Agents.43 The organization refused, and Hall brought suit against the
Incorporated Society of Law-Agents in Scotland.35 The Society, surpris
ingly, volunteered that although "[a]ccording to inveterate usage and
custom in Scotland, that practice has in all departments of the law been
hitherto confined exclusively to men .... [It did not] conceive it to be
their interest or duty to maintain that women ought not to be enrolled as
law-agents."63
The Hall case, like the

Chauvin case across the Channel,37 turned on

the court's narrow interpretation of its power to act in what might be
considered a purely administrative matter. In the Chauvin case, the
French court refused to order the petitioner's admission on the grounds
that the law did not permit it to usurp the power of the relevant profes
sional association.38 In the Hall case, the court worried about its ability to
take such a drastic step absent a very clear indication from the legislature
that the admission of women as law-agents was contemplated when the
statute was drawn, even though the professional organization in question
did not oppose the admission of women.93 The organization did, however,

27.
28.

Id. at 432.
See Bedwell, supra note 25, at 218 (citing Act Enabling Women to Practice Law, 1906, 6
Edw.7, ch. S, §1 (Eng.)).
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See id. at 221 (citing 10 Ed w. 7, ch. 16 (Eng.)).
See id. at 223 (citing 5 Ed w. 7, no. 10 (Eng.)).
See 45 Viet., no. 5 (1881).
See Bedwell, supra note 25, at 224 (citing 4 Edw. 7, no. 14 (Eng.)).
See id. at 225 (citing 3 Edw. 7, no. 1837, § 2 (Eng.)).
Hall v. lncorporated Soc'y of Law-Agents in Scotland, 3 Fr. 1059 (1901).

35. See id. at 1059-60.
36. See id. at 1060.
37. See Christine Alice Corcos, Lawyers for Marianne: The
Nature of Discourse of the Entry
of French Women into the Legal Profession, 1894-192
6, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 435, 443-56 (1996).
38. See id.
39.

See Hall, 3 Fr. at 1062-64.
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"pass the buck" to the court by indicating some hesitation on the question
of the admissibility of women to practice law in Scotland:
The respondents do not feel called upon to oppose the prayer of the
petition. At the same time there may be a question whether women
have a legal right to be admitted to practise the profession of the law.
According to inveterate usage and custom in Scotland, that practice
has in all departments of the law been hitherto confined exclusively to
men.

40 .

Custom apart, however, "[t]he respondents ... do not conceive it to be
their interest or duty to maintain that women ought not to b e emolled as
law-agents. "41
Hall herself maintained that the law presently permitted the admis
sion of women, but even if the justices disagreed with her interpretati on,
the court still had the power to admit women as part of its traditional role
as regulator of the Scottish Bar.42 She based much of her case on the
wording of the Law-Agents Act of 187343 which held that "[f]rom and
after the passing of this Act no person shall be admitted as a law-agent in
Scotland except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. •'44 As Hall
pointed out, "no person" applied equally to men and women (unless the
court deemed for some reason not to recognize women as "persons" for
the purposes of the statute):
The Act neither expressly nor by implication excluded women. It
contained express notice of disability of minority, but none of dis
ability of sex. Its terms, strictly construed, included women. The sub
stantive used throughout was the general one, "person," which was
followed in accordance with English usage, even where the term ap
plied to both genders, by the masculine pronoun "he," "his" or "him."
Moreover,

previous to the

Brougham's Act of

passing

of

the Act

of

1873, Lord

1850 had been passed, which provided that after

1850 "in all Acts words importing the masculine gender shall be
deemed and taken to include females, unless the contrary as to gender
is expressly provided." The Act of 1873, construed in the light of
Lord Brougham's Act, included women. Lord Brougham's Act was
repealed and substantially re-enacted by the Interpretation Act, 1889,
section 1.45

Further, even if the statute was not capable of the reading Hall gave it,
she asserted that the court had, by custom and statute, the responsibility
of admitting all law-agents who met the appropriate standards:

40.

Id. at 1060.

41.

Id.

42.
43.

See id.
36 & 37 Viet., ch. 63

44.

Id.§ 2.

45.

Hall v. Incorporated Soc'y of Law-Agents in Scotland, 3 Fr. 1059, 1061 (1901) (citations

omitted).

(Eng.).
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It was competent for . the Court, and within its discretion, to admit
them. The Act of 1 873 created no new duty in the Court, and gave it
no new power with regard to this question. The duty of regulating the
admission of persons desiring to practise as law-agents had been ex
ercised by the Lord of Council and Session of their own motion ever
since they first admitted agents to practise before the Courts, and
simply as a matter of the administration of the Courts . . . . The Court
had, ever since they had first admitted agents to practise either in the
superior or inferior Courts, regulated their admission merely as one of
the incidents of the administration of the Courts of the country with
out any further power conferred upon them by the Legislature than
that of conducting the business of the Courts. . . . Seeing, then, that
the admission of persons as law-agents had always been treated by
the Lords of Session as one solely of administration in conducting the
business of the Courts, it could not be said to be incompetent for the
Court to admit women to practise law.46
By presenting the question of admission as one of simple administration,
requiring little judgment on the part of the court except a willingness to
"go along," Hall clearly hoped to diffuse the question on which the Soci
ety attached its refusal, that of technical inability to support admission,
even though the Society had never really been requested to do so. Hall ' s
initial petition to the Law-Agents had simply been for the right to sit "for
the first of the two examinations which intending law-agents" were re
quired to pasS.47
Turning to the question of custom, Hall pointed to historical in
stances of female advocates, including that of Lady Crawford, who ob
tained an acquittal for her client. 48

That the Court might not have been entirely averse to admitting
women to the practice of the law, even in early times, might be gath
ered from the fact that the Justiciary records contained a report of a
trial on 12th June 1563 in which the Lady Crawford appeared as ad
vocate in the High Court of Justiciary for the defence of a prisoner
who was ultimately acquitted.49
Note the addition of the phrase "even in early times," implying that in
fact women could point to a long tradition of admission, even though the
last documented instance was 350 years previous. The words suggested
to the court that even the culturally benighted legal profession of Renais
sance Scotland recognized the rights of able women in this regard.
Hall also answered other objections. Women were now able to earn
the appropriate education at the University; therefore they could not be

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 1061-62.
Id. at 1059.
Id. at 1062 (citing SCO'ITJSH L. �. Feb. 9, 1 90
1 , at 1 26).
Id.
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said to be acking in training.50 Other countries, including the United
States, admitted women to the bar, and even in Scotland women were

�

admitted to the practice of medicine and allowed to hold other positions
of authority.51
The Incorporated Society of Law-Agents responded by asserting
that women never had been law-agents, or held any other office bearing
on the practice of law.52 Further, even after the Act of 1873, legislation
regulating the practice of law always used the masculine form. "The
masculine gender was used throughout the whole of the Acts of Parlia
ment and Acts of Sederunt both prior and subsequent to the Law-Agents
Act of 1873, and there was nothing to suggest that Parliament or the
Court contemplated women acting as agents."53
In addressing the questions of interpretation posed by the Interpre

tation Act of 1 889,54 the Society cited two cases which clearly contra
vened the intent of the Act, Beresford Hope v. Sandhursr5 and Chorlton
v.

Lings,5() both of which assumed that Parliament could not have meant

what it said. In Beresford Hope, the presiding justice held that in order to
detennine whether use of the masculine gender also included the femi
nine,

as

required by the Interpretation Act, "'the history of the matter'

must be looked at. "51 In the suffrage case, Chorlton, "it was held that
'man' did not include ' woman,' notwithstanding the provision of Lord
Brougham ' s Act. "53 As the Bebb court would later suggest,59 the Law
Society suggested Parliament simply could not have meant what it said.
Thus, the court, which prided itself on its adherence to the letter of the
law, must necessarily find that Parliament's actual language meant the
opposite if to give effect to the literal meaning meant a change in the
status quo.
As far as custom was concerned, "[i]t did not appear that women at
any time prior to the present application sought to be admitted as
agents.''60 Further, citing to the case of Sophia Jex-Blake, who had re
quested admission to medical school,61 the Society quoted Lord Neaves,
who

SO.

See id.

St.

See id. at 1063.

S2.

See id.

at 1 062-63.

S3. Id. at 1064.
54. 52 & 53 Viet., ch. 63 (Eng.).
SS. 23 Q.B.D. 79 ( 1 889).
S6. 4L.R.-C.P. 374 ( 1 868).
1 064 (1901 )
57. Hall v. Incorporated Soc'y of Law-Agents in Scotland, 3 Fr. 1059,

�:: �bb v. Law Society, 24

T.L.R. 634 ( 1 9 1 3), aff d, 30

Parts IV.C.2, IV.C.3.
60.

61.

Hall, 3 Fr. at 1 064.
Jex-Blake v. University of Edinburgh, 10 M. 549 ( 1 873).

·

T.L.R. 179 (C.A. 1 9 1 3)-, See infra
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referred to the Roman law disabling women from acting as procura
tors, and further said that he never heard it s uggested that a woman
could be a member of the College of Justice. Reference to the Roman
law, and to the reason for women being disabled, was made in an ad
dress of Sir Robert Spottiswood, Lord President of the College of
Justice, to the members of the Faculty of Advocates, summer session,

1 633.62

Regardless of the outcome of Jex-Blake 's petition, women were ulti
mately admitted to medical school and to the practice of medicine. The
dicta in that case, citing to the practice of the seventeenth century, was
comparable to the arguments advanced in the

Bebb case concerning Sir

Edward Coke's pronouncements on the legal disabilities of women.
Further, the Society pointed out that "the respondents had commu
nicated with the societies corresponding to their own in England and
Ireland, and had been infonned that no woman had been admitted to
practise

as

a law-agent in these countries. No woman, it appeared, had

hitherto sought to be admitted."63 Yet, the Society concluded lamely,
"[t]he respondents . . . did not . . . conceive it to be their interest or duty
to maintain that women ought not to be admitted to practise the profes
sion of law.''64 The Society did not make it clear whether it considered
such a position legally questionable, or simply politically unwise.
While the judges of the Second Division agreed that, within the
confines of the Interpretation Act, "persons" included both males and
females,65 it disagreed that Parliament meant what it said.
[l]n the case of an ambiguous term, that meaning must be assigned to
it which is in accordance with inveterate usage. Accordingly we in
terpret the word as meaning "male persons," as no other has ever
been admitted as a law-agent. If females are now to be admitted as
66
law-agents, that must, in our view, be authorised by the Legislatu re .

What was "ambiguous" about the use of the word "person" is unclear,
given the very clear explanation in the Interpretation Act of 1 889,67 un
less the court was requiring that Parliament anticipate which of its uses
of the word might seem radical should it be interpreted to include
women, and thus use the phrase "male and female" instead of "person."
The other judges delivering the Hall opinion held that "before the Act of
1 873 women were not eligible to

be appointed law-agents, and that they

are not made eligible by that Act.''68 With such language a judicial inter-

Hall, 3 Fr. at 1064.
Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1065.
66. Id.

62.

63.

67.
68.

52 & 53 Viet. , ch. 63 (Eng.).

Hall v. Incorporated Soc'y of Law-Agents in Scotland , 3 Fr. 1059, 1065 (190 1).

1998)

PORTIA GOES TO PARLIAMENT

321

pretation of custom and usage overrode a statute intended to address the
shortcomings of that custom and usage.
Like �e Bebb judges after them, these judges felt it necessary to
protect Parliament from what they considered to be the unintended ef
fects of its legislation, due to the incautious use of the word "persons."
Nevertheless, by 1 907 women were admitted to study law at one S cottish
university, although they were not admitted to the profession until the
passage of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act.69 However, the num
ber of women admitted as solicitors did not reach thirty percent until
1979.70
2.

Ireland

Although it was still part of the Union in the early 1 900s, Ireland
offered women somewhat more latitude in participating in the legal pro
fession than did England. "Women were entitled to appear in court and
plead for themselves in cases in which they were concerned and some
Irish women became well known for this in the latter half of the nine
"11
teenth century . . .
One woman even argued her own divorce appeal
before the House o f Lords.12 Meanwhile, the Irish legal profession
.

watched and waited.
Irish women had clearly been waiting for the opportunity to qualify
for the bar.73 In January 1 920 the King 's Inns admitted the first two
women in Ireland to the study of law. One, Frances Kyle, distinguished
,

herself by winning the leading scholarly prize for Irish law students then
available.1• Both she and her colleague were admitted to the bar in No
vember of 192 1 ,n six months before the first Englishwoman was admit
ted in England.16 Kyle was also the first woman admitted to the bar of
Northern lreland.'1 By 1 920 a woman was a magistrate in Northern Ire
land and by 1923 the Irish legal profession had welcomed its first female
solicitor.78 In 1 92 1 an Irish woman sat on a Dublin jury.79 Generally

69.

Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71,

§1

(Eng.); see also Alan

A. Paterson, The Legal Profession in Scotland: An Endangered Species or a Problem Case For Market
Theory, in 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIEIY 76, 93 (Richard
70.
71.

72.

L.

Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988).

Paterson, supra note 69, at 1 13 tbl.3.12.

DAIRE HOGAN, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN IRELAND,

1 789-1 922, at 147 ( 1986).

Id.

73. Hogan speculates that they participated actively but without recognition for some decades
before admission. Id. This may well be true since Irish women quickly qualified for legal study and
were admitted before English women, thus suggesting that they, like their English sisters, were not only
"in the pipeline" but psychologically ready for admission.
74.

75.
76.
77.

78.

Id.
Id.
See infra note 43 1 and accompanying text.

HOGAN, supra note 7 1 , at 1 47.

Studies in the history of the Irish legal profession

are

.
still somewhat sparse. 1be ma.JOr

bibliography on Irish law is PAUL O'HIGGINS, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATIJRE
is a general

RF.LATING TO IRISH LAw ( 1966), with subsequent supplementation; HooAN, supra note 7 1 ,

[Vol.
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speaking, the situation of women barristers and solicitors in Ireland
seems to parallel that of women lawyers in other countries. Women tend
to make less money than men in the same position and with the same
number of years of experience,80 tend to cluster in particular areas of
work,81 and suffer the same kinds of discrimination, although it seems to
occur less frequently in Ireland than in other countries.
As to experience and perception of bias and sexist attitudes, whether
from solicitors, clients, judges or colleagues, there was some, but lit
tle, evidence of bias from all sources . Colleague bias was the most
frequently mentioned, and it was particularly remarked that some
older male barristers appear to have problems dealing with a female

barrister. Also, a woman's attire might be commented on in a way
which that of a man would not. There seems, however, to be little
scope for individuality of dress. With the statutory exception of cer

tain family law proceedings . . . the wearing of a wig and gown is
obligatory in court. Indeed, this dress regime seems emblematic of an

atmosphere in which there is great pressure to conform and censure of
those who do not.82

III. SIMil...ARITIES WITH THE PROFESSION IN OTHER COUN1RIES

In general, women's admission to the bars of most European and

Commonwealth countries took place between the 1 870s and the 1 920s.
Thus, the English movement to admit women was part of a multinational
wave of discontent with the exclusion of women from political equality
with men that also included demands for suffrage rights, child custody
rights, property rights, and employment rights.83 The "persons" cases,84 in
which British women repeatedly attempted to expand their political and
civil rights, form a unified attack on male privilege and power.

account Generally, the collection BREHONS, SERJEANTS AND ATIORNEYS (Daire Hogan & W.N.
Osborough eds., 1991), contains nothing for the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, but W.N.
Osborough, 1'he Regulation of the Admission of Attorneys and Solicitors in Ireland, 1600-1866, in
BREHONS, SERJEANl'S AND ATTORNEYS, supra, at 101, is of some interest A good collection for
general Irish legal history is THE COMMON LAW TRADmoN:

EssAYS IN IRISH

U!GAL

HlsToRY (J.F.

McEldowney & Paul O' Higgins eds., 1990), which has a useful bibliography beginning at page 231.
79.

HOGAN, supra note 7 1 , at

80.

On women in the Irish legal profession,

147.

see

Alpha Connelly & Betty Hilliard, 1'he Legal

Professwn, in GENDER AND TIIE LAW IN IRELAND 212, 2 1 6-17 (Alpha Connelly ed., 1993).
8 1 . See id. at 217.
82. Id. at 219.
83.

The literature on each of these movements grows yearly. On the women's movement and the

development of the recognition of women's rights in the U.S.,

see,

for example, SARA M. EvANS, BORN

FOR UBF.RTY: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA ( 1989). On custody rights,

see

PHvu.Js CHEsLER,

MOIHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATILE FOR Cnn..DREN & CuSTODY (1986). On equal employment,
A1J:RE.D W. BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW:

THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY (1 993).
84.

See SACHS & WIT.SON, supra note 3, at 22-35.

see
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Other Countries of the Commonwealth
1.

Canada

The efforts to admit women to the Ontario Bar paralleled, to some
extent, the battle in England. Clara Brett Martin requested admission to
the BencherS,85 a group of senior attorneys appointed by Ontario' s "gate
keeper" law society to enforce its regulations.86 In its decision of June 30,

1 89 1 , the Convocation of Benchers decided that it could not admit Miss
Martin, based on its reading of applicable regulations.87 The govern
ment's response was swift. The Prime Minister, Sir Oliver Mowat, asked
the Ontario legislature to permit the Law Society of Upper Canada to
admit womenaa as solicitors by affirmative language in an appropriate
statute." Martin duly applied and was eventually called to the bar, but not
without further obstacles.90 Her admission finally required two separate
acts of the legislature,91 which finally admitted her as both a solicitor and
barrister on February 2, 1 897, after the Ontario legislature passed further
legislation enabling women to be barristers.92
An observer of the contemporary scene wrote:
If I were to sum up in a sentence the results of the admissions of
women to the practice of law from my experience and inquiry, I
would say that it has done some good, and no harm, while all prophe
cies of ill results have been falsified; that its effects on the profession
and practice of law have been negligible, and that it is now regarded
with indifference and as the normal and natural thing by Bench, Bar,
93
and the community at large.

85.

William Renwick

Riddell, Women as Practitioners of law,

200, 201 (1918). On Martin's battle for admission,

see

For Others of My Sex"; Clara Breu Martin's Career

1 8 J. COMP. LEG. & INT'L LAW

Constance B. Backhouse, "To Open the Way

as

Canada's First Woman Lawyer, 1 CAN. J.

WOMEN & L. I (1985), and on Canadian women lawyers of the early and mid-twentieth century,

Mary Kinnear, "That There Woman LAwyer" : Women Lawyers in Manitoba 1915-1970,

see

5 CAN. J.

WOMEN & L. 41 1 (1992).
86. On the Law Society of Upper Canada and the Benchers, see Wll.LIAM RENwlCK RIDDELL,
THE LEGAL PROFFSSIO N IN UPPER CANADA IN ITS EARLY PERIODS 133-42 ( 1 9 1 6). Riddell, who
documented Martin's fight for admission elsewhere does not mention it in this overview.
87.

Riddell, supra note 85, at 201 .
. .
to
The Law Society may in its discretion make rules providing for the admiSSJon of women
-02.
201
at
85,
note
supra
practice as solicitors. 55 Vic., ch. 32 ( 1 892) (Eng.). See also Riddell,
88.

89.
90.

91 .

Riddell, supra note 85, at 202.
Id. at 202 n.3.
7
See JOHN HAGAN & FIONA KAY, GENDER IN PRACTICE: A STIJDY OF LAWYERS' LIVES

(1995).
92.

93 .

Riddell, supra note 85, at 202.
Id. at 2()1).
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Certainly English lawyers would have examined the Ontario statute. If
women could be admitted in a part of the Commonwealth, why not in the
Mother Country herself?94

2. Australia
Various territories of Australia a�mitted women to the legal profes
sion long before their mother country did.95 G.F. Greig, identified by the

Commonwealth Law Review as "the first woman lawyer to practise in the
Commonwealth,"96 delivered cogent views on the difficulties of law
practice for women. In her opinion, women ' s fuller participation in all
occupations, not just in law, contributed to public morality.91 "No sign yet
appears of any approaching catastrophe, such as the wise men have pre
dicted, and still predict.''9·8 A woman ' s ability to succeed in law simply
repeats her ability to succeed in other professions, once given the chance.
"The women who first determined to enter commercial life were those
who were forced to immediately do something remunerative . . . and then
each year found a new inroad made into higher and still higher posi
tions.'.w Once they had proven themselves in business, they attacked the
centers of learning and made their names in science and medicine.100
Yet law remained closed to Australian women far longer than it
should have. "[T]o many, the main question is, are women capable of
performing legal work? Well, why not? Personally I have never heard
one rational reason against it, although I have listened to heaps of twad
dle."101 As Greig points out, "[f]or many years now we have been accus
tomed to see women figuring as exhibitioners and in the first class hon
our lists of our University, and the Law school is not more difficult than
any other."102 Greig pointed out the deficiencies of the male habit of ar-

94. I have not been able to ascertain whether any female solicitor or barrister, having been
admitted in a constituent country of the Commonwealth, made a request to be admitted to the Bar in
England. The result would certainly have been interesting, though probably negative.
95. David Weisbrot, The Australian Legal Profession: From Provincial Family Finns to
Multinationals, in 1 LAWYERS IN SocmrY, supra note 69, at 244, 270-71 (giving a short history of the
admission of women and their subsequent success in the profession).
Victoria removed the legal barrier in 1903, followed by Tasmania (1904) , Queensland
(1905), South Australia ( 1 9 1 1), New South Wales ( 1 9 1 8), and Western Australia ( 1 923).

In New South Wales, the first woman was admitted to practice in 192 1 (she had been the
first woman law graduate ( 1 902); in Victoria, the first woman was admitted in 1923 (she
was appointed Victoria's first and only woman Queen's Counsel in I 965) . . . .

Id. at270.
96.

See Greig, supra note 16, at 146.

97.

Id.

98.

Id.

99.

Id. at 146-47.

ICKl.

Id. at 147 .

101.

Id. at 149.

102.

Id.
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guing that women never had been lawyers, therefore were incapable of
perfonning adequately in that profession.
I notice that most men, when it comes to an argument as to what
women could or could not do, generally argue "You have not, ergo
you cannot." . . . They will rarely make allowance for the fact that
men for generations have been trained to do what women are doing
now for the first time . . . . Opportunity is everything with we medi
ocrities . . . . [A]ny man or woman of average ability, given the op

portunity to thoroughly master any business, profession, or trade that
he or she has some natural taste for, and he or she will become a ca
pable mediocrity worthy of all respect. '°3

Given the same abilities and the same training, women could, in
Greig's opinion, be the equals of men in any branch of the law, not just
those with which some felt women had a natural affinity. Barristers had
the more consistently interesting practices,104 but the profession of so
licitors offered steady work, and though some of it was tedious, some
was rewarding and challenging, including the preparation of briefs for a
barrister. 105 Ultimately, education could not take the place of experience
and temperament.
The most successful solicitor, then, is not always the most erudite, he
is the one who has a good working knowledge of the law that is daily
applicable and knows exactly where to find anything else that is
likely to crop up. In a word, he requires exactly the same qualities
which go to m ake the successful business man in any other path of
commercial life. And as women have succeeded in other businesses,
06
why not in thisi

However, by the 1 980s, women were still underrepresented in the profes
sion.'°1 As in other countries they were "bunched" in certain areas of
practice, primarily those concerned with family law, except for estate
planning.108

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 150-51.
Id. at 151-52.
Id. at 152-53.
Id. at 154.
Weisbrot, supra note

95, at 271. Weisbrot states:

In New South Wales in 1984, women constituted only 3 .9 percent of partners in

8

26.5 percent of employed
48.9 percent of male solicitors in private practice
were partners and only 27.4 percent were employed, only 14.2 percent of women were
partners and fully 70.8 percent were employed. According to figures supplied by the
Women Lawyers Association of New South Wales, only about 78 of the 1,100 active
barristers in that state in 1985 were women.
solicitors' finns and

percent of sole practitioners but

solicitors. Stated another way, while

Id.

108.

Id.
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New z.ealand

Unlike other member states of the Commonwealth, New Zealand
never prohibited women from practicing law ,'00 and the first woman to set
up practice as an attorney in New Zealand was Ellen Melville in 1 909.1 10
However, women felt discouraged from entering the profession, primar
ily because of the attitude of male lawyers. A 1 98 1 study by the Auck
land District Law Society found that women faced discrimination based
on assumptions about their family responsibilities and interest in fur
thering their careers! 1 1

4.

South Africa

While the first attempt to admit a woman failed in 1 9 1 2,112 the Cape
Supreme Court determined that the word "person" did in fact include
women, to the satisfaction of the plaintiff, Madeline Wookey. 1 13 A disap
pointed Cape Law Society obtained a reversal of that court's decision in
Incorporated Law Society v. Wookey, which contains language reminis
cent of that in the Bebb decision.
The second (of three) judge(s) . . . said that ordinarily the term "per
son" included women as well as men, but was often used to refer to
one sex only. Looking at the statute in the context in which it was
passed, it seemed inconceivable to him that if the Legislature had in
tended to introduce so great a change and to throw open the doors of
the profession to women, it would not have done so in clear and un
ambiguous language, instead of leaving it as an inference to be drawn
from the use of the word "person'', which might or might not include
women as well as men}14
B.

France
Generally speaking, the more virulent argument over the admission

of women to the French legal profession took place after, not before ad
mission.115 While some debate took place between 1888 (the date of pub
6
lication of an influential book on the subjectY 1 and the denial of admis
sion to Jeanne Chauvin in 1 897, that event shocked the incoming gov
ernment to the point that it made the passage of enabling legislation in

109. Georgina Murray, New Z.ealand Lawyers: From Colonial GPs to the Servants of Capital, in 1
LAWYERS IN SOCIETY, supra note 69, at 318, 329.
1 10.
111.

Id.
Id. at 329-30.

A

1 1 2. See S CHS & WILSON, supra note 3, at 36.
1 1 3 . Id.
1 1 4. ld. at37.
115
See Corcos, supra note 37, at 437 (regarding the admission of women to the French Bar).
1 1 . Loms FRANK,
PoINT DE YUE DE LA SOCIOLOOIE (1 898). This book
went mto �t least two ed1nons, the second appearing in 1 898. See
also infra notes 141 -42 and
accompanymg text.
·

�
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1 11

After the admission of women, the profession engaged
m spmted debate, but the possibility of expelling women once
they were
'
admitted, was very slight.
.

In England, the debate began at about the same period, but because
of unified opposition in the profession as well as failure in the courts and

in Parliament, women waited an additional twenty years for the right to
practice law. Without the intervention of wartime necessities, it is likely
that opposition to the notion of female solicitors and barristers would
have continued for another ten or twenty years.
Like their French sisters, English female solicitors made very little
initial impact.
The subsequent history of women as solicitors is rather an anti

climax; the fear of competition proved quite unfounded. The first
woman solicitor was admitted in

1 922 and the event went unnoticed.

Since then the numbers admitted each year have risen steadily but

very slowly. Even now fewer than forty women are admitted each

year. In

1 957 there were 560 women on the roll, of whom 337 held

practising certificates. The solicitors ' profession does not appear to

attract women very much. Among practising solicitors the ratio of
women to men is roughly one in fifty. A large number of these have
family links with the profession, which no doubt exercised some in

fluence upon their choice of career. At the Bar the ratio of women to

men is nearer one in twenty-five, but this may be deceptive. It is

likely that many of them have only been recently called to the Bar,

and the proportion who become established is practice is probably
1
much smaller. 18

Similarly, when describing the French Bar in a short article, one
commentator of the late twenties failed to note the presence of any
women in the profession, demonstrating that women lawyers simply had
not made much of an impression at the time.
The Bar council still nails to the cross any man who makes the slight
est attempt at advertising . . . . No lawyer may bring an action for the
payment of a fee unless he obtains the specific authorization of the

Bar Council. . . . Lawyers, when they appear in Court, wear a black

gown somewhat similar to, but more formal than that adopted by the
American bench. . . . They represent a professional elite of educated

gentlemen who have high ideals and who live up to them. To be an

avocat a la Cour d ' Appel de Paris or of the most remote provincial

center is to stand forth among one 's fellows. . . . The French lawyer

See Corcos, supra note 37, at 443-44.
hundred,
BIRKS, supra note 18, at 277-78 (reporting that the number of women lawyers, per
number
the
with
ratios
these
g
comparin
then
in the U.S. as 2.48 in 1 95 1 and in England as 2.1 in 1957;
6)).
in
of women in the English medical profession ( 1

1 1 7.

1 1 8.
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may be said to have taken Holy Orders. His sacerdotal office is as in
divisible as that of any priest of the Gospel . 1 19
Even though they obtained the same education and fulfilled the same
requirements as men, French women lawyers were still constrained to
some extent by tradition or by other existing legal handicaps. An Ameri
can observer of the time noted that
[t]he woman lawyer who is married, cannot practice law without the
consent of her husband; and no woman is permitted to practice in the
Court of Cassation (Court of Appeals). Should a woman lawyer have
a case that would necessitate an appeal to the higher court, she is
obliged to have a man bring the appeal for her. Queer, isn' t it, the
handicaps men place on women, while so often admitting their effi
ciency? In France, the country which writes in great letters of stone,
"Equality, Fraternity, Liberty," over the gates of its capitol, we have
men, when it comes to admitting the equality of the woman, only
half-practising that which is their boast, and, like little Jack Homers,
120
thinking they are great boys at that.
English legal journals, however, followed the progress of French women

lawyers with satisfaction and interest. As early as 1 9 1 5 the Solicitors'
Journal and Weekly Reporter noted the admission of the twenty-ninth
female member of the profession.121 They chronicled the success of
Jeanne Rospars, the first woman to be accepted to the Conference des

Avocats, 122 and observed that she might well become the batonnier (head)
of the Paris Bar.123 The Law Times ridiculed the arguments of the oppo
nents of female participation in the French legal profession. "They had
discovered this formula, in the form of juridic axioms, which to-day

makes one smile; for instance, Robe sur robe ne vaut. The profession of

avocat was considered virile."124 It also reported on the question of dress
for avocates.
It was curious to see how she (Mme Petit, the first woman to be ad
mitted to the French bar) bore her robe in the manner of one who had
not expected to become an avocate to posses's a robe. She justified
women wearing the gown: "Since the avocats dress themselves as
women, the women should be allowed to dress themselves as avo
cats. "

125

120.

Pierre Crabites, The French Bar From Within, 1 4 A.B.A. J. 369, 371 (1928).
Macy M. Lilly, The French Women Lawyers, 21 CASE & COM. 43 1 , 431 ( 1 9 1 4).

121.

Current Topics: The Admission of Women to the French Bar, 60 Souc. J. &

1 19.

WKLY. REP. 35,

35-36 (1915).
1 22.
123.

Occasional Notes, 1 54 LAWT!MEs 123, 124 ( 1922).

See also id. (stating that Jeanne Rospars might as well be made blitonnier); The Legal
Profession in France, 1 4 LAW NOTES 149, 149 (1910) (stating that the presiding officer is known as the
Batonnier, which in Paris is a position of great dignity, held by one of
the conceded leaders of the bar).
124. Occasional Notes, supra note 122, at 1 24.
125. Id.
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The American legal journal the Green Bag noted with enthusiasm
the professional

debut of Helene Miropolosky, which, it felt, added some

eclat to the female half of the profession.
[IJt is said that she made a most pleasing appearance. She was attired

in a simple black gown relieved by the conventional white barrister's
bib. Her costume was further accentuated by the black toque which

crowned her jet black hair. She appeared to every one an irresistible
legal belle . . . . If the ladies of the United States would more generally
emulate the e xample of the charming Mlle. Miropolosky, the beauty

of woman would vie with the dignity of man in raising the general
126
s:
tone o f the pro1ess10n.
•

However, ne ither English nor U.S . legal journals were unanimous in
their support of the avocates, and some watched their progress with
amused contempt. The

Green Bag ' s acclaim of Miropolosky 's admission

to the Paris Bar occasioned this snippy response from A.H. Robbins in
the Central Law Journal:
While every lover of the fair sex, and they are legion, wish for them

the highest possible places in our civilization, we do not think the

editor of the Green Bag has in any degree helped them in that direc
tion when he encourages them to "emulate the example of the

charming Mlle. Miropolosky." Whether women should forsake, under
no circumstances, the ideals of home life, might be a debatable ques

tion. Surely many exigencies of her existence in these modem days
often compel a woman to seek her living in gainful occupations, but
neither the w oman herself nor the world generally regards the situa

tion as in any way elevating her. It is always a situation that calls for
some apology. And of all the occupations usually performed by men

which tend in some degree to embarrass a woman and detract greatly
from her delightfully retiring and maidenly qualities, that of the legal
7
profession probably heads the list.12

For Robbins, both woman's innate lack of ability to "think like a lawyer"
and her (sex-linked) weaknesses combined to demonstrate her incapacity
to perform adequately as an advocate:
Woman 's failure in this profession has been notorious and is due to

several reasons. First, a woman 's emotional temperament utterly u� 
fits her for unprejudicial analytical investigation; second, her sensi

tive disposition recoils and is shocked by the necessary rud�n� ss a_n d
bitterness of contesting litigants; thirdly, her natural femmme m
stincts often e mbarrass her in her relations with other members of the

profession and with witnesses; fourthly, the peculiar and fre�uent
.
physical incapacity of women jeopardize their success m the tnal of

126.
127·

The Call to Arms, 21 GREEN BAG 597, 597 ( 1 909) .
3�-9g ( l909)
A.H.R[obbins], Jetsam and Flotsam: Women and the Law, 69 CENT. L.J. 39?,
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cases by makin them unfit to meet the demands of the situation con
f
fronting them.12

The appeal to scientific bases to support his objection reveals itself in the
writer's dispassionate references to female emotionalism and sensitivity
and to her "peculiar and frequent physical incapacity." Objectionable
traits are listed and classified as if they are the result of an objective
study of the issue. The reference to menstruation lifts the argument above
the accusation that Robbins is simply prejudiced against women lawyers:
undeniably, human females undergo monthly biological changes for
thirty to forty years of their lives.129
Robbins also rejects the "moral uplift" argument by asserting that
women are superior to men by virtue of their gentler natures. If they at
tempt to compete with men at a professional level, they lose that superi
ority. They distract their male opponents through feminine wiles or they
force men to abandon their chivalrous instincts in order to do their duty.
In either case, women cause a dislocation of the system.
ff]o lawyers generally it is an occasion for much embarrassment to
have to meet a lady as opposing counsel, and often, either of two
things must result, to-wit, either the interests of their clients must suf

fer by reason of their unwillingness to take advantage of their fair op
ponent's mistakes, or they must crush their natural feelings and atti

tude toward the weaker sex and treat her as any other opponent to a
point which they must consider rude toward a woman, although not
so as between man and man. . . . The argument that woman's entrance

would elevate the moral tone of the profession may, for the sake of
the argument, be admitted, but such result could not possibly be
reached without detracting to a large extent from the high standing
women already enjoy. To a gentleman, a lady is an object, if not of
worship, at least of the highest possible e steem. . . . For her to be
come, not merely a competitor as in some lines of business, but his

active antagonist as she must do when she assumes the role of a bar

rister, is either to take advantage of her antagonist or to abdicate her
throne. Either alternative degrades a woman in the estimation of the
man she thus unfairly opposes.130

128. Id. at 398.
129. One Canadian law school dean blatantly stated his belief that women students were at a
biological disadvantage. According to one law student
[T]he old Dean really had a lot of reservations about women going into Law. He called
me in for a little chat and explained that although he knew that I was quite cJever enough
to do all these things it really wasn't suitable. I was baffled. He said, very embarrassed,
"[W]ell, some times of the month you just might not be up to it."
Kinnear, supra note 85, at 425. Male students also made clear their finn conviction that women pursued
law degrees to get a husband. "One woman, married and a little older, perplexed the men. 'A couple of
fellows couldn't figure out what I was doing there. One of them said to me (he was not a very smart
fellow), "You've already got a husband. What are you doing here?""' Id.
130. R[obbins], supra note 1 27, at 398.
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tri�ializing women' s desire to obtain civic
and legal equality,
Robbms falls to address their very real concerns.
He evokes the most
enduring of images of confl ict between male and fema
le and one of the
m�st frightening for men.1 31 He suggests that the worn
in competition
eate� s not only his ability to remain true to his profes
�1th the �an

sion (she is a d1stract1on) but to his natural code of honor (she
tries his
patience and his virtue) .132 A real lady could not possibly wish
to "abdi
cate her throne," even throug h most women have sat on thrones through
the ages only because of a particular relationship with men (marriage
to a
male sovereign) and not because of inheritance, and a real lady,
he
clucks, would not want to put a male adversary at the huge disadvantage
of competing with her unchivalrously in order to win a case. Further,
notice that Robbins sounds the familiar theme that women do not under
stand the rules of competition. They would necessarily play .the game
unfairly, as "active antagonists," while men are precluded by tradition
and socialization from fighting back as they would with a male opponent.
Too many accommodations would have to be made to allow a woman to
compete at all in the legal area, much less to compete "fairly."

�

�

[H]er success must necessarily be relatively small as she is not in
mind or body predisposed to the kind of work, mental and physical,

131.

See FARRELL, supra note 15 (casting the entire male-female relationship in terms of a

continuing battle based on misunderstandings and conflicting assumptions about male and female
roles). For Farrell, the culture tends to encourage and value women. For Joan Shapiro, another popular
commentator, the opposite is true.
In our culture, boys . . . learn a sense of entitlement. After all, men are the important
people in the world. . . . Because of this status, they learn that they are important. All we
have to do is look around us, and especially on 1V and in newspapers and magazines, to
know that the most "important" people are men. Boys may say that they want to be a
fireman or a policeman when they grow up. They also say that they want to be President
of the United States. They very often learn that they should get the things that they want,
and very often from women. We as women need to recognize our participation in this as
we try to understand why men react to us in the ways that they do. We are, like it or not, a
part of the culture that elevates men and devalues women. We absorb our cultural roles as

well as do men. After all, we are the ones who lead men to believe that shirts appear, as if
by magic, cleaned, pressed, and in their drawers! By living up to our role as helpers,

nurturers, as the ones who meet men's ordinary daily needs, we cripple them in a sense.
We handle them so quickly they don't even know they have these needs.
JOAN SHAPIRO, MEN: A TRANSLATION FOR WOMF.N 54 (1 992). If women relinquish this supportive
role in order to "compete" with men in the arena in which they

are

the traditional leaders, men will

naturally feel confused and betrayed.

132.

This attitude is painfully obvious throughout all of the arts. In particular, the familiar plot of

the woman attempting to compete with a man is depicted in movies (from Susan Hayward as an oil
prospector in TuLsA (Eagle-Lion 1 949) to Jane Fonda in COMES A HORSEMAN (MGM/UA Home
Video 1997)), in fiction (Scarlett O'Hara as a mill owner in MARGARET MITcHElL, GoNE WI111 TIIE

WIND (1936)), and in ballet (the cowgirl who ropes as well as a man in Agnes DeMille's ballet RODEO

(1950) can't get a date for Saturday night (see Maggie Hall, "Rodeo" Hobbled by Sticking to Safe, Old
Trail, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 30, 1997, at 4)). That women compete unfairly, usually by using sex as a
weapon, is also a common message. The Demi Moore character in DISCLOSURE (Warner Bros. 1994)

harrasses poor innocent employee Michael Douglas, and Carolyn Pohlhemus sleeps her way to the top
PRF.sUMED INNOCENT (Mirage Productions 1990), but she gets murdered for it. Michael Douglas

in

catches hell again from a woman for sexual misconduct in FATAL ATIRAcnON (Paramount 1987)
wherein the rabbit dies once more.
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which a successful lawyer is often called upon to endure.
. We
have no intention by our position in this article to indicate any oppo
sition to the right of women to earn a livelihood whenever it becomes
necessary in any business to which she may be physically and men
tally equal and where she does not become a direct personal antago
nist to one of the opposite sex. Our only purpose is to hold out to her
a fair warning that we see no possibility of her permanent success as
an active practitioner of the law.133
These arguments are remarkably similar to those advanced by French
opponents of women's admission.134
One contemporary commentator concluded that French women
lawyers of the period took the initiative to defend women and children
charged with crimes directly traceable to the effects of poverty and pow
erlessness. m

The woman lawyer is everywhere in the criminal courts of Paris. She
is a charming figure as she floats smilingly through the halls and cor
ridors of the Assises of the Palais de Justice; and truly is she an angel
of mercy to the women and children brought to these courts charged
with crime. She pleads for them without hope of remuneration, and
rarely, if ever, receives a fee for her services. The men lawyers voted
this field of the law entirely to her, and most enthusiastically does she
fill it. With my American commercialism, I could not help speculat
ing as to whether or not the men would have so gallantly accorded
this distinctive place in the law courts to the women had there been
any money in this particular field. . . . This thought of helping women
and children seemed to have been in the minds of all these French
women lawyers, unorganized as they were; for with one accord, al
most in one voice, they flung at me the question, "What are you
women lawyers of the United States, with all your liberty, doing for
the women and children of the United States, for," said they, "You
lead, we follow."136

133. R[obbins], supra note 127, at 398. Miropolosky herself seems to have been quite aware of
r
her image. An American woman lawyer of the period noted
"When I told her I had seen notices of he
in the American papers, she replied; with an alluring
smile �d the most delightful accent, 'Have I, then.
so bad a reputation?"' Lilly, supra note 120,
at 432.
134. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 472; FERNAND CORCOS LES AVOCATES 163 ( 1926).
,
135.

Jeanne Chauvin, the woman whose attempt to be admitted to the Paris Bar in 1 897 ultimately

in a
as an attorney
cnnunal action. See Occasional Notes, supra
note 1 22.
136. Lilly, supra note 120, at 431 . However
period
some Canadian women attorneys of the
objected to their �tomatic inclusion in the ranks
that I
and
"
dem
of family lawyers. I did have to make a
not do all the Fa
mlly Work. I liked it no more than the
y the
suall
U
clear.
men did and had to make that
women lawyers were landed with
all the Family Work and not much else." Kinnear, supra note 85, at
.
429 (quollllg an unnamed Canadian
female attorney).

fo� the i.ssue of female participation in the legal profession, made her debut
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C. Belgium
In 1 882. Marie Popelin requested admission to the B russels Bar.'37

As could be expected the Council of Discipline refused to allow her to
.
take the required oath, and the Cour d' Appel and then the Cour de Cas
sation upheld this decision. The court of appeals expressed itself in
words that would be echoed in the debate over the admission of women
to the English and French Bars and in the U. S. Supreme Court decision
Muller v. Oregon.'38
Seeing that the special nature of woman, the feebleness of her con
stitution . the modesty inherent to her sex. the protection which is nec
essary to her , her peculiar mission to humanity, the demands and the
obligations of maternity, the training that she owes to her children,
the control of the household and the domestic hearth entrusted to her
efforts, place her in conditions little reconcilable with the duties of

the profession of an advocate, and give her neither the necessary lei
sure, strength, nor fitness for the strifes and labours of the Bar.139

The Cour de Cassation reiterated this view. "Considering that under the
old system c onformably with the Roman law the profession of an advo
cate was considered as a masculine office. that the restraint imposed by
good manners on the woman does not permit her to fulfil. .. .40
While Popelin failed in her attempt, she inspired other women, par
ticularly in France, and one Belgian attorney was moved to write an im
passioned defense of the woman• s right to practice law. Louis Frank's La.
Femme-Avocat au Point de Vue de la Sociologie14' went into several edi
tions and was studied by both sides in the debate over female admission,
most particularly in the Chauvin case.'42 Belgium finally admitted women
to the bar in 1 922.'43
IV. THE CONTROVERSY OVER PROPOSED LEGISLATION
With regard to the admission of women to the English Bar during
the period, male solicitors and barristers exhibited a range of attitudes. '44
Some believed that the profession in general should by right be opened to
women, either because they had already proven themselves the intellec
tual equals of men or because such proof was irrelevant to the question.
137. Edward S. Cox-Sinclair, The Bar in Belgium, 24 LAW MAG. & REV. 17 (1909).
138. 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (holding that the state had an interest in regulating women's
working conditions because of their physical inferiority).
139. Cox-SincJair, supra note 137, at 263 (citing a Dec. 12, 1888, decision of the Cour d'Appel).
140. Id. at 264. (citing a Nov. 1 1, 1889, decision of the Cour de Cassation).
141. FRANK, supra note 1 16.
142. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 443 n.51 and accompanying text
143. See Luc Huyse, Legal Experts in Belgium, in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY, supra note 69, at 225,
231. By contrast, Italy admitted its first woman lawyer, Lidia Poet, on August 9, 1 883, after passage of
the General University Act of October 8, 1 876. See Vittorio Olgiati & Valerio Pocar, The Italian Legal
Profession: An Institutional Dilemma, in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIE'IY, supra note 69, at 336, 338.
144. See BIRKS, supra note 18, at 276-77.
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Some held that women should be admitted, but directed to
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certain roles

or encouraged to take up only certain types of law. And some were ada
mantly opposed to the entrance of women into the profession at all be
cause they thought that women were intellectually, physically, socially
and emotionally ill-suited to the practice of law.

In addition, because the profession was then, as it is now, somewhat
overcrowded, some male solicitors feared that the admission of females
to their ranks would make earning a living an even more precarious
proposition.145 The admission of women to the legal profession was a
contentious issue primarily because it meant that women were requesting
admission to the very profession that created, interpreted and adminis
tered society' s official rules.
For many Englishmen the attitude toward the entrance of women
into the profession was as recounted in a story of the period.
Mayor Baker (a contemporary Mayor of Cleveland, OH), lecturing at
the law school, told a little story of an Englishman who was asked by
an American, why the brass railings in the galleries of the House of
Lords were not removed, as they obstruct the view of the Speaker.
Horrified, the Englishman gazed at the American for a moment and
146
then answered: "Why, they have always been there."

"Because it has always been so

,,

is an attitude quite understandable

of the English lawyer, whose experience i s primarily with the common
law and with written law as expressed by the legislative branch. Lacking
a written constitution for guidance, the English lawyer relies on the strict
interpretation of Parliament's word as expressed by particular statutes, on
the rules of interpretation set forth in the Interpretation Act, and on the
presumed reluctance of judges to make law by inferring Parliamentary
intent. At least, such is the common explanation of the workings of English law.
·

In the case of the admission of women to the twin English legal

professions of solicitor and barrister, we have a prime example of the
ability of English judges to make law without seeming to do so, and a
reflection of the controversies that surround any legal issue consigned to
statutory rather than constitutional regulation. The courts ' insistence on
both positive and unambiguous expression by Parliament of the intent to
enable women to join the profession led to much more acrimonious de
bate and many more pieces of legislation than would have been the result

had the courts been willing to find, for example, that legislation of

145. "One correspondent wrote to the Solicitors' Journal complaining that 'a crowd of women arc
to be loose further to cut up the profession'; another thought
the
that such a proposal was 'sacrificing
profession on the present-day altar of 'sentimentality gone mad'." Id. 276.
at
146. Women in the Law, supra note 15, at 133.

I�
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18771•1 and 1 �88148 ad�ssed the question of women's participation in the

legal profession. C�rtaJnly th�y could have done so; just as certainly,
English courts previously had interpreted statutes or common law to find
other rights when they chose.

In addition, in interpreting the act in ques

tion to exclude women, the courts arguably may have failed to give
proper effect to the Interpretatio n Act of

1889,149 as well.

The desire to control female behavior through proscription (women
shall not be lawyers) and through prescription (women shall be unpaid
caregivers and h elpmeets to male attorneys) was part of the larger wave
during that period of legislation intended to force women into particular
avenues o f activity, although it did not carry forward unquestioned. As
early as

1 844, Lord Brougham demanded to know on the floor of the

House of Lords why such protectionist and paternal legislation was nec
essary. "Cannot a woman make a bargain? Cannot a woman look after
her own interests? Is not a woman capable of understanding those inter
ests, of saying whether or not she has stamina and strength to work?"150
The writer Barbara Leigh Smith commented ten years later that while
men's social and economic progress could be measured by the lessening
of laws restricting their activities, the same could not be said for women,
who
more than other members of the community, suffer from over legisla

tion. A woman of twenty-one becomes an independent human crea
ture, capable of holding and administering property to any amount;
or, if she can earn money, she may appropriate her earnings freely to
any purpose she thinks good. Her father has no power over her or her

property. But if she unites herself to a man, the law immediately steps
in, and she finds herself legislated for, and her condition of life sud

denly and entirely changed

.

.

.

. "In short," says Judge Hurlbut, "a

woman is courted and wedded as an an el, and yet denied the dignity
of rational and moral being ever after." 1 1

?i

1 47. The Solicitors Act of 1 877 gave complete control to the Law Society of the preliminary
& 41
examination for Solicitors of the Supreme Court of Judicature. The Solicitors Act of 18'.',
Viet, ch. 25 (Eng.). It represented the cubnination of several attempts to exert some
control over the profession of solicitor, beginning with the granting of a charter to the Law Society m
.
183 1 and continuing through the Solicitors Act of 1 843, which allowed the �d es to re�late the
.
Profession and
administration of examinations. See Lord Hailsham of St Marylbone, Sol1c1tor s
Qualifications, 44 HALsBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 7, 8 (4th ed. reissue 1995).
of the Role 0f
1 48
e ., ch. 65 (Eng.) (giving custody
. The Solicitors Act of 1888, 51 & 52 Vi t
Solicitors to the Law ociety).
S
149. 52 & 53 Viet., ch. 63 (Eng.).
15 0. 84 PARI... DEB. (3d ser.) 1315 (1 844).
IMPORTANT
l5 l . BARBARA LEIGH SMITH A B RIEF SUMMARY IN PLAIN LANGUAGE OF rnE MOST
1 3 <1 854>·
THEREON
LA.ws CONCERNING WOMEN
ATIONS
wrrn A FEw OBSERV

�
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sh Bar
Early Attempts by Women to Gain Admission to the Engli
1.

Private Attempts

In 1 876 the Law Society, the organization charged with regulation

� � uring

of the profession,152 denied membership to a woman candidate."

the same period Lincoln 's Inn denied ninety-two women perm1ss1on to
attend its lectures. 154 As early as 1 879 , a Society was founded "to promote

knowledge of the law and to consider the abilities and disabilities of
women

as

to the practice of the law in any of its branches. ,,m The argu

ments for inclusion seem to have been based on the premise that the
practice of law, at least as far as solicitors were concerned, was a private
office since admission was regulated by private entities, albeit entities
chartered by Parliament.
Eventually rejected by the courts,156 this argument nevertheless fore
shadowed the intercession of Parliament to recognize and regulate the
law as a profession that had emerged as a particularly public function.
That Parliament took this role eventually is ironic, since earlier it had
rejected attempts by women to obtain civil equality, thus forcing their
battle into the courts.151
Other women who attempted unsuccessfully to obtain admission to
the profession included the "suffragette" Christabel Pankhurst.158 Some
time in the 1 890s, two women opened a legal practice in London,
through which they provided some service to the bar, although they ap
parently did not practice law.159 In 1 902, Gray' s Inn accidentally admitted
Bertha Cave; when it realized its error it deliberately expelled her. 160 She
appealed, and lost, 1 61 for the learned judges led by the Lord Chancellor

152.

Solicitors Act of 1877, 40 & 41 Viet, ch. 25 (Eng.).

153.

BIRKS, supra note 18, at 276.

1 54.

In regard to a petition of 92 ladies praying to be admitted to attend law lectures, it was

resolved "that in the opinion of this Bench it is not expedient that Women should be admitted to the
Lectures of the Professors appointed by the Council of Legal Education." V THE BLACK BOOKS OF

LINCOLN 's INN 178 (Ronald Roxburgh ed., 1 968).
1 55 . St. John-Stevas, supra note 1 8 , at 27 1-72.
1 56. See Bebb v. Law Society, 29 T.L.R. 634 (1913). See also infra notes 292-97 and
accompanying text.
1 57.

St. John-Stevas, supra note 1 8, at 261-63.

Helena Kennedy, Women at the Bar, in THE BAR ON 'fRlAL 148 (Robert Harell ed., 1978).
See also St. John-Stevas, supra note 1 8, at 276-82. On Pankhurst' s attempts to be admitted, see SACHS
& WU.SON, supra note 3, at 172-73.
1 59. See BIRKS, supra note 18, at 276 (identifying these women as Miss Orme and Miss

1 58.

Richardson and the location of their office as in Chancery Lane).
160. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 148.

161 . Id. (citing PENSION BOOK OF GRAY'S INN (RJ. Fletcher ed., 1 903)). However, the PENSION
BooK index gives several citations to "women in chambers," but all refer either to wives
of members or
to women of "questionable virtue" and uniformly indicate that the governing body of the Inn directed
that these women be removed, no matter what their claims to residency. But
see FRANas COWPER, A
PRosPF.CT OF GRAY'S INN (1951) ("In 1903 a committee of judges had dismissed an appeal by Miss
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applied the same reasoning as did the trial court and Court of Appeals in
the Bebb case ten years later. No woman had ever been an attorney in
England, and Bertha Cave was not going to be the first.
But Cave' s attempt did not go unnoticed. In 1 9 1 0 the Solicitors'
Journal and Weekly Reporter published part of a letter advocating the

admission of women which summarized the other jurisdictions which

had already admitted them and urged his colleagues in the Law Society
"not to follow the example of the society's revered patres conscripti,
who in 1903 , without assigning any reason, refused to entertain or listen
to the application that was then made by Miss Cave to be allowed to en
12
ter her name on the roll of students . . . . " 6 Unpersuaded by the corre
spondent's arguments from equity and example, the Journal advanced

the objection that admission was neither socially nor economically rec
ommendable. "We venture to doubt whether, in the present overcrowded
condition of the profession, it will be considered desirable, either in the
interests of women or present male solicitors, that the profession should
be opened to the female sex." 163
2.

Early Attempts in Parliament
a.

Support for Women Attorneys in the Profession

Two years later, after the tentative letter to the Journal, that periodi
cal reported on Edward A. Bell's 164 paper on the admission of women to
the profession, written in support of a like-minded bill introduced into
Parliament. That bill, introduced by Lord Wolmer and also favored by
Lord Robert Cecil165 (who later took on the case of Gwyneth Bebb),
would have permitted women to become both solicitors and barristers,
but it failed to obtain the support of either the Law Society or a signifi

cant portion of the practicing bar!66 Bell's paper foreshadowed the argu
ments that would be raised in support of Gwyneth Bebb's application

and addressed most of the issues that concerned opponents and those
neutral on the subject.

Bertha Cave, a young lady whose application for admission to Gray's Inn had been refused by the
Benchers.").

162.
163.
164.

Our Learned Sister, 55 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 25, 25 (1910).
Id.
See &!ward A. Bell, Admission of Women, 56 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 814, 814 (1912)

(indicating that Bell also agreed to take Gwyneth Bebb as a clerk).

165. Neither party nor personal affiliations were an indication of a politician's stand on the issue
of women's admission. Both Robert Cecil and David Lloyd George favored admission. On Lloyd
George's role, see infra note 400 and accompanying text. On the politics of Robert Cecil (later Viscount
Cecil of Chelwood), see LoRD ROBERT CEo:L, AI.L THE WAY (1949); LoRn ROBF.RT CEaL, A GREAT
(1941); Jere Langdon Jackson, Lord Robert · Cecil: Apostk of the League, in
PERSONALITIFS AND POLICIES: E.5sAYS ON ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN HISTORY 94 (E. Deanne Malpass

ExPERIMENT

1 977).
1 66. BIRKS, supra note 18, at 276.

ed.,
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First, Bell reported that other common law countries already admit

ted women. "I have been infonned that there are no less than 20,000
women carrying on the profession of attorneys at law in the United
States. A great number of women . . . also follow the vocation of notaries
and, I believe, patent agents. " 167 He also pointed out that women already
served as advocates in some courts, "with marked ability. ,,,63 He noted

their abilities in the political arena and pointed out that some members of

Parliament certainly favored the activities of women in the legal profes

sion by stating that "quite recently the daughter of a present member of

Parliament for a Welsh constituency acted as her father' s ex
69
liamentary agent, and gained the election for him. "1

officio

Par

Bell directly addressed the question of statutory interpretation as
well, criticizing in advance the ultimate decision of the court of appeals
in the Bebb case.

I find on reference to the Solicitors Act, 1 843, . which Act controls
all subsequent Solicitors Acts, that the Interpretation Clause of this
Act of Parliament distinctly provides "that every word importing the
masculine gender only shall extend and be applied to a female as well
as a male." Now I venture to assert that in law the interpretation of
this Act gives women sound legal grounds upon which to support
their claim to be admitted upon the Roll of S olicitors. It is on record
that a lady has applied to the Law Society to be allowed to qualify for
such admission; her application, however, was refused. I do not think
any appeal to the law courts was made in this particular case. If such
an appeal were ever made in any other case it would be a matter
which would require an exceedingly refined judicial power of inter
pretation to read out of an Act of Parliament what I submit is a clear
enactment enabling duly qualified women to be enrolled as
solicitors.•m
.

.

Bell clearly recognized the fear of competition as well

as

a genuine if

somewhat hysterical anticipation of possible dilution of the quality of
practitioners manifested by some of his colleagues.

I would urge upon members of this Society that the Bill which this
resolution purports to support does not enable any woman to get on
the Rolls; they have to render themselves eligible by good character
and education and competent by qualifying examinations . . . . Fur
ther, they have to present themselves for examination at the Law So
ciety in London where . . . their demeanour and deportment can be
taken into consideration. If women who have qualified themselves for
the unromantic, serious and responsible profession of a solicitor,
calmly and decorously request the responsible authority of this hon-

167.
168.
169.
170.

Bell, supro note 164, at 814.
Id.
Id.
Id.

PORTIA GOES TO PARLIAMENT

1998]

339

ourable Society to be allowed to become solicitors, why should that
request be refused? . . . Why should woman be prevented from devel
oping her life along the lines for which her particular capabilities may
fit her, and i n which she is most interested . . . ? I can hardly bring
myself to believe that there is an underlying and unexpressed opin
ion-a selfish and timid attitude to mind-that the profession is over
crowded already. This could not be so when every man who is quali
fied is allowed to become a member as "of course."171

Bell also pointed out that the dulce domum argument (that women were
by nature fitted only for home and family)112 which had been used to pre
vent women from pursuing other professions had been unsuccessful, and
women had "taken up positions which, it is now admitted, they adorn and
intensify by their ability."113 Concluding with a flourish, he stated,
[T]he enfranchisement of the sex, the force of modern circumstances,
the progress of public opinion, the example of other civilised com

munities and the acknowledged average mental equality of women
and men if they be trained for any particular calling, render the ad

mission of women into the ranks of the legal profession a matter of
time only. Granted these facts, I venture to assert on the ground not
only of expediency, but of justice, that the Law Society, which has
long been one of the pioneers of legal refonn, should through its Rep
resentative Council support the Bill when it again comes before Par
liament for the removal of the existing archaic and unjust restraint
upon the admission of ualified and competent women into the ranks
�
of the legal profession.' 4

That his arguments were persuasive seems evident from the inability of
another solicitor present, identified as R. Ellett to dispute them, but sim
ply to repeat the arguments which Bell had addressed. Further, he in
sisted that the admission of women was a parliamentary question, a point
on which he and B ell agreed.
,

If females were to be admitted to the profession, the step must be
authorised by the Legislature, for the word "persons" in the Solicitors
Act was interpreted to mean male persons. If ladies were to be �d
.
mitted, it would be necessary for the council to support a Bill with
that object. He asked if the proposition was in the interest of the pro

fession. He had never heard that there was any lack of solicitors. The

public could not be said to have demanded the change. And it was n�t
in the interest of women themselves that they should enter so labon
ous a profession. The president had already referred to the smallness
of the incomes of solicitors, and pointed out that in many cases they

l71 .

n,
Id. On the fear of competition among French male attorneys towards wome

supra note 37, at 466-67 .

172.
1 73 .
174.

Bell. supra note 164. at 814.

Id.
Id.

sec

Corcos ,
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n were admitted it would obviwere absolutely insufficient. If wome
.
m
ousl y tend to reduce the remuneration.

Appealing to the popular conception of women as natural chatter
boxes, he also asserted, "[t]heir great faculty of continuous speech would
fit them better for the bar, and when the benchers had admitted them to
that branch of the profession, it would be time to admit them as solici
tors."116 Let the rival branch have these interfering females! Deliberately
misunderstanding Bell ' s reference to a pending bill, he said, "Mr. Bell
spoke of a bill that was to be introduced into Parliament, and when that
was done it would be time enough to consider whether it should be sup
ported. "in Other speakers announced themselves for or against Bell 's
position. C.E. Longmore made a practical argument in favor of admis
sion: "Thousands of pounds were spent in educating women, and when
the time came for them to put their exertions to some advantage they
were shut out. He hoped they were not going to be afraid of the competi
tion of women."111
The temporary setbacks in obtaining support from the Law Society
and Parliament turned women' s attention to a less formal means to ob
tain admission to the profession. Four women who had successfully
completed the formal education required for solicitors agreed to request
admission to the Law Society.'79 The Society ' s eventual refusal, based on
the claims of custom, resulted in the judgment in Bebb v. Law Society.'80
But twenty years later, the same claim was rejected in a colonial court. In
the British Mandate of Palestine, a woman requested admission to the
bar. The Supreme Court of that jurisdiction held that since no regulation
or statute prohibited the admission of women, she might be admitted.
Custom was not a sufficient reason to exclude her.'81
b.

Objections Based on Custom and Existing Legislation

Generally speaking, objections to the entry of women into the legal
profession were based on arguments of custom, and as a fallback, on the
intellectual and physicial inability or unsuitability of women to perform
the duties of advocates. For many male opponents, a woman's intellec
tual inferiority consisted largely of assumptions about her inability to
understand legal ways of thinking, which essentially institutionalized the
male world view, and male notions of dispute resolution. Because
women had never been trained in these ways of thinking, and would not,

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 814-15 (citing remades of R. Ellett).
Id. at 815.
Id.

Id. (citing remarlcs of C.E. Longmore).

&e BIRKS, supra note 18, at 1:16 (identifying the four as Miss Bebb, Miss Costello, Miss
Ingram and Miss Nettlefold, "all of whom had brilliant careers at either Oxford
or Cambridge'').
1 80. 29 T.L.R. 634 (191 3).
181.

F.M.G., Notes: Women at the Bar in Palestine, 13 J . COMP. LEG . 1 2 8 (3d ser. 1931).
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could not, develop them on their own, they could never demon

aptitude for the practice of law. S ince they had never
demon
an aptitude, it followed that they should not
be admitted.
Historically, women never had been admitted to the English Bar;
there
fore they should continue to be excluded. That these objections consti
an

strated such

tuted a chicken-and-egg argument was not lost on supporters of the
women' s movement.182

These arguments were not unique to the English opponents of
women' s admission. Indeed they were shared by opponents in other
common-law jurisdictions. The American attorney Mary Bartelme an

grily pointed out their hypocrisy and self-serving nature in a 1 9 1 1 ad
dress to the Illinois State Bar Association. What is interesting in her talk
is that she speaks briefly but eloquently to each of the misapprehension s,
objections, and mistaken assumptions that govern male resistance to
women in the professions .
I am well aware of the many prejudices that exist against women en
tering different professions and fields of occupations, and also am
aware that they exist largely among persons who have not given the
matter serious consideration and whose sentimental opinions are
based upon conditions that existed in the good old time of their fore
fathers, to which they would not return if they could. They are still
bound by the tyranny of tradition.183

Further, she noted that one of the reasons that women were de
manding the right to enter into traditionally male occupations was the
result of male intrusion into occupations that had previously been pri
marily female, and that had provided most if not all of the paltry income
that women were allowed to earn for themselves. This tit-for-tat argu
ment is quite aggressive given the prevailing submissiveness of women
even in the early twentieth century.
Not many years ago addresses were made and articles written advo
cating the prohibition of women in industrial and professional fields
because they were trespassing upon the domain of men. They com
plained that women were out of their sphere, and yet many of the men

182. This attitude still permeates some legal thinking. See , for example, Raines v. Byrd, 1 17 S. Ct.
2312 (1997) (holding that members of Congress had no standing to challenge the line item veto), in

which Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that "several episodes in our history show that in analogous
confrontations between one or both Houses of Congress and the Executive Branch, no suit was brought
was
on the basis of claimed injury to official authority or power." Id. at 2321. If appellees' claim
Office
of
Tenure
the
challenge
to
standing
sustained, presumably several presidents would have had
2321-22.
Act, which prevented the removal of a presidential appointee without Congress' consent Id. at
But see the often repeated comment by Justice Holmes that
.
.
own m
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so _it �as l:ud
lcud down
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon w 1c� 1t was
_
the past.
have vanished Jong since, and the rule simply persists from bhnd nmtall.on of
.

�

�

457, 469 (1 897).
s Before the Illinois State Bar
Addres
Bar,
the
at
lme, A Woman's Place
183. Mary M. B
Association, 43 Cm. LEGAL NEWS 370, 370 ( 1 91 1).
Oliver Wendell Holmes The Path ofthe Law, IO HARV. L. REV.
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defining women's sphe� ,
who were advocating such measures and
s, bak� �s and cannenes
were opening mills and factories, dairie
act1v1ttes that had been
which were taking out of the home the many
and as a matter of
woman's contribution to the family household,
never be returned to
economy and good business management will
g of butter, and to a
makin
g,
knittin
the home. The spinning, weaving,
lo:°ger do�e in the
no
are
g
large extent, the sewing, baking and cannin
work m order
therr
home . . . and women necessarily have follow ed
the family,
that they may contribute their part to the maintenance of
and it is not because of their whims or wishes, their desire for feathers
and frills and their loss or lack of love for home ties and family life,

�

but because economic conditions have changed and they are forced to
.
184
do therr part . . . .

The argument from equity is particularly powerful. B artelme further ac
cuses her audience of hypocrisy in suggesting that they listen closely to

arguments of any sort only when they believe they are being espoused by
men. Men in any occupation, she asserts, fear competition.

The question of competition is another factor that places barriers in
the entrance of women to the professions or vocations heretofore
wholly occupied by men. As an illustration . . . let me cite the experi
ence of a woman teacher who wished the opinion of some experts on
her theory pertaining to the treatment of certain scientific subjects.
Her first requests were signed with her full n ame, and the replies to
them were courteous but empty. She then wrote a letter signed with
her initials, which brought forth this reply: "Dear Mr. A: I am tre
mendously interested in the question and consider it the most vital
and important with reference to-education now before the teachers of
the country. You will have a hard fight for your position . . . . So
many women teachers who ought to be tatting or doing other fancy
work, are wedded to their pretty little courses in-, and they will fight
for them like cats. I hope you will get your paper printed. Could I not
help you?"185

Helena Normanton, a law graduate and supporter of women' s ad
mission, would make substantially the same arguments eight years

later .186 For Bartelme, female participation in professional and technical
occupations promises more happiness for everyone in society, even
though traditional social constructs may become less numerous.
The question, "Will women lose interest in wifehood and motherhood
through entering these broader fields," may be answered. Yes. From
the standpoint of marriage for shelter and support, or to escape the
opprobrium of being an old maid, she may, but from the basis of mar
riage for wholesome companionship and love, I believe that in the ul-

1 84. Id.
1 85. Id. (dashes in original).
1 86. Admission of Women to the Profession, 1 46 LAw TIMEs 428 (1919) [hereinafter Admission of
Women].

1998]

PORTIA GOES TO PARLIAMENT

353

not desire to see women in it merely because they were women. She
desired to see them in it, and successful in it, because the work was of
so great importance that the whole of human ability should be an
224

open field from which the lawyer should be chosen.

Nonnanton • s abilities

as

a debater must have surprised her opponents.

Traditionally upper-middle- and upper-class men, but not their socio
economically middle- and l ower-class sisters,ru received the kind of edu
cation that permitted them both to formulate and to express powerful
226

argument.

Nonnanton' s most vocal opponent at the debate was Mr. J.A. Sym
monds, a Metropolitan Police Magistrate, who suggested that she did not
fully understand the nature of legal practice, an argument that she was at
a disadvantage to refute since neither she nor any other woman was a
member of the bar.
[W]omen had not the judgment that was necessary for practising as
lawyers. It was the man-in-the-street's, and . . . perhaps, the woman-

224.

Id. At least some of the encouragement may have been due to the traditional animosity of

journalists toward lawyers.

225.

But see SUSAN J. LEoNARDI, DANGEROUS BY DEGREES: WOMEN AT OXFORD AND THE

SoMF.RVlll.E COI.J..F.GE NOVELISTS (1 989) (discussing a study of upper middle class women during the
period between the world wars

226.

and their record of accomplishment).

In her examination of the observable differences between U. S. men and women's scores on

standardized tests, Beryl Lieff Benderly suggests that a great deal of it is attributable to the lack of
emphasis which American education and culture generally place on verbal skills for men, as opposed to
the importance they have for the run of the mill Englishman. See BERYL LIBFF BENDERLY, IlIB MYTH
OF Two MINDs: WHAT GENDER MEANS AND DoESN'T MEAN (1 987).

[I]n England and Scotland, grown men play word games on the radio; limericks and
anagrams rank as national pastimes; the witty Ronald Coleman, not the stolid Gary
Cooper, molded the notion of celluloid sex appeal. Schoolmaster-the admirable Mr.
Chips-remains an honorable masculine calling, immune to the scorn Americans heap on
ineffectual buffoons like the comic strips' Mr. Weatherbee or television's Mr. Peepers or
Mr. Conklin. British culture has traditionally tied social power and literary skill into a
single urbane, upper-middle-class package. It trains young politicians in the crackling
debates of the Oxford Union. It signals class and caste by subtleties of sttess and syntax.
That highly verbal culture-not surprisingly-produces males who do as well as females
on verbal tests. But so do Nigeria, where British educational traditions continue, and
West Gennany, where men often teach in the primary grades.

Id. at 216-17. In spite of attempts to glamorize the teaching profession for young American boys
through television series like Room 222 (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 17, 1969 to Jan. 1 1 , 1974) and
Lucas Tanner (NBC television broadcast, Sept 1 1 , 1974 to Aug. 20, 1 975), and films like STAND AND

DELlvER (American Playhouse
or

1988), they still prefer "active" occupations like policeman or fireman,

if they

are interested in teaching, college rather than elementary school teaching, as shown in their
reactions to these characters on television. See Tom Dorsey, Girls Searching for Role Models Gel Little
Help from Television, COURIER-I., July 22, 1996, at 3D. Further, men who evince an interest in
spending time with small children (as in child care) are automatically suspect Men still outnumber
women in the legal profession, however, because of its high status, showing that they can acquire verbal
skills when they

see a payoff in status or salary, preferably both. The challenge that "overeducated"

American women posed to the traditional dominance of the privileged males who earned the
"gentlemen's C's" and went on to law school remains to be examined; however, it is certainly
considerable. When I started law school, one male professor warned me not to expect
"gentleman's C", which he described as an acceptable
woman" I never knew.

more

than a

grade. Whether he meant "in general" or "for a
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law schools and pass the bar.191 At the least, this success demonstrates the
equality of the female intellect; at the most, its superiority.
Bartelme does accept the notion that women will prefer a civil prac
tice to a criminal one, and within the civil law, areas such as real estate,
probate and family law . 1 92 She assures her listeners �at thos� ?Iale la�
yers and legislators who take an interest in the working and hvmg � ond1tions of the less fortunate, including an alarming number of children,
would find nothing but assistance and admiration from their female col
leagues.193 But for this American attorney, as for her sisters in England,
who were attempting to enter the profession, traditional views of the fe
male intellect and female ability must necessarily give way to the natural
urges of women to better themselves as well as to interest themselves in
the world around them and to make some positive change in the social
and economic conditions to which they objected.
In 1 982, two English sociologists noted that the inequities of which
Bartelme spoke still existed:
When women enter a male-dominated profession they operate in an
opportunity structure and in an internal labour market which is differ
ent to that of men. Coser has noted how women at work experience a
"deficit in rewards" compared with men, and how the presence of
women in an occupation or profession is inversely related to the re
wards available. Women tend to be paid less and their opportunities
for promotion are more restricted than those of men. They are un

likely to be permitted to do similar work to men of the same (or even
inferior) education and status. The lower financial rewards of women
in male-dominated professions are partly the result of their concen
tration in low-reward segments and partly the result of women 's un

der-representation in the higher rank of such professions. The average
income of barristers illu strates this.

A survey carried out for the Royal

Commission on Legal Services showed that the average income of
women juniors in

1 976177 was £3,908 compared with £6,700 for

�en. For all barristers the figures were £4, 1 37 and £8,039 respec
tively. Even when men and women barristers doing similar work
were compared in the same survey, the average earnings of women

were only 50-60% of those of men.194

The assumed lack of intellectual ability justified the continued ex
clusion of women from the profession, and the continued exclusion as
sured that the argument over lack of intellectual ability could never be
addressed, much less put to rest. How, then, was the problem to be re
solved?

1 9 1 . Id. She also notes that at that time a woman had achieved the highest grade point average yet
at the University ofChicago Law School. Id.
192. Bartelme, supra note 1 83, at 370.
193.

Id.

1 94.

Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 27-28 (footnotes omitted).
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For some male attorneys, the fact that women never had been for
mally accepted into the bar was enough reason to continue to exclude
them, even though they might make inroads into other professions, such
as medicine. Proponents of the admission of women retorted that " [t]here
were women lawyers in ancient Rome, and there was quite a chain of
women lecturers and teachers of law in this country throughout the Mid
dle Ages."195 One American lawyer made reference to "one Spanish
woman receiving the degree of doctor of laws at the age of twenty
one."196 Nevertheless, as we shall see, when Gwyneth Bebb made this
"historical" argument before the English courts, they found it unpersua
sive.
The argument that women should not be allowed to practice law
because they did not participate fully in military service was also a com
mon one, and at first glance it looks fairly persuasive.191 However, one of
the major functions of the military is to settle disputes which have gone
beyond words, that is, beyond the capacity of a specific dispute resolu
tion system. To suggest that because women have not, cannot, or should
not impose a solution through physical force they ought not to participate
in finding solutions through argumentation or persuasion is extremely
tortured logic. Yet because so many analogies and thought processes in
the common law are drawn from the language of war or sports 198 (mock

195. Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 428. 1be reference seems to be to three women in
particular. Paul Fuller, The French Bar II, 23 YALE LJ. 248 ( 1 9 1 4).
I find in an old volume, which I presume reliable, that long before the Theodosian Code
(in the fourteenth century) women were accepted as lawyers in Rome, and that two of
these, Arnasia and Hortensia, acquitted themselves with great credit, while a third,
Afrasia, was usually herself the litigant and so scandalized the judges by her loquacity,
her effrontery and her outbursts of passion, that she was forbidden to speak in pubic [sic],
a prohibition later extended to all women, and only modified by Theodosius to the extent
of permitting them to speak in their own defense. Whether Afrasia is an argument against
the new proposition or whether Amasia and Hortensia are a preponderating argument in
·
its favor, I leave to your own judgment.
Id. at 262.
See also Nicolaus Benke, Women in the Courts: An Old Thom in Men's Sides, 3 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 195, 203 (1995) (identifying the offending female as Carfania). Benke uses Carfania's
case as a method of investigating traditional male and patriarchal objections to women's exercise of
legal power, particularly as advocates. Id. at 203-40.
1 96. Women in the Law, supra note 15, at 133.
1 97. We can, however, speculate on the effect of "male attitudes" on women in predominantly
male professions. Pilots are notorious for their sexual escapades, for example. One expert on military
law suggests that some female military pilots may deliberately engage in sexually aggressive behavior
in order to seem more like "one of the guys." Conversation with Kenneth Murchison, in Baton Rouge,
La. (July 3, 1997). On one female pilot's legal problems and subsequent discharge, see Ron Martz,
Military Justice: An Elite Career in Ashes; 1st Lt. Kelly Flinn Has Escaped a Possible Prison Term
With a Plea Bargain, But Others Say They'll Keep Fighting on Her Behalf. ATI.ANTA J. & CONST.,
May 23, 1997,at 18A.
1 98.

On the use of sports metaphors in law school and legal communication, see

Catherine Weiss

& Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1299 (1988) (the issue

was devoted to gender and Jaw). "Men presume that everyone understands a sports analogy. I would
never presume to use a knitting analogy." Id. at 1337. Consider also the use of sports analogies in
discussing substantive law, such as the "level playing field" in anti-discrimination cases.
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war) such a comparison made sense to those opposed to the participation
of women in the legal profession.
Technically, "adversary system" merely means th�t "neu al and pas
sive factfinders . . . resolve lawsuits on the basis of evidence pre

o:

sented by contending litigants during formal a judicatory proceed
_
ings." The phrase connotes more than its technical defimt1on, how

�

ever.

A

complex web of metaphor pervades the i ea o f the adversary

�

system in a way that captures the hearts and mmds of the lawyers
.
.
who function within that system. In case law, academic hterature,
professional literature, and in popular culture, a trial is a battle and
the lawyer the client's champion; a trial is a sports contest and the
lawyer the client-team' s winning coach or star player. M�taphors
transform the trial lawyer from a mere person who presents mforma
tion favorable to his client to a triumphant hero and change the other
party to the dispute into the enemy.199

Some commentators are unwilling to accept as settled the premise that
women are naturally less combative than men, but acknowledge that
inability to engage in ritualistic verbal combat puts female attorneys at a
disadvantage.
The premise behind this contentious system is that ardent, strident
representation of both sides to a dispute is the best mechanism for un
earthing all the relevant facts and defining all the relevant law while
still respecting the rights of the individuals involved. And the further
premise is that with the best case for both sides out on the table,
whether in a congressional hearing room, or in a court before a judge,
or in direct negotiations between opposing lawyers, the side with the

greatest merit prevails. Therefore, in the interest of ultimate fairness,
lawyers compete with all the skill, energy, and creativity at their
command. Like football . players or armed warriors, they are licensed

to compete with the serious aim of defeating the opposing side.200

The similarities between this description of the ideal functioning of
the adversary system and the ideal functioning of the traditional "trial by
battle" in which one or both sides hired a "champion" to fight for him is
obvious.201 While the operating assumption was that God was on the side
of right and justice, still each side hoped to increase the possibility of

1 99. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images ofBattle, Spons,
and Sex Shape thL
Adversary System, 10 Wis. WOMEN'S LJ. 225, 225 (1995) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting S1EPHAN

LANDsMAN,

READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO AoruDICATION 1
( 1 988)). Consider as well the use of sports analogies to describe
the behavior of OJ. Simpson's criminal
defense lawyers. Robert Shapiro and F. Lee Bailey, among others,
were the defendant's "dream team."
Schiller notes that during their conferences with him, the attorne
y s frequently communicated
with th fonner football player in sports terms, which enabled
him to take active charge of his defense.
Joumahsts also translated analyses of defense strategy
into sports talk. See LAWRENCE SCllil.LER &
]AMES WllLWERTif, AMERICAN TRAGEDY 381-82 (1997).
200. MONA IIARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REwRr
G
riN THE RUI.ES 1 29 (1994).
201 . On trial by battle, see GEORGE NEILSON, TRIAL
BY COMBAT ( 1 890).

�wrence
�
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victory • recognizing the truth of the often-repeated dictum that God
.

on

the side of the strongest battalions.

202

[M]any women, drawn to the law b y its promise of fairness

was

shun

chronic engagement in battle. Bearing out the stereotyped im ge of

�

woman as pe�cemaker, not warrior, they tend to shy away from the
.
most adversanal arenas m the law and to gravitate toward those forms
of practice that are most consultative and conciliatory, or those that
are bound by hannonizing rules. This last includes fields such as

se

curities , antitrust, bankruptcy, and tax, in which doing the work is
like solving a puzzle.

Many women in big firms opt for a corporate law practice be

cause it allows them to work cooperatively with groups of people
who have conflicting interests but also a common interest in putting

together a particular deal or solving a common problem.

But the more aggressively hard-edged the practice, with trial
work at the extreme, the fewer women are involved. This is a fact, but
the question is, Why. Has nature programmed men hormonally to do
battle and women to avoid it? Or do women shun competition be

cause the larger culture socializes them to dislike it, teaches them the
their virtue lies in sympathy , understanding, patience, cooperation,
and peacemaking rather than in combat? Or is it mainly a lack of
practice? Would women feel more comfortable as competitors if their
families and schools and communities placed girls in the same

gladiatorial roles that boys assume from early childhood onward? Or
is it that women, entering the legal profession with more social train
ing than men in quiet dispute-settling, see the lawyer's reliance on

adversarial procedures as excessive? Are women rejecting, as a mat
ter of consci01,1sly formed critical judgment, the degree of competition
they find in the law?203

202.

J ai toujours

"

'

vu

Dieu de cote des gros battailons" ("I have always seen God on the side of

the strong battalions''). Statement of Marechal de la Ferte-Senneterre to Anne of Austria (Queen of

Louis XIII

of France), cited in BOURSAULT, lEITRES NOUVELLES DE MONSIEUR BOURSAULT 384
(1698). lbis statement is also often attributed to Napoleon, among others.
203. HARRINGTON, supra note 200, at 1 29-30. The author quotes two particularly telling
comments from successful women attorneys on the similarities between law practice and sports or war.
[A] state court judge who graduated from law schools in the 1950s remarked, "I think
doing trials isn't comfortable for women,

as

a trial draws on a playing-field mentality.

Women prefer to settle. They don't like the winner-take-all philosophy-and, I think,
rightly so . . . . " A fonner Jaw-review editor . . . doing civil litigation in a large, well
known firm . . . questioned the good sense of settling business disputes through
adversarial procedures. "Litigation is strange," she said. "It's a strange way to settle
problems. It's war. It's a game. I mean, there're these little battlefields and this is the way
you're supposed to shoot the other person. It's just absurd . . . I'm good at it Probably
it's what I'm best at in the world, but it is sort of silly . . . and it's incredibly wasteful."

Id. at 132.
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"ritual opposition" occurs
Deborah Tannen also points out that oral
today both in business and in law.

results from ritual op
A modem-day equivalent of the bonding that

�
�

com�te,
position can be found in business, where indiv duals may
enmity.
argue, or even fight for their view w itho�t f�e mg. pe�son�
.
d m�st
�
ionahz
mstitut
1s
mqmry
for
Opposition as a ritualized format
will
side
each
that
d
expecte
is
it
formally in the legal profession, and
the
when
relations
do its best to attack the other and retain friendly
case is closed. 204

We should not be surprised that male lawyers therefore expect this kind
of relationship, and feel uncomfortable when it is not forthcoming,
whereas for women lawyers verbal sparring is not only foreign but considered antithetical to "real womanhood."
B.

Arguments For and Against the Admission of Women to the Profes
sion
As we can see, the debate over the admission of women to the bar

had started long before Bebb stated her case and continued more viru
lently afterward. Just as in France and the United States, the arguments
centered on two issues: ( 1 ) the faimess of refusing women admission to
the bar while allowing them to pursue other professional avenues, par
ticularly given their willingness to share the burdens of political and so
cial life with men; and (2) the question of women 's ability to meet the
traditional standards of the profession (physical, psychological and in
tellectual).
That the contributions of Englishwomen to the war effort were
taken as a demonstration of their intellectual and physical equality with
men was clear as early as

1915

(the second year of the First World

War).205 One journal suggested that women ought by right to be admitted
to the profession of solicitor if they were qualified by education and
ability.

If women who have qualified themselves for the unromantic, serious,
and responsible profession of a solicitor calmly and decorously re
quest to be allowed to become solicitors, why should that request be
refused? So far as the profession is concerned, there is nothing im
proper or inexpedient in allowing competent women to become so
licitors. Why should woman be prevented from developing her life
along the lines for which her particular capabilities may fit her and in
which she is most interested, thus depriving the state of her services

204.

DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING FROM 9 ro 5: How WOMEN'S AND MEN'S CONVERSATIONAL

STYLES AFFECT WHO GETS HEARD, WHO GETS CREDIT, AND WHAT GETS DoNE AT WORK 237

(1994).

�05. � same j�stific�tion was advanced in support of the admission of U.S. women, in an essay
which also �sapprovmgly cited the results in Hall, Cave and Bebb. See Sophonisba P. Breckinridge, A
Recent English Case on Women and the Legal Profession, 23 J. POL. EcoN. 64, 67-70 (1915).
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in any rofession in which she may be fitted by nature or education to

J!

excel?

The intellectual equality of women was also very much at issue
during this period, not only in England but in other countries wrestling
with the idea of integrating traditionally male professions. Critics ad
vanced both attempts at serious study and anecdotal evidence to support
their views. In France, for example, some of the debate concerned the
supposed lack of intellectual capacity that theoretically accompanied
women's smaller brain sizes.201
In the United States, female physicians and lawyers already worked

actively and publicly to champion the cause of women, and their work
was documented in the legal journals of the period.
For the first time in history a jury composed of women physi

cians recently sat as judges of the court for the insane at the Detention
Hospital in Chicago. This jury saved two women from being com
mitted to the insane asylum by their husbands. Women lawyers all
over the country are hoping that the example of this Chicago jury

may be followed in other cities, especially in cases in which the san
ity of women in concerned. Sixty women lawyers of Chicago have

placed their services at the disposal of Judge Heap of the municipal
court, who is privileged to call any of them to defend girls brought
before him. The women lawyers have organized the Public Defenders
League for destitute girls, and they plan to appear for penniless
women who are arrested and brought into the morals court.208

Another writer documented the work of women professionals, pri
marily judges and lawyers, in many special courts in cities such as New
York and Philadelphia, for a meeting of the New Constitutional Society
for Women 's Suffrage.209 Law reviews and other periodicals eagerly re-

206.

Flotsam and Jetsam: Women

as

Lawyers-Modern View, 51 CAN. L.J. 79, 79 (1915)

(quoting the LoNDON L.J.).

207. See FRANK, supra note 1 16, at 158. On the arguments for and against women lawyers
generally, see Corcos, supra note 37, at 449-63.
208. Editorial Comment: Women Physicians and Lawyers Set Good Example, 22 CASE & COM.
63, 65 (1915). Husbands and fathers of women considered "insane," whether because of actual
mental disability or because they objected to the behavior of men in their families, traditionally
turned to the courts for permission to incarcerate these women. See HELEN SMALL, LoVE's
MADNESS: MEDICINE, TIIE NOVEL, AND FEMALE INSANITY 1800-1 865, at 184-92 (1996) (discussing
famous cases and social reaction to wrongful incarceration of wives during the late 1 850s in
England). The theme of non-conformist behavior as insanity runs through the literature of the
nineteenth century. See SANDRA Gn...BERT & SUSAN GUBAR, THE MADWOMAN IN THE Arne (1 979)
(discussing nonconforming behavior as portrayed in nineteenth century poetry and fiction); SMALL,

supra (tracing the treatment during this period in medicine and literature of women who had gone
mad due to abandonment by loved ones). On the English judiciary 's attitude toward insanity, see
JOEL PETER EIGEN, WITNESSING INSANITY: MADNESS AND MAD-DocrORS IN TIIE ENGLISH COURT

(1 995).

209. See G. Hopkins (Mrs. Herbert Musgrave), Women's Work in the Courts in the United States,
1 5 J. COMP. LEG1s. 198 (1915). French women attorneys apparently also attempted to set up a
children's court before the First World War. See Lilly, supra note 1 20, at 433. G. Hopkins later visited
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ported the establishment and progress of law schools that a

women.210 However, some observers objected to the segregation of
women into a special school, such as the Cambridge Law School for
Women even if it were "as nearly a replica of the Harvard Law School
as it is

�ossible to make it."211 Said Mary Agnes Mahan, ex-president of

the Massachusetts Association of Women Lawyers,

Personally, I feel that women should have been admitted to the
_
Harvard Law School. There was no necessity for a separate orgam
zation . . . . The phrase "First graduate law school in America exclu
sively for women" has no charms for me. The students will lose the
benefit of contact with men ' s views and opinions, and that benefit,
under the circumstances, i s inestimable. There have been generations
of men lawyers; it' s a new field for women, in a way. There have
been few Portias through the ages. I think coeducation in a graduate
law course is almost an essential.212

Even though women were firmly established in the U.S. legal pro
fession, the old debate over their aptitude continued, demonstrating that
at least for some male attorneys, familiarity continued to breed contempt.
In some cases women lawyers contributed opinions that smacked of spe
cial pleading. In the late 1 800s, members of the Equity Club regularly
received advice about safeguarding their health. One attorney believed
that overwork had partly contributed to the death of her law partner,213
echoing the theories of Edward H. Clarke in his widely read

Sex in Edu

cation: Or, a Fair Chance for the Girls,214 which
explained the supposed weaknesses of female physiology to the gen
eral reader. Wrapped in the banner of medical authority, Sex in Edu
cation was an assault on the new phenomenon of coeducation. Clarke
warned that women 's reproductive physiology made it unsafe for
them to undertake any intellectual activity with the same rigor as
men. Excessive study, he explained, diverted energy from the female

England and spoke of the work of the "women's courts" to interested members of the New
Constitutional Society for Women's Suffrage in Knightsbridge. See Courts for Women, 59 SOuc. J. &
WKLY. REP. 274, 274 (1915).

2 1 0. See Graduate Law School for Women, in 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 54 (1918). Among them
were the Washington College of Law, whose motto "F.qual Opportunities for Men and Women"
�fleeted its origin as an institution of higher education "founded primarily for women." Its faculty
included both male and female professors. Id. The Portia School of Law was in its seventh year of
operation in the fall of 1915. Its dean, Arthur W. Macl..ean, pointed out to the eager entering class,
61 strong, the "advantages to women of the modem tendency against coeducation of the sexes, and
toward the establishment of separate schools for men and women in all
lines of intellectual
endeavor." Id. at 54-55. Apparently the advantages did not extend to an
all-female faculty and
administration.
2 1 1 . Id. at 54.
2 1 2.
2 1 3.

Id. (quoting Mary Agnes Mahan).
See VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS AND 1lffi ORIGINS
OF PROFESSIONAL
ID� � AMERICA: THE LETI'ERS OF EQUITY CLUB, 1 887 TO 1 890, at 33 (19'J3) (construing Ellen
A. Mamn in reference to the death of Mary Frederika Perry).

2 1 4.

EowARD H. CLARK, SEX JN EDUCATION: OR, . A FAIR
CHANCE FOR THE GIRLS

(1873).
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reproductive organs to the brain, causing a breakdown in women' s
health and threatening the health of future generations.215

Additionally,
[t]he women lawyers of the Equity Club understood all too well that
the warnings to Clarke and other physicians threatened their desires
for professional careers. But, within the privacy of the Equity Club,
where they could openly discuss their concerns about health, Equity

Club members did not unanimously reject Clarke ' s ideas. Ellen Mar
tin first brought the issue into the open in her letter to the Equity Club
in

1 888 when

she warned her fellow club members about the delicacy

of the female reproductive system. Sharing Clarke ' s view, she wrote:

"I refer to the close relation between the brain and the organs peculiar
to women, and to the fact that any trouble with those organs (and a

celebrated anatomist says they seem made to �et out of order) seri
6
ously affects the brain and the nervous system." 1

Thirty years later, a 1 9 1 5 address by attorney Selma Klein George
of New Orleans, Louisiana, encapsulated many of the arguments con
cerning the necessity of women ' s participation in political and profes
sional life.
If a moving picture could be made of the real influence exerted

by woman in love, politics and the home, man would come better to

understand the part she plays in the law. The far-reaching force and
effect of woman ' s influence in every sphere of life cannot be over
rated. . . . Undoubtedly woman exercises a greater influence in the

making of laws which are calculated for the betterment of society

than the law-maker himself. She is the power behind the throne. And
if this be so as to the creation of law, why should she not play an im

portant part in the interpretation of, and the carrying into effect of its
mandates?211

George was adamant that accusations that women were not the intellec
tual equals of men were the direct result of fear. Like Helena
Normanton,218 she identified much of the antagonism against women

lawyers as an unreasonable fear of competition in general or as fear that
men who are conscious of their social responsibilities toward the weaker
sex would be put at a disadvantage in the courtroom.219

215.
216.

DRACHMAN, supra note 213, at 31.
Id. at 33. For more on the debate,

see

id. at 34-37. French male opponents of women 's

participation in the legal profession made similar arguments. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 47 1 ;
CORCOS, supra note 134, at 162.

217.

Selma Klein George, Woman and the Law, 8 LAW. & BANK. 1 1 8, 1 1 8 (19 15). The

reference to "moving pictures" is an interesting one, given the novelty of this medium and indicates
that it had already been recognized

as

a very powerful opinion-maker in early twentieth-century

culture, even among the professional elite.
2 1 8.

See Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 428 (discussing Helena Normanton's view

that men feared competition with women in the legal profession).
219.

Id.
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In those states where woman is forbidden to practice law, about

the only reason given by man is that they would persuade without ar
gument. . . . Woman is in every sense the equal of man. The books
with which our libraries are filled, the arts, the academies, show that
their intelligence and learning nourishes all the world . . . . The law is
supposed to be founded on common sense. If it has that for a basis,
then it goes without saying that woman is equally as well prepared to
.
0
mterpret or to enfiorce the law as man.22
In fact, George went so far as to say that because women inspired so
much of the "unwritten law," the custom, of the time, they

might have a like part in all that concerns the statute or written law . . .
. Any real rivalry of the sexes even in the practice of law, is the
sheerest folly and most unnatural nonsense. The genius of woman is
not alone in her heart; it is equally in her head. . . . Woman truly
commands. Contact with one that is highminded is acknowledged to
be good for the life of any man. . . . I submit in conclusion that you
must agree with me that in-sofar as the professions of life as con
cerned, woman is the "better half."221
The content of the debate in England was remarkably similar. Dur
ing one particular open debate in London three years before Ivy Wil
liams's admission, Helena Normanton argued that

if women were unfitted to enter the profession of the law they must
be equally unfitted to enter the medical profession as doctors, for the
mistakes of the doctor were very much more likely to be serious than
those of the lawyer. If women were by temperament incapable of pre
cision, care, judgment, observation, all these were faculties which a
doctor needed. It came with a very ill grace from a lawyer to demand
that his profession should be closed to women, when it was remem
bered that so many of the occupations which had been thrown open to
women had been so opened by lawyers.222
Normanton charged that such reluctance on the part of the male attorney
suggested that he "feared the competition of women" and maintained that

3

such opposition was unknown outside the legal profession itself. 22

[S]he could quite honestly say that she had never met anybody out
side the legal profession who had in any way condemned her for
wishing to become a lawyer. On the contrary she had been most per
sistently encouraged by a class of men whose opinion was impor
tant-the law reporters of the newspapers. She could not tell how
many had urged her to persevere. They said they had seen many cases
in the courts where a woman lawyer would have been extremely use
ful. . . . She took the profession of the law so seriously that she did

220.

See George, supra note 217, at 1 1 8-19.

221.

See id. at 1 20.

222.

Admission o/Women, supra note 186, at 428.
Id.

223.
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not desire to see women in it merely because they were women.
She
desired to see them in it, and successful in it, because the work was
of
so great importance that the whole of human ability should be an
open field from which the lawyer should be chosen.224

Normanton' s abilities as a debater must have surprised her opponents.
Traditionally upper-middle- and upper-class men, but not their socio
economically middle- and lower-class sisters,225 received the kind of edu
cation that permitted them both to formulate and to express powerful

argument.

226

Normanton' s most vocal opponent at the debate was Mr. J.A. Sym
monds, a Metropolitan Police Magistrate, who suggested that she did not
fully understand the nature of legal practice, an argument that she was at
a disadvantage to refute since neither she nor any other woman was a
member of the bar.
[W]omen had not the judgment that was necessary for practising as
lawyers. It was the man-in-the-street' s, and . . . perhaps, the woman-

224.

Id. At least some of the encouragement may have been due to the traditional

225.

Bui see SUSAN 1. LEONARDI, DANGEROUS BY Df.GRF.ES: WOMEN

226.

In

journalists toward lawyers.

animosity of

AT OXFORD AND TifE

SOMERVILLE COUEGE NOVELISTS (1 989) (discussing a study of upper middle class women during the
period between the world wars and their record of accomplishment).
her examination of the observable differences between U. S. men and women's scores on

standardii.ed tests, Beryl Lieff Benderly suggests that a

great

deal of it is attributable to the lack of

emphasis which American education and culture generally place on verbal

skills for men, as opposed to

the importance they have for the run of the mill Englishman. See BERYL LIEFF BENDERLY, THE MYTH
Of Two MlNos: WHAT GENDER MEANS AND DoF.SN'T MEAN (1987).
[l)n England and Scotland, grown men play word games on the radio; limericks and
anagrams rank as national pastimes; the witty Ronald Coleman, not the stolid Gary
Cooper, molded the notion of celluloid sex appeal. Schoolmaster-the admirable Mr.
Chips-remains an honorable masculine calling, immune to the scorn Americans heap on

ineffectual buffoons like the comic strips' Mr. Weatherbee or television's Mr. Peepers or
Mr. Conklin. British culture has traditionally tied social power and literary skill into a
single urbane, upper-middle-class package. It trains young politicians in the crackling
debates of the Oxford Union. It signals class and caste by subtleties of stress and syntax.
That highly verbal culture-not surprisingly-produces males who do as well as females
on verbal tests. But so do Nigeria, where British educational traditions continue, and

Id. at

West Germany, where men often teach in the primary grades.
216-1 7. In spite of attempts to glamorize the teaching profession for young

American

boys

through television series like Room 222 (ABC television broadcast, Sept 17, 1969 to Jan. 1 1 , 1974) and
Lucas Tanner (NBC
STAND AND
television broadcast, Sept 1 1 , 1974 to Aug. 20, 1975), and films like
DELIVER (American Playhouse 1988), they still prefer "active" occupations like policeman or
tJ_ieir
or if they are
interested in teaching, college rather than elementary school teaching, as shown 10
Litt
Get
Models
reactions to these characters on
Role
or
f
television. See Tom Dorsey, Girls Searching
� interest m
Help from Television,
COURIER-I., July 22, 1996, at 30. Further, men who evince
s nding me
still
�tnumber
Men
suspect.
ally
automatic
are
with small children (as in child care)
ti
pe
ve��
w men in the legal
acqwre
they
that
showing
status,
high
profession, however, because of its
�
d
overeducate
kills when they
s
see a payoff in status or salary, preferably both. The challenge that
. the
earned
.
wh
males
;;merican women posed
to the traditional dominance of the privileged
�
however, it is certainly
gentlemen's C's"
and went on to law school remains to be examined;
considerable.
expect more than a
When I started law school one male professor warned me not to
"gentleman's
t "in general" or "for a
C", which he described as
acceptable grade. Whether he mean
woman" I never
knew.

�m�,

�
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in-the-street's, idea of law that it consisted in a man standing up in
court and pleading. Every lawyer present would know that the most
important part of a practising barrister's work was done long before
he got into court. He had advised what should be done and how it
should be done. . . . It was he who said to a client what a woman
would not say. He would ask: "What do you want in this case?" The
client would not have thought of that. Then, when the l awyer found
that out it was often just what the other side wanted, and the case was
settled without further trouble. That would never happen with one
woman in the case, still less when there were two.227

He failed to state that knowledge of a barrister's "real" work is acquired
through education and practice; men are not born with it. Even a law
yer's child would be likely to have only an imperfect knowledge of the
actual content of a barrister's daily experiences .
Symmonds objected to what he considered to be a lack of under
standing on the part of women of the shared background and experiences
of the barrister class, learned as the aristocracy might say, "on the play
ing fields of Eton. ,,ns

2'2:1.

228.

&e Admission o/Women, supra note

186, at 428-29.

Popular commentators have identified men's shared experiences and expectations as a

continuing barrier to male empathy with female demands for equality. As one writer noted:

My brother, my father, and I were going for a walk. . . . My brother was asking my father
questions about joining the army. Would he have to go'l How old would he be'l Would
there be a war'l Would he have to fight'l I remember feeling very far away emotionally.

As they talked, I knew that their conversation would not ever include me. For the first
time, I was glad. I didn't want to be drafted and go to war, and I knew I would never have
to. . . . My brother would never be able to have that same kind of relief. . . . Men are
expected to be like soldiers all the time, and they come to expect this of themselves. They

act brave and take charge even if others, including we women, don't overtly ask them to
do so. . . . Understanding the metaphor of the soldier goes far in helping you understand
men. That they
lives.
SHAPIRO, supra note

are

the ones who go to war is invisibly woven into the fabric of men's

131,

at 16-17. Similarly, in the

area

of sports, men share both language

and

experience.

11iey're (sports analogies) everywhere, and, I believe, men love to use them. 1bey
know they understand each other, a little bit like a secret code, although it's not so secret.
We are all becoming familiar with things like, "We'll keep going till we score," or "The

best defense is a good offense." These analogies are pervasive in all arenas. They are so
much a part of the language of business that we don't even recognize them as such.
Women in business soon learn to recognize them and use them. Men talk about
touchdowns, time-outs, fouls, and how about plain old win and lose! And in governmen t,

there's always talk of being on the president's team or being a team player.
Id. at 21 1. Men use sports analogies as a traditional and effective way of keeping most women out of
the conversation. Graham and Maschio point out the number of times that sports references in the film
THE ACCUSED (Paramount 1988) exclude or marginalize women. Graham & Maschio, supra note 12, at

1042.

Note also the analogy between sports and war in the "best defense is a good offense" remarlc . As
n
Marechal Foch wrote in a report to Marechal Joffre after the first battle of the Marne, July 191 4: "M�
is
t
righ
my
centre cede, ma droite recule, situation excellente, j'attaque" ("My center is crumbling,
bold
retreating, situation excellent, I attack!''). It is difficult to imagine a woman making such a
statement; it ranks with the often-<Juoted remark about winning a case: "If the law is against you , argue
g
the facts. If the facts are against you, argue the law. If both the facts and the law are against you, ban
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Far was it from him to say that women were not conscientious. They
had a deeper sense of conscience than the average man. It was more
tender, more easily aroused, there was sympathy for right and justice.
But he did say that women were wanting in that kind of honour
which, speaking before many experts as he did, he ventured to call
the honour of the profession. It was a thing to be learned. It was a
thing learned on the playing-fields largely, on the cricket and football
grounds of the public schools and elsewhere. It was a thing that
women were greatly wanting in. She would do nothing that she
thought wrong intentionally, but she would not know when she was
doing that which was not quite right to do in the Profession. It was a
profession in which one had to fight, to take advantage of his oppo
nent if he could, to resort to what might be called tricks and dodges
up to a certain point which was admissible, but there was a limit.229

Here Symmonds turned the "moral uplift" argument against women.
Their sense of justice, their innate tenderness, was misplaced as applied
to law. Because, as a practical matter, lawyers were not as concerned
with compassion and equity as they were with promoting the "business
of England" and with winning cases no matter what the rightness of the
opponent' s cause, Symmonds was perfectly willing to concede women's
superiority in those areas. 210 Women 's innate tendency to care for every
one concerned and to look for alternative solutions231 would necessarily
impair the proper workings of the system.232
While he did not specify it, he was also clearly concerned about a
woman's ability to "shift gears," to pursue a particular argument for the
good of the client without allowing it to carry over into the social or pro
fessional sphere outside the courtroom. The ability to "play a part" is one
that male common law attorneys tend to learn relatively quickly, if only
to grease the wheels of professional practice. The aggressive, unforgiv
ing lawyer does not get far when the time comes for negotiation or for
the granting of favors. "Playing a part" on a team is also part of the good
sportsmanship that boys learn early; it has not necessarily been part of
women's shared culture since until relatively recently girls have not par
ticipated in team sports to the extent that boys do. Thus, although he
would not have identified it as such, Symmonds ' fear that women would
not understand the unwritten rules of competition as practiced in law and
modelled on sports and war was based in an unarticulated but under
standable appraisal of deficiencies in women's socialization.

16 CARDOZO L. REV.
Ratner, A Brief Word in Response,
1793 (1 995).
229. Admission o/Women, supra note 186, at 429 (quoting remarks by J.A. Symmonds).
230. Id.
VOICE 28231. The classic statement of this quality is given in CAROL Gn.LIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
31 ( 1982).
ment
232 See Admission of Women, supra note 1 86, at 428-29 (illustratin the failure of the settle
� .

on the table and yell like hell." See David L.

·

Process that would take place if women lawyers were involved in the negotJations).
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Note that the assumptions about women's habits of thought211 are
linked to the particular characteristics of the English common law. While
opponents of the admission of women to the French Bar made the same
argument, that women would not be "tough enough" or intellectually
agile enough to make effective legal arguments on behalf of their clients,
they could not make the arguments that advocacy was of paramount im
portance. Instead, they suggested that women's ability to think "ration
ally" was less than men's, therefore they could not apply the principles
of French law adequately to defend their c lients' interests.234 They would
instead fall back on traditional feminine wiles in order to influence
judges.235 Symmonds continued that he was not suggesting that

the woman's sense of honour in the ordinary affairs of life would not
be as high as man's, but that honour which dealt with and related to
the honour of the profession he thought she would be wanting in. It
was for those who were in the profession to warn those who wished
26
for this change of the danger of the course they were pursuing. 3
But he objected to what he considered to be the lack of understanding
women had of the supremacy of the law.

Miss Nonnanton had not said a word about the common law of Eng
land, which was the admiration of the whole world. . . . Another ob
jection was that women were not law-abiding-that was of the deep
est importance. There was no hope for the civilisation of the world
surviving without deep respect of the law of the country-surviving
the storms of world revolution which were sweeping from the East
and threatening to overwhelm us. In this country the man had a deep
reverence for the law, and was by nature a law-abiding creature. But
the woman did not respect the law simply because it was the law. She
showed this, it might be, by slapping a policeman 's face. In his opin
ion it would be endangering this wonderful system of ours if the
touch which was not law-abiding and not full of judgment should be
237
permitted to interfere with the Ark of the Covenant.
In this passage one sees not only a failure on the part of the speaker
to recognize that the law involved has traditionally disenfranchised
women while presuming to legislate their rights and conduct, but also an

attempt to justify it on the grounds of secular legitimacy, on the grounds
of tradition, on the grounds of natural law, on the grounds of political
necessity and national security, and on the grounds of religion. It is a

233.

The question of real differences between male and female brains is still under discussion. Set

BF.NDERLY, supra note 226, at 3, 6, 7, 217; ROBERT NADEAU, S/HE BRAIN: SCIENCE, SEXUAL
POL.mes, AND nlE MYTIIS OF FEMINISM (1996).

234. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 445 (discussing arguments to justify women's participation in
.

professions generally}.

235. Id. at 472.
236. Admission o/Women, supra note 1 86, at 429.
237. Id.
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masterful (no pun intended) use of language to evade the very real ob
jections that women of the period had to the existing system of law. His
.
suggestion that women would react with violence to the legitimate exer
cise of authority ("slapping a policeman' s face") might well be a reflec
tion of his own actual experience as a police magistrate, possibly arising
from a notorious 1906 case,238 but it failed to acknowledge the very real
possibility that a woman ' s sole defense against an unjust situation might
well be physical resistance. The slap, indeed, represents the woman' s
traditional response t o objectionable male (usually sexual) behavior. For
Symmonds, however, it signals an inappropriate, therefore illegal, use of
violence, as opposed to men's self-defining, therefore legitimate, use of
violence (restraint of the woman who slaps the police officer, for exam
ple, even though he may be enforcing a law that disempowers women).
Symmonds went on to suggest that while women could serve per
fectly well on the bench (thus addressing Normanton's suggestion that he
feared competition), they mistakenly assumed that participation in the
profession would benefit them. Nothing, he asserted, could be further
from the truth. Indeed, the practice of law might be injurious to their
financial and emotional health.
On the bench he did not dread woman, it was as a practising lawyer,

advising clients, that he feared her. Miss Nonnanton asked if it would
be good for the community and for the Profession that women should
be allowed to enter the Profession. He would ask whether it was good
for the woman. The profession of the Bar was the hardest apprentice
ship of any profession in the world. Women desirous of entering it
were thinking of the successes they saw, he was thinking of the fail

ures-not of the incompetent and unlearned, but of the men of ability,

men of the greatest intelligence, who had hung on for years and had
never attained the success they deserved, or even reached in many
cases, a merited competence. And this failure was due merely to ill

luck, to having selected the wrong chambers, the wrong circuit, or
from a dozen such causes. He did not want to see the young women
of 19 to 27, 28, or 30 doing as he had seen the young fellows. They
were better able to bear it than the young women.239

His protestations are hard to take seriously, since judges need even
more common sense than practicing attorneys. It is difficult to see how a
woman, lacking the judgment necessary to counsel clients, could have
the judgment necessary to serve on the bench. Furthermore, it is a strange

238. Miss Billington wished an interview with the Chancellor of the Exchequer; when a policeman
intervened, she "slapped and kicked him." See Miss Billington's Case, 159 PARL. DEB. (4th ser.) 64849 (1906), cited in 5 A HlsrORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL l.AW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750
441 n.37 (Uon Radzinowicz & Roger Hood eds., 1968).
239. Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 429. Symmonds may, however, have meant that as a
judge he did not fear women advocates. This interpretation, which bespeaks a patronizing attitude as

well, is not, on the whole, much more satisfactory.
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concession, since judges generally have much more power in the court
room, and in the day-to-day control of the law, than attomeys.240
To counteract these arguments, Normanton responded that the sup
posed lack of honor among women was purely theoretical and specula
tive. What she did not point out was, of course, that a male notion of
"honor" is considered. It was extremely hypothetical to say what people
would lack in circumstances not known for long centuries.241 As for the
objection that women were not "law-abiding," although she did not quote
Shakespeare's famous line, "First thing we do, let ' s kill all the
lawyers,"242 she made an analogous argument. Citing the chaos of con
temporary Russia, she pointed out that "the first thing the Bolsheviks did
when they got power in Russia was to hang every lawyer, man and
woman."243 Giving women a stake in maintaining the legitimacy of the
legal order was a much more intelligent course than banning them alto
gether.
She would suggest that women lawyers would be a strength to soci

ety. If women once got these doctrines of anarchy into their heads and
hearts, it would be a thousand times worse than when they were con
fined to the men. The more women were interested in the law the
better for society and for themselves.244

As for Symmonds ' thoughtful concern for the well-being of women:
[W]hat happened to a woman who failed in any profession? If a man

failed in any capacity he had to go to the wall. That was the inexora
ble law, and it held good of the woman. Let every one be given any

equal chance. It had been said that the profession of the law would
take a great deal out of a woman. So did every profession-nursing

soldiers at the front, and in many other instances. When she (Miss
Normanton) made her application last year to the Middle Temple, it
was refused with unanimity, but immediately the largest organisation

of women in the country protested. That was an organisation which
numbered two and a half million members, the National Council of
Women Workers. There was a very large demand indeed amongst
women for women lawyers. The serious opposition, such as there had

been, had practically melted away, and she would like to leave the
question-and it was a great question-in the long run to the consid
eration that it was for the good of the country as a whole and to the
highest service of the community that, if proper service was ready to

240.

es of
See, e.g., Delfs, supra note 15, at 322 n.169 and accompanying text (providing exampl

sexist behavior by male judges in contemporary courtrooms).
241. Admission of Women, supra note 1 86, at 429.

SC. 2; see also
424 (1953)
J.
New York County Lawyers Association Honors Chief Judge John C. Knox, 39 AB.A

242.

WilLIAM SHAKESPEARE, lHE SECOND PART OF KING llENRY THE SIXfH act 4,

(quoting the remarks of Edwin M. Ottenbourg which provide the real meaning
misinterpretation of these lines).
243. Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 429.
244. Id.

and frequent
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be rendered to the State by any individual of any kind, the State
should hesitate

S

service.24
•

long

and seriously before rejecting that proper

Like other supporters, Normanton was clearly offended by the sug
.
gestion that women would be reduced to tears if they lost a case or faced
real opposition in the courtroom.246 Her words, and those of Miss Oon
desley Brereton and others attending, ultimately persuaded the listeners
to the debate.247
Among additional arguments advanced against both the right and
the advisability of women becoming attorneys was that of the likelihood
of marriage, which immediately conferred both a legal and social dis
ability on the woman.248 The small number of women likely to be inter
ested in becoming attorneys, based on the number of impediments pre
sented, itself became an argument against the admission of women to the
bar. Opponents argued that so few women would be affected that the
question was hardly worth addressing.249 Even the supporters of female
membership in the bar acknowledged that their numbers were so few
that, as one Canadian commentator acknowledged:
I do not think that the most fervent advocate of women 's rights could

claim that the admission of women to the practice of law has had any
appreciable effect on the bar, the practice of law, the bench, or the

people. It is claimed that it was a measure of justice and fair play, that

245. Id.
246. French opponents of admission advanced a similar argument See Corcos, supra note 37, at
469 (listing complaints related to the question of women's physical and mental fitness for the bar).
247. "The motion was carried, 35 votes being given in its favour and 28 against" Admission of
Women, supra note 186, at 429.
248. Marriage was viewed as an impediment to other professions as well. When the Inter

Departmental

Committee of the British Foreign Service examined the question of the admission of

women to the service, it considered both the traditional prejudices against women in those positions,
which it deemed unfortunate, and the very real obstacles that marriage might present to those women.
[E)ven if governmental regulations place no bar in the way of employing married women,
a normal attractive young woman who wishes to marry may, nevertheless, find herself in
the unfortunate predicament of being obligated to resign from the Service or to give up
the man of her choice. The consequence of placing its foreign service officer in this
dilemma is likely to result in a loss of efficiency for the Government, whether it be
because of the resignation of an experienced officer or because she may be handicapped
by the canker of a serious constraint, consequent upon her renunciation.
Ellery C. Stowell, Editorial Comment: The Admission of Women to the British Foreign Service, 30 AM.
J. INT'LL. 499, 500 (1936).

249.

Likewise, the report of the Inter-Departmental Committee of the British Foreign Service

recommended against the admission of women.
Finally, His Majesty ' s Government do not consider that any injustice is being done
to women by their continued exclusion from the Diplomatic Service. It is, to say the least,
doubtful whether women

are

suited to this Service owing to the conditions prevailing; it

is equally doubtful whether the admission of women would contribute any special
advantage to the State; lastly, the size of the Service is so small that the general question
of the employment of women is in any event hardly affected.

Id. at 501 (quoting the government's official pronouncement). French opponents of women's admission
expressed the concern that only unattractive women would pursue a long-tenn career in the law,
apparently an outcome too dreadful to be contemplated. Corcos, supra note 37, at 468.
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it removed a grievance and has had no countervailing disadv

That claim may be fairly be allowed; in other respects, the adm1ss1on
of women is regarded with complete indifference by all but those
immediately concerned. :zso

Even the most committed supporter of women ' s rights must have
wondered how women raised in an intellectual, social and political ambi
ance so different from men could adequately adj ust to the standards of
behavior inculcated in the class of men who traditionally became mem
bers of the English Bar. Women for whom the public school was foreign
territory, and the training grounds of the British armed forces, the City,
and the Houses of Parliament were complete mysteries, might very well
fail to understand those unspoken mores that formed the shared environ
ment in which English lawyers operated. In addition, the legal profession
was anxious to maintain the status that it had spent centuries in acquiring
through an emphasis on its connection with the traditional medieval uni
versity curriculum as well as the habits and fortunes of the landed gentry
and the aristocracy .251 Given that women ' s rights to hold land and titles
were circumscribed to various extents, contemporary male attorneys
were likely to accept intuitively that they should also be excluded from
the professions, particularly law.
To allow individuals who had traditionally had no part in formally
shaping that law to take part in its application and future development
was certainly a leap of faith for even the most fervent male advocates of
the equality of the fairer sex. The changes that these men anticipated
included the traditional expectation of "moral uplift": women would
bring a sense of moral purpose to the law, interesting themselves in
"women's issues" such as marriage and probate, the care of children,
domestic violence, prostitution, and education. Some women attorneys
found this interest natural as well.
To-day men and women alike rejoice in the record of scientific

achievements, in the progress made along educational lines. . . . But
women at the same time are "wondering why" about many things.
My point is this-that just as they, true to woman nature, have
worked in the past, indirectly, to mitigate the overshadowing evils
that have accompanied our advance every step of the way-so will
they, under new conditions-working without any handicap, in the
future and holdin� high positions in the state--concentrate upon cer
_
tam problems which from their very nature appeal to womankind and

�

which the rank and file of men deplore half-heartedly . . . . [I]t i but
natural that our sex should be acutely conscious to-day of the burdens

Riddell, supra note 85, at 206.
See
Pres t, Why the History ofthe Professions is Not Written,
in LAW, EcONOMY AND
SOCIE.TY, 1750-1914. FssAYS
TIIE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 300, 3 15-16 (G.R. Rubin & David
Sugarman eds., 1984) (elaborattng on the meanin
g of the word "profes
250.

25 1 .

Wilfr�

�

sion" to the lawyer).
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that rest most heavily upon women and little children. Because of
252
this, the evils of the industrial system loom up largely.

Most men, however, did not recognize, or did not articulate, the possibil
ity that women might actually refocus the attention of the law on other
issues, or force a change in the debate that contemplated as yet unfor
mulated solutions to traditional problems. Such approaches might bring
about fundamental changes in the nature of the English common law; the
men who supported the entrance of women into the English legal profes
sion would have had difficulty anticipating them.
C.

Existing Legislation and Its Interpretation
1 . Attempts to Obtain Admission Through the Courts

Finally, one Englishwoman who had completed the appropriate
education for the profession of solicitor and had been accepted as a clerk
in accordance with the requirement of the Law Society (the certifying
body for the profession) ,253 requested admittance by taking her case to
court, initially to the Supreme Court of Judicature. Her attempt, like that
of Jeanne Chauvin in France,254 Myra Bradwell in the United States (Illi
nois),255 and Clara Brett Martin in Canada (Ontario),256 forced the courts to

252. Giles, supra note 6, at 356.
253. See EDMUND BROWN VINEY CHR.iSITAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF SOLICITORS 177 (1896)
(providing a history of the Law Society).
254. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 447.
255. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872). See ROBERT SlEVENS, LA.w SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1 850s TO Tiffi 1980s, at 8 1 -84 (1983). Joan Hoff gives a fuller
account of Mansfield's admission in LAW, GENDER AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HlsTORY OF U.S.
WOMEN 162-63 (1991). Hoff also rehearses the story of Ada H. Keply, the first American woman to
graduate from an accredited law school and the objections to Bradwell's admission, namely that she
was married. Id. at 163-70. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Clara Slwrtridge Foltz: "First Woman", 28
VAL U. L REv. 1231 (1994) (discussing the first woman admitted in California).
For other U.S. cases in which the bar denied admission to a womam admitted in another state,
see In re Maddox, 50 A. 487 (Md. 1901); In re Leonard, 6 P. 426 (Or. 1 885). But see In re Application
for License, 55 S.E. 635 (1906) (intimating that judges who deny qualified women admission to the bar
are lacking in common sense). See also Admission of Women, supra note 186; Some Judicial Views of
Woman's Sphere, 15 LAW NOTES 103 (1911); Women Lawyers and the Law, 16 LA.w NOTES 1 41
(1912). By July 1915, Law Notes was suggesting to the Georgia legal profession that it was much too
late to deny women the right to enter the practice of law, no matter what its intentions. Right of Women
to Practice Law, 19 LAw NO'I'ES 62 (1915); see also Virginia G. Drachman, Women Lawyers and the
Quest for Professional Identity in Late Nineteenth-Century America, 88 MICH. L REV. 2414 (1990)
(discussing attempts to create a gendered, professional identity). French opponents of women's
admission also objected that married women were barred from acting as attorneys, since their freedom
of action was subordinate to their husbands' will. See Corcos, supra note 37, at 462.
As early as 1886, however, some male attorneys were considering the possible impact of women
on the profession. In that year Mr. Charles C. Moore published a piece of overheated Victorian prose
called The Female Lawyer, in which he speculated on the arrival in the town of Litchfield (home of the
first U.S. law school) of a female attorney named Miss Mary Padelford, who, denied entrance to the
Massachusetts Bar, obtains her license in Connecticut Miss Padelford is painted as a very competent
member of the profession, particularly in the area of "consultations, drawing deeds, bonds, will and
other legal documents," but is unfortunately done in by the unchivalrous behavior of an adversary. After
,
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consider whether admission to the practice of law is a public, not a pri
vate function, and as such whether it may be regulated by the appropriate
jurisdiction. While the women requesting admission by court degree
were uniformly unsuccessful,231 their requests forced the various govern
ments involved to acknowledge the end of an era in which the right to
make law could no longer be determined simply by members of a very
select and self-selecting group.258
2.

Bebb

v.

Law Society: The Trial Court Case

After attending school in London and at Oxford University, where
she earned honors in jurisprudence,v9 Gwyneth Marjorie Bebb decided to
attempt to qualify as a solicitor. In order to do so, she needed the spon
sorship of a practicing solicitor, who would accept her as a clerk for a

a bout with brain fever, she returns to Litchfield to marry a colleague, join him in his practice and live
happily ever after. In deference to her feminine disabilities, however, the practice is divided up
"between the partners to the entire satisfaction of both." Charles C. Moore, The Female lawyer, 26
GREEN BAG 525 (1914) (citing the DAil..Y TIMEs (Hartford), May 1 7 , 1886). Virginia Drachrnan talces a
rather sour view of this story, emphasizing Moore's assumptions about the woman lawyer's natural
e ess of her limited practice after her marriage. See DRACHMAN,
physical frailty and the appropriatn
supra note 213, at 32-33. While to late twentieth-century eyes the style of the story does seem outdated
and the sentiments somewhat patronizing, Moore's willingness to allow his protagonist hero, a
successful lawyer, to fall in love with and encourage the aspirations of the woman attorney in the story
is refreshing. Indeed, given the continuing prejudices against women attorneys documented in works by
Podmore & Spencer, supra notes 17, 19; SACHS & WR.SON, supra note 3; and Kennedy, supra note
158; Moore may be more somewhat more progressive than he seems at first. But see D. Kelly
Weisberg, Barred From the Bar: Women and Legal Education in the United States 1870-1890, 28 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 485 (1977) (addresis ng women's struggle to gain entry into the legal profession). Further.
the career path chosen by Miss Padelford is quite similar to those chosen by some Canadian women
lawyers up to the 1 970s. See Kinnear, supra note 85, at 428-29.
256. See supra Part ID.Al.
257. It is significant that these women thought the courts might be sympathetic to their claims,
since it suggests that they believed that their rights were at least as strong as those of men similarly
situated. On the realization of the ability of courts to empower women with civil rights previously
see MICHAEL GROSSBF.RG, A JUDGMENT FOR SOLOMON: THE D'HAlITEVILLE CASE AND
LEGAL ExPERIENCE IN ANTEBElLUM AMERICA 155-67 (1996) (describing the attempt of a nineteerith

denied,

century Philadelphia divorcee to obtain custody of her children from her Swiss ex-husband).
258. On the history and regulation of French lawyers, see MICHAEL P. FITZSIMMONS, THE
PARISIAN ORDER o: BARRISTERS AND nm FRENCH REVOLUTION (1987); LUCIEN KARJ'IK, Im
AVOCATS: ENTREL'ETAT, LE PuBUCETLE MARCllE XXIIIE-XXESIECLE(l995). On U.S. lawyers, see
ANTON-HERMANN DIR.OUST, THE RISE OF THE l.EGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA (1965) ; THE 1.EGAL
H
PROFESSION: MAJOR HlsroRICAL INTERPRETATIONS (Kermit L Hall ed., 1987); 1llE NEW HIG
e
siv
en
preh
PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN PoST-CIVIL WAR. AMERICA (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1 984). A com
al .,
et
hurs
Art
W.
legal
Canadian
the
of
Harry
history
profession has yet to be written; however, see
Canadian Lawyers: A Peculiar Professionalism, in 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY, supra note 69, at 123-77.
On English lawyers, see 15 HOIDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 14, at 223-47;
Richard L Abel, England and Wales: A Comparison of the Professional Projects of Barristers and
Solicitors, in 1 LAWYERS IN SocIETY, supra note 69, at 23-75.
e
259. Bebb v. Law Society, 29 T.LR. 634, 635 (Ch. 1913). Tue case was ttied in the Supre�
ich
wh
.
Court of Judicature, Chancery Division, on July 2, 1913, and appealed to the court of appeal
.
heard the case on December 9 and 10, 1913, and delivered its opinion on December 13, 1913 . Bebb v
I.aw Society, 30 T.LR. 179 (C.A 1913).
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stated period of tirne.260 Ultimately, she also needed some kind of official
recognition from the Law Society that she would be admitted, once she
completed all the requirements satisfactorily as defined by the Solicitors
Act of 1843,261 which established the requirements of membership in the
English Bar, including minimum qualifications for training and member
ship.262 Section 3 required would-be solicitors to have been "bound

as

a

clerk to a solicitor."263
She understood that there were firms of solicitors who were willing to
take her as an articled clerk . . . . Mr. E.A. Bell, examined by Mr.
Wright, said that he practised in the City as a solicitor, and that he
belonged to the finn of Carter and Bell. He was willing to accept the
plaintiff as his clerk.264

Section 2 of the Act required such work experience:
[N]o person shall act as an attorney or solicitor, or as such attorney or
solicitor sue out any writ or process, or commence, carry on, solicit,
or defend any action, suit, or other proceeding, in the name of any
other person or in his own name . . . unless such person shall have
previously to the passing of this Act admitted and inrolled and other
wise duly qualified to act as an attorney or solicitor under or by virtue

of the laws now in force , or unless such person shall after the passing
of this Act be admitted and inrolled and otherwise duly qualified to
act as an attorney or solicitor, pursuant to the directions and regula
tions of this Act, and unless such person shall continue to be so duly
qualified and on the roll at the time of his acting in the capacity of an
attorney or solicitor as aforesaid.265

Nothing in this section, or indeed in the rest of the Act, stated that
only men could become clerks. If a woman could complete the require
ments laid out in the Act, she should theoretically be allowed to practice.

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Bebb, 29 T.L.R. at 634.
6 & 7 Viet., ch. 7 3, §§ 2, 3 (Eng.).
Id.

Bebb, 2 9 T.LR. at 634.

Id. at 635. Bell's willingness to assist Bebb would still have been unusual in the England of

the early 1980s.
A male sponsor will have mixed feelings about accepting a woman as protege or as
presenting her to his colleagues as a good proposition in the long term for a law
partnership to take on. He will he unlikely to identify a woman

as

a potential partner or

successor and will tend to prefer a male protege who is assumed to be more committed to
a career. Sponsors (like selectors everywhere) tend to pick proteges "in their own image",
[sic] which automatically reduces the chances of women. Moreover, a woman protege is
assumed to be potential "trouble" in other ways and the ideal type close relationship
between sponsor and prorege may be less easy to maintain between members of the
opposite
account.

sex,

particularly when the views of the respective marital partners

are

taken into

(footnote omitted). John Mortimer's short stories Rumpolt!
Female of the Species, in THE SECOND RUMPOLE OMNIBUS 324 (1 987) and Rumpok and thL
Miscarriage of Justice, in RUMPOLE ON TRIAL 79 (1992), detail the difficulties of women in the

Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 29
and the

profession.

265.

Solicitors Act of 1843, 6 & 7 Viet., ch. 73,

§ 2 (Eng.).
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According to Bebb's attorneys, Messrs. Stanley B uckrnaster266 and
R.A. Wright, the Law Society 's difficulty stemmed from the admittance
of women to clerkships. If a woman could be admitted to a clerkship,
then, assuming she completed her training satisfactorily, nothing pre
26
vented her from being admitted to the profession of solicitor. 1 They ad
dressed the traditional objections to a llowing women into the profession,
specifically custom and statutory language.m Common law provided no
support for the contention that women were excluded from the profes
sion. Prior to the reign of Edward II, women could, and did, appear as
advocates.269 Apart from the Act o f 1 888, the only prohibitions against
women entering the profession were inferred from tradition, and based
on no required denial of the right.

1 888. By
1 0 of that Act the Master of the Rolls was bound to admit the

The only Act which was in mandatory form was the Act of
section

plaintiff if she presented a certificate. That being the position, then,
unless the Law Society could refuse to let her sit for the examination,
there was nothing to prevent her from being admitted as a solicitor.
The only right to inquire into the character and capacity of an appli
20
cant was the right given at the time of the final examination. 1

Since Bebb was not requesting the right to exercise a public office, from
which women were disqualified,

266. Later, he became Lord Buckmaster. See DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, 1931-1940,
at 1 1 9-21 (LG. Wickham Legg ed., Supp. 1949) (describing Lord Buckmaster's life).
267 . Bebb v. Law Society, 29 T.LR. 634, 635 (Ch. 1 9 1 3).
268. Id. at 635.
269. The story of the woman who appointed another woman as her attorney and then removed her
is often told. 1 SELECT CIVIL PlEAs, case 141, at 56 (William Paley Baildon ed., 1 890). Generally
speaking, the "2:-tcmey" was not a member of a recognized profession but simply one who spoke for
another in court; thus any person could fulfill that role.
Originally the job is rather "casual." Even a woman could do it; in 1 203 a woman
puts her sister in her place and then removes her, but she is not called attornata. But in
1 3 1 3 a man claims "per Isabellam de Uptone attomatum suum". Katherine Bompuz in
1 306 was "appointed" attorney to receive a gold ring. Thus the word is originally not
technical but lay, if not popularly coined, while all the words with which it soon has to
compete were by this time-though they, too, had once been of popular origin-stamped
with ajural character.
HERMAN COHEN,
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR AND A7TORNA7VS TO 1 450, at 1 34 (1929)
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter COHEN, A HISTORY]. Cohen also contributed an erudite two-part essay
· on the subject, The Origins of the English Bar, 30 LAW Q. REV. 464, 467 (1914); 3 1 LAW Q. REV. 56,

A

62-63 (1915).
The case of women advocates during Roman times is also often cited as evidence that women
could and did serve as lawyers , although it also demonstrates the objections that men had to women
attorneys, namely that they could be too energetic (therefore ill-suited to the practice of law). Quoting
the Siete Partidas of Alfonso X, Cohen stated:
The code ( 1 .8) is very emphatic in disqualifying any woman "however (wise or)
learned" (sabidora) from practising, "for two reasons; it is not decent for a woman to
compete publicly with men, in arguing for another: then because the sages in the past
prohibited it after their experience of Calfumia." This story seems to have had a
fascination for Latin jurists.
COHEN, A HISTORY, supra at 422 (footnotes omitted).
270. Bebb, 29 T.L.R. at 634.
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there was nothing to prevent a woman from performing a private

duty, and the office of a solicitor was a private office. The disability
extended only to the exercise of public functions. That women had

not hitherto desired to exercise these functions merely meant that
their qualifications had lain dormant, not that they did not exist.
There was no disqualification either at common law or by statute.27 1

The two advocates also presented a carefully constructed case on
the question of statutory language, arguing that since women were not
specifically exempted from becoming solicitors by the Act, that Bebb
should be allowed to qualify, or in the alternative, that if women were
not allowed to practice as solicitors by the terms of the Act, they could
not be held to be in violation of it, should they fail to be admitted and
enrolled by the Law Society. "If the use of the masculine gender and the
word 'person' in other parts of the Act did not include women, then
women were not included under that section, and they could act as so
licitors without being admitted and enrolled, and could not be punished
for so doing."212 Indeed, Ivy Williams, who would later become the first
woman admitted to practice law in England, had challenged the profes
sion with that argument in 1 904:
There will be a band of lady "University lawyers." These University
lawyers will say to the Benchers and the Law Society: "Admit us, or

we shall form a third branch of the profession, and practise as outside
lawyers." There is no law to prevent it. Ladies holding University law

degrees, learned and skilled in the law, deservedly enjoying public
confidence, could legally compete in vast fields of the solicitor's and
counsel 's most lucrative domains, and without infringing the law.

And they need not trammel themselves with lawyers' trade union
3
rules.27

Bebb, however, professed herself willing to comply with certain of the
requirements, such as apprenticeship, although she maintained that she
could be exempted from talcing the preliminary examination.214 Further
legislation of 1 877210 and l 888216 set forth clarification in regard to the
271. Id. at 635. Interestingly, no one seems to have remarked that the office of sovereign, the most
public office in the realm, had been repeatedly and until 1 2 years before, spectacularly occupied by a
person ofthe female sex. But see infra notes 303-04 and accompanying text.
272. Bebb, 29 T.L.R. at 634.
273. Obiter Dicta, 39 LAW J. I ( 1904) at I. The reporter also quoted an American attorney who
opined:

My own observation of women lawyers, based upon thirty years' experience at the
Bar of Illinois and of the Supreme Court of the United States, is that they do not succeed;
indeed, hardly appear as advocates, however useful they may become as office
practitioners . . . . The few women I have ever seen in the Courts did n?t appe� to me to
be conspicuous examples of success; and one of them, who had, I believe, gamed some
notoriety, had done so in the Police courts by the sacrifice of qualities usually considered
as feminine.

Id.

274. Bebb, 29 T.L.R. at 635. She was undoubtedly making reference to the Solicitors Act of 1 894,
57 & 58 Viet., ch. 9, § 3 (Eng.).
275. Solicitors Act of 1877, 40 & 41 Viet., ch. 25, §§ 5, 7, 8 (Fng.).
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fitness of applicants to sit for the required examinations and the necessity
for a certificate to be presented to the Master of the Rolls attesting to
acceptable completion of the requirements for entering the profession.
Like many other questions in which the exact classification of
women figured, the meaning of the word "person" was crucial to the
interpretation of the statute, and therefore to the entry of women into the
profession.
Section 48 was the interpretation clause, and was very important. It
enacted that "every word importing the masculine gender only shall
extend and be applied to a female as well as a male; and the word
'person' shall extend to any body politic, corporate, or collegiate,
municipal, civil, or ecclesiastical, aggregate or sole, as well as an in
dividual; unless in any of the cases aforesaid it be otherwise specially
provided, or there be something in the subject or context repugnant to
such construction. m

This "repugnancy" applied to section 2, the section setting forth the
qualifications for the position of solicitor.278 Further, Bebb' s attorneys
argued, nothing in section 48 was repugnant to section 2.279 Note also,
that the Interpretation Act of 1 889, required that "unless the contrary
intention appears,-(a) words importing the masculine gender shall in
clude females; and (b) words in the singular shall include the plural, and
words in the plural shall include the singular.'�80
The Law Society also pleaded custom and the interpretation of lan
guage as well as an inability to make such a momentous decision in ob
jecting to Bebb's request.281 Mr. Hughes, one of the barristers represent
ing the Law Society, argued that
in this matter the Law Society was in the position of a public official.
It was the registrar and was responsible for the register of solicitors.
When the plaintiff and three other ladies presented their application
the society felt that it was impossible to admit them without taking
the opinion of the Court. With regard to the period before the modem
Acts, there was no known instance of a woman practising as an attor
ney or solicitor. The right to have an attorney, instead of the obliga
tion to appear in person, only developed very gradually . . . . The Act
of 1 8 43 was negative throughout. It proceeded on the footing that up
to that time men, and men only, had acted as solicitors. Ordinarily,
where words importing the masculine gender were used, they in-

276. Solicitors Act of 1 888, 51 & 52 Viet., ch. 65, § 1 0 (Eng.).
277. Bebb, 29 T.LR. at 634 (quoting the Solicitor's Act of 1843, 6 & 7 Viet., ch. 73, § 48 (Eng.)).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Interpretation Act of 1889, 52 & 5 3 Viet., ch. 63, § 1 (Eng.). On English statutory
interpretation, see PETER BENSON MAxwEu., ON 1HE INTERPRETATION OF STATIJI'ES 349 (G.F.l..
Bridgman ed., 7th ed. 1929) (reprinting the Interpretation Act).
281. Bebb, 29 T.L.R. at 635.
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eluded women, but that would not apply in this case, because it was
not the custom for women to act as solicitors.282

Notice here the reversal of the traditional anti-female position that if a
word is not used, this omission is deliberate and necessarily means that
women are excluded. The Law Society acknowledged here that failure to
specify that women were included was not fatal to the plaintiff' s case.283
Instead, it took the position that the omission resulted from the failure of
the drafters to recognize that women might actually request inclusion. 284
Such tortuous logic suggests bad faith on the part of a Law Society
that knew the temper of the times was slowly turning against it. In sup
port of its position, it could only cite a Scottish case interpreting a voting
statute,

Nairn v. University of St. Andrews,285 in which women graduates

of the University of Edinburgh were denied the right to vote for Parlia
mentary electors,286 and another Scottish case, Hall v. Incorporated Soci
ety of Law-Agents,281 whose reasoning ultimately paralleled that in Bebb,
the Scottish equivalent of the Law Society had not opposed the admis
sion of the petitioner.288
Similarly, when addressing the question of section 35 ,289 Hughes
argued that since the legislature did not specifically mention women, it
could not have contemplated their inclusion in the profession.290 "Person"
within the meaning of the Act necessarily meant "male."291
For Mr. Justice Joyce, the question seemed to tum on whether the
position of solicitor had any public duties associated with it.292 If so, then
women, being disqualified from exercising public offices, were neces
sarily disqualified from the profession. "According to common law, a
woman was incapable of occupying a public office . . . . It had been said

282.

Id.

283.

Id.

284.

Id.

285.

25 T.L.R. 160, 1 60 (Sess. 1 908).

286.

Nairn, 25

287.

3 Fr. 1059 (Sess. 1 90 1 ).

288.

Hall, 3 Fr. at 1060.

T.LR. at 1 60.

289.

Hughes stated:
.
.
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That from and after the passing of this Act, in case any person shall m his own name or
or
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process,
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writ
any
out
�
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the name of any other person sue
defend any action or suit or any proceedings in any court of l�w or equity, w1tho�t bemg
_
m such
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§ 35 (Eng.).
Bebb v. Law Society, 29 T.L.R. 634, 635 (Ch. 1 9 13).

Solicitors Act of 1 843, 6 & 7 Viet., ch. 73,
290.
291 .

Bebb, 29 T.L.R. at 635.

292.

Id.
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that a solicitor did not exercise a public function, but he was very much
mistaken if solicitors of standing were not qualified to exercise certain
·public functions."293 His Lordship did not believe he was mistaken.294 In
deed,

[h]is Lordship entertained no doubt as to the position of women be
fore the modern legislation. He did not doubt that they were disquali
fied by reason of their sex from acting as solicitors. Then there was
the Act of 1 843. His Lordship read section 48, and said that such a
clause as that was only to enable the drafting of the Act to be done
more concisely than it might otherwise be. The same remark applied
to the Interpretation Act. It was never intended to make such a revo
lution. There was no statute which showed any intention of the Leg
islature to alter the common law. The disability therefore still existed,
and would exist until it was changed by the Legislature. The action
must therefore be dismissed. 295
Apparently, his Lordship felt no compunction about so actively inter
preting the intention of the legislature, in contravention of the Interpreta
tion Act of 1889.296 To suggest that statutory language that specifically
includes women was written simply for the sake of efficiency is to make
a mockery of any possible legislative intent.297
3.

The Court of Appeals Case

Bebb pursued the matter, and in 1 9 1 3 the court of appeals upheld
the finding of Mr. Justice Joyce.298

The action was brought by Miss Gwyneth Marjorie Bebb asking for a
declaration that she was a "person" within the meaning of the Solici
tors Act, 1 843, and the amending Acts, and a mandamus to compel
the Law Society to admit her to the preliminary examinations held by
the Law Society under such Acts with a view to her becoming a so
licitor.299
The appellate court focused on the question of interpretation of the
statute, as the appellant' s new counsel, Lord Robert Cecil, requested.300
Further, the issue of the disqualification of women to hold public office
was by no means clear.
Id.
Id.
295. Id.

293.

294.

296.

52 & 53 Viet., ch. 63 (Eng.).

297.

This kind of Humpty-Dumpty jurisprudence (that a word means what a person chooses it to
mean, LEwlS CARROL, ALICE'S ADVE.NTIJRES IN WONDERLAND
, AND THROUGH TIIE LooKING GLASS
(1912)) recalls a 1947 Louisiana case in which the
court refused to find the existence of undisclosed
agency in spite of the fact that the relevant statute
specifically provided for undisclosed agency. See
Sentell v. Richardson, 29 So. 2d 852 (La. 1947).
298.

299.

Bebb. v . Law Society, 30 T.L.R. 179 (C.A. 1
913).

Hebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179.
300. Id.
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�is contentions were ( 1 ) that unmarried women had the same legal

nghts as men; (2) that at Common Law there was nothing to prevent
women from becoming attorneys; and

(3)

that on the fair construction

of the statutes on the subject they favoured the view that women were
entitled to be admitted as solicitors.

in

Pollock and Maitland ' s His

tory of English Law (first edition), Vol. I, p.

468,

it was laid down

that women had the same private rights as men, but that there was no
place for women in public offices. If that was to be taken as being
true as regards public functions, the words must be construed nar
rowly.301

Surprisingly, Mr. Cozens-Hardy, the Master of the Rolls, the official
appointed to accept certificates from aspiring solicitors, volunteered from
the bench that "women had acted as churchwardens."302
Cecil also made the rather obvious point that women had ruled the
country, both as queens regnant303 (i.e., in their own right) and as regents
for absent kings or child sovereigns.304
Queen Eleanor had acted in

1 253

as Keeper of the Great Seal. . . .

Counsel then cited authorities to show that a woman had also acted as
a hereditary Lord High Constable, by deputy, and as Marshal and

Lord Chamberlain. There was authority that she could act as governor
of a workhouse . . . a sexton . . . or an overseer. Thus there was no ab
solute sex disqualification which prevented women from holding
public offices, but their right to do so depended on the circumstances

of each case. They were excluded . from military offices for want of
physical capacity and could only hold them by deputy.305

Id.
Id. This comment was unpersuasive to at least one commentator. See Notes: Women and the
Profession, 26 JURID. REV. 1 30, 1 3 1 (1914). On the duties of churchwardens as officers of the state, see
301 .

302.

generally WII..LIAM LAMBARDE, THE DUETIES OF CONSTABLES, BORSHOLDERS, 'I'YTinNGMEN, AND
SUCH 0rnER LoWE AND LAY MINISTERS OF 1llE PEACE ( 1 599); JOHN LAYER, THE OFFICE AND DUnE
OF CONSTABLES, CHURCHWARDENS AND OI'HER Tiffi OVERSEERS OF nm PooRE (1641); GEORGE
MERrroN, A GUIDE FOR CONSTABLES, CHuRCHWARDENS, OVERSEERS OF nm PooR, SURVEYORS OF
1liE HIGH-WAYS, TREASURERS OF THE COUNTY-STOCK, MASTERS OF nm HOUSE OF CORRECl10N,
BAYLIFFS OFMANNORS, TOLL-TAKERS IN FA1RS &C (l679).
303.

Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 1 79. The most recent example was of course Victoria (1837- 1 901), who is

the subject of many biographies, including CAROLLY ERICKSON, HER L!'ITLE MArnSTY: THE LIFE OF

QUEEN VICTORIA (1997).
304.

Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179. Among the most notable were Eleanor of Aquitaine, the wife of

Henry II, who governed the kingdom during his absences fighting on the continent, Margaret of Anjou,
the unpopular wife of Henry VI, who governed during his bouts of insanity, and Catherine of Aragon,
who was named Regent while Henry VIII was off to fight with Francis I of France.

Some historians

have now begun to study the roles of queens as rulers, advisors and educators from the earlier Christian

See PAULINE STAFFORD,
QUEENS, CONCUBINES, AND DoWAGERS: THE KING'S WIFE IN TifE EARLY MIDDLE AGES 1 1 5-90

period through the middle Renaissance (roughly 500 C.E. to 1 500 C. E.).
(1 983).
305.

Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179 (citations omitted). The "Queen Eleanor" of Cecil's reference was

Eleanor of Provence, the Queen of Henry III (reigned 1 21 6- 1 272).
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Cecil also addressed the case of Beresford-Hope v. Sandhurst,'l06 one of
the cases on which the Law Society had relied to demonstrate that
women could not exercise any public office.
Lord Esher had expressed the view that a woman could not exercise
any public function, and had relied on Chorlton v. Lings, but Lord
Esher's dictum could not be supported by what was said by Willes, J.,
in that case, and was incorrect. If it was correct it would be difficult
to see how female inspectors could be appointed under the Factory
and Workshop Act, 1901, section 1 1 8.307

The case of Chorlton v. Lings308 was a suffrage case, an early at
tempt to obtain the right to vote for women through an error on the part
of the election commissioners. Mrs. Lilly Maxwell, a resident of Man
chester, discovered that she had been erroneously entered on the electoral
register and with the assistance of barrister Chisholm Anstey attempted
� �� � �� � ��� � � � �� � An� �
veloped the argument, the right to vote had traditionally been attached to
property ownership rather than to gender.110 More than five thousand
other women eagerly seized on the opportunity, also claiming the right of
suffrage.31 1 The court of appeals rejected Mrs. Maxwell' s petition, pri
marily because even if the right had ever existed, women had lost it by
failing to exercise it.312 This malicious argument paralleled the position
that opponents of women's admission to the bar used to justify their ex
clusion. How can one exercise a right that one has been assured one does
not possess? Such reasoning had the effect of codifying the custom of
denying women the vote, forcing the decision back into the legislative
arena. But it appealed to the Bebb court which adopted the "custom"
argument in rejecting her position.313
At least one of the presiding magistrates, Lord Justice Phillimore,
did not find Cecil' s historical argument persuasive. Although the barris
ter cited both the Pollock and Maitland work,314 a classic statement of the
development of English legal history, and some of the Yearbooks of Ed-

306. 5 T.L.R. 472. (C.A. 1889).
307. Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179 (citation omitted).
308. 4 LR. 347 (C.P. 1 868).
309. Nonnan St John-Stevas, Women in Public Law, in A CENnJRy OF FAMILY LAW 185 7-1 957,
supra note 18, at 256, 263-64.
310. Id. at 263.
31 1 . Id. at 263-64.
312. Chorlton, 4 L.R. at 347.
313. Bebb v. Law Society, 30 T.L.R. 179, 180 (C.A. 191 3). Eventually women did oblain a
limited right to vote with the passage of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1 9 19, 9 & 1 0 Geo.
5, ch. 71, § 1 (Eng.).
314. FREDERICK POI.LOCK & FREDF.RIC Wll.lJAM MAm.ANn, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
216 (2d ed. 1903). On the difference between "countor'' (or serje nt) and attorney, see EDMUND
a
BROWN VINEY CHRISTIAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF SOLICITORS 3-4 (1 896).
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ward III,315 his Lordship objected that "at that time there was no profes

sion of attorneys, but a litigant could appoint anyone to be his
attomey."316 Cecil acknowledged that was true, but that after the profes

sion had formally emerged, women had still been employed as advo
cates. "Other authorities were Select Civil Pleas, Vol. 1 ., case 141 , p. 56,

when a woman appointed another woman to represent her, and Bracton' s
1
Note Book, Vol. ii., case 3 42, p. 283 , and Vol. ill ., p. 33 5 ."31 Cecil reit

erated that the use of the word "person" in section 2 of the 1 843 Act "in

cluded a woman"318 and that section 48 mandated that the use of the mas
culine gender incorporated women as well.

[E]very word importing the masculine gender only shall extend and

be applied to a female as well as a male; and the word "person" shall

extend to any body politic, corporate, or coliegiate, municipal, civil,
or ecclesiastical, aggregate or sole, as well as an individual, unless in
any of the cases aforesaid it be otherwise specially provided, or there
be something in the subject or context repugnant to such
construction.3 19

Again Lord Phillimore questioned Cecil, this time on the question of
the rights of unmarried as opposed to married women to exercise the

profession of solicitor.32° Cecil pointed out that

his view was that it was a well-settled general rule of the Common
Law that married women had no ordinary rights, and he did not con
tend that section 2 of the Act of 1 843 conferred any new right, but
that it confirmed and corroborated the right of an unmarried woman
21
at Common Law to act as an attorney.3
As in France, the question of a married woman involved in a profession

raised huge questions of autonomy and of conflict of interest, since a

315.
316.

Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179. See 13 Y.B. Eow. 3 186 (1339).
Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179. The role of attorney seems to have been an ill-defined and fluid one

during the period.
[A] man is allowed to put forward some one else to speak for him, not in order that he
may be bound by that other person 's words, but in order that he may have a chance of
correcting fonnal blunders and supplying omissions. What the litigant himself has said in
court, he has said once and for all, but what a friend has said in his favour he may
disavow. The professional pleader makes his way into the courts, not as one who will

represent a litigant, but as one who will stand by the litigant's side and speak in his
favour, subject however to correction, for his words will not bind his client until th�t
client has expressly or tacitly adopted them. . . . Just because the pleader makes hts
appearance in this informal fashion, as a mere friend who stands by the litigant's side and
provisionally speaks on his behalf, it is difficult for us to discover whether pleaders
commonly employed and whether they are already members of a professional class.

Powxx & MAm.ANo, supra note 314, at 190-91.

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179; see also supra note 269.
Bebb, 30 T.L.R. at 179.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 179-80.
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married woman was expected to conform to the wishes of her husban d in
matters of behavior, residence and other areas of life.322
"Person" was also used in section 26 of the Solicitors Act, 1 860, which
imposed penalties for wrongfully acting as a solicitor, and it was

reasonable to suppose that it included a woman there. . . . In view of
the rights possessed by women at Common Law it would require an

express prohibition to prevent them from becoming solicitors. In
several of the Colonies and in certain foreign countries women were

pennitted to act as solicitors.323

R.B. Finlay, who represented the Law Society, requested a clarification of the appellant's position regarding the

1843 Act.

[H]e understood that the appellant did not contend that there was

anything in the Act of 1843 which conferred on women the right to be

admitted as solicitors. Lord Robert Cecil said that he did not say there

was sufficient in the Act of 1843 to remove any existing prohibition
at Common Law, but that, in the absence of such a prohibition, it did
confer on women the right to be admitted.324

From the discussion of the meaning of the statutes involved, the
crucial issue clearly became the question of whether women were cus
tomarily advocates, or had customarily attempted to exercise such a role.
Sir R.B. Finlay said that he relied on the fact that there was not a sin

gle instance of a woman's having been admitted as a solicitor. This

inveterate usage was of great weight, and the existence of such a long

usage was relied on in Miss Bertha Cave ' s case noted in The Times of
December 3, 1 903, which was a case where Miss Cave had applied to
be admitted to Gray's Inn , and in the Scotch case, Hall v. Incorpo

rated Society of Law Agents in Scotland. If the appellant' s contention
was right, women would equally be entitled to be admitted to the Inns
of Court, and no doubt this would make dining in hall far more
amusing; but the real answer was that no one had ever been
admitted.m

This type of specious argument is of course of the kind that was ad
vanced to oppose the candidature of the daughter of Henry I to succeed
her father as sovereign,326 and of the daughters of Henry VIII to succeed

322.

See Corcos, supra note 37, at 462; Lilly, supra note

1 20, at 43 1 .

323.
324.

Bebb v. Law Society, 30 T.L.R. 179, 180 (C.A. 191 3).
Id.
325. Id (citation omitted).
326.

This claimant was the Empress

Maud,

at
or Matilda, the only surviving and somewh

��le child of Henry I, who challenged King Stephen for the throne. She eventually abandoned

disa

,

her chu
m m favor of her son, the future Henry Il, but clearly his claim derived as much from his descent
from her as the rightful queen as from his successful conquest. However, Stephen's claim was not
without merit He was male, and also had a male heir, and was considered amiable. Although the barons
had sworn fealty to Matilda, they had not sworn obedience to her husband, Geoffrey of Anjou, and
See
some preferred a known quantity (Stephen) to an unknown and
younger man (Geoffrey).
CHR.!STOPHER BROOKE, FROM ALFRED TO HENRY ID: 871 - 1 272, at 166-72 (1961 ).
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32

1 not only because their sex seemed
to disqualify them, but also
because of the dangers of their marriage.

him,

Finlay' s reduction of Bebb' s application for equal admission to a
prestigious profession to a simple request for social privileges suggests
the desperation of an advocate who senses the shifting temper of the
times. He did attempt to address the question of custom as it was codified

in learned treatises and in contemporary case law:
The passages in Coke Litt. were really conclusive on the law. They
contained definite statements that a woman could not be an attorney. .
. . There was, in fact, something repugnant to the word "person" in
cluding a female-namely, the well-settled usage at Common Law.
The cases showed that long usage ought to govern the law in these
328
cases-Chorlton v. Lings and Jex-Blake v . Edinburgh University.
The attraction of the argument of custom and the inertia of "well-settled
usage" was enough to overcome Cecil' s arguments:

1bree grounds were alleged as proving disability. First, it was
said that Lord Coke, in language which his Lordship said seemed to

327.

These queens were Mary I (reigned

1553-1558), the daughter of Henry's first wife, the

divorced Catherine of Aragon, whose marriage to her cousin Philip, the King of Spain, seemed to
validate all the country's fears about having a Catholic and a married woman as head of state, and
Eliz.abeth I (reigned

1558-1603), the daughter of Henry 's second wife, the beheaded Anne Boleyn, who

learned from her sister's difficulties that too much religion and a husband were a

sure

road to disaster

On the children of Henry vm, see CAROILY ERICKSON, BLOODY MARY (1978);
ELlzABETII JENKINS, EuzABETH TifE GREAT ( 1958); J.E. NEALE, QUEEN ELlzABETII (1934). I omit the

for a queen regnant

ill-fated Jane Grey, whose claim derived from a badly drawn will of Edward VI, the son and heir of
Henry VIII, and from acclamation by a Parliament that abandoned her after nine days. Her claim is
actually interesting legally.

See generally DAVID MATIIBW, LADY JANE GREY: THE SETTING OF 1HE

REIGN (1972); ALISON PLoWDEN, LADY JANE GREY AND TIIE HOUSE OF SUFFOLK (1985).

The next queen regnant was Mary II, of William and Mary fame, whose claim derived as much
from Parliament as from her own descent from the discredited James II. After her death, her sister Anne
should have succeeded but she very thoughtfully waited until the death of her brother-in-law, William

ill. See generally HENRI VAN DER ZEE & BARBARA VAN DER ZEE, Wll.LIAM AND MARY (1973).
Queens have been few and far between in English history, but females have passed their claims

to the throne with very little question about their legitimacy to their descendants. Indeed, Princess
Eliz.abeth, the daughter of James I and sister of James II, passed her claim, such as it was, through many
generations to the Electress Sophia of Hanover, who was the ancestress of the Hanoverian (Windsor)
line still on the throne today.

See JOHN CANNON & RALPH GRJFATHS, THE OXFORD lLLUS1RATED

HISTORY OF TIIE BRIT1SH MONARCHY (1988). Recently, the Queen has expressed her support for a new

See David Hughes, New Law to End Male Right to the Throne, DAILY
1998, at 5 .
328. Bebb, 30 T.LR. a t 1 80 (citation omitted); see also Jex-Blake v . University of F.dinburgh, 45
M. 549 (1873). Much of the opinion reflects similar concerns, and similar justifications, to those of the

law to end male primogeniture.
�. Feb. 28,

opponents of women's admission to the Bar.

As to the expediency of ladies becoming medical practitioners it is enough to say that it is
a fair subject for difference of opinion. To suggest jealousy of the rivalry of women as
entering into the objection would be altogether absurd. Those who entertain the objection
no doubt conscientiously believe that the result would be to diminish the delicacy and
respect by which the female character in well-bred society is so advantageously
surrounded.

Id. at 564. See also SACHS & Wll.SON, supra note 3.
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him not to be so doubtful as was suggested by counsel for the appel
lant, had laid it down

300 years ago that a woman was not allowed to

be an attorney . . . . Lord Coke was speaking of attorneys not in the
old sense in which the word would be used but of attorneys as a pro
fessional body regulated by statute and recognized and created by
statute between four and five hundred years ago. It might be that the
Mirror of Justice was not a work of the highest authority, but the ref
erence to it did not in the least take away from the value of Lord
Coke's opinion. An opinion of his as to what was the Common Law
required no sanction from anybody else. That alone, therefore, was
evidence of what the Common Law was, and at Common Law
women were under a disability which prevented their being attorneys.

Apart from this opinion of Lord Coke there was the fact that no
woman had ever been an attorney. There had been a long, uniform,
and uninterrupted usage. Such usage was the foundation of the greater
part of the Common Law and the Court ought to be very loth to de
part from anything supported by long usage. Although, therefore,
there had been a most interesting discussion as to what was or was
not a public office, his Lordship could not help thinking that all this
discussion was beside the mark. His Lordship said that he decided
this case on the fact that at the time of the passing of the Act of

1 8 43

there was an existing disability which prevented women from being
attorneys and which had not been destroyed by that Act.329
Such an argument would, of course, allow absolutely n o change in
the common law whatsoever. It certainly would not allow the revolution
ary decision by Lord Mansfield granting freedom to a slave brought to
England after the argument that "[t]he air of England is too pure for a
slave to breathe,"330 or of Chief Justice Holt in refusing to give effect to
slavery in English domestic law, though the government of England
might recognize it as part of the law of nations: "As soon as a negro
comes into England he becomes free."331 While the legality of slavery
was still an unsettled question through the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, such decisions called the practice into question, making the

work of judges much less clear than the court of appeals in the Bebb case
seemed to find it.332 The judicial position was clear: Parliament could
simply not have meant what it said, because if it had, the result would
have been the admission of women to the bar. Women had never been
lawyers; therefore, Parliament simply could not have been serious. In
deed, Mansfield and his like-minded brethren gave effect to a basic hu-

329.
330.

Bebb, 30 T.LR. at 180 (citation omitted).

Sommerset v. Stewart, 98 K.B. 499, 509 (1772). For a discussion of the impact of the "ftce
au" language, see Jonathan A Bush, The First Slave (and Why He Matters), 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 599,
626, 629 n.82 (1996).
331. Stephen Sedley, Persons Aggrieved, l.oNOON REV. OF BOOKS, May 22, 1 997, at 26. On
Chief Justice Holt's continuation of Mansfield's jurisprudence, see Bush, supra note 330, at 626, 629
n.89. For more of Holt's language, see Smith v. Gould, 92 K.B. 338, (1706); Smith v. Brown & cooper.
90 K.B. 1172, (1702).

332.

B ebb v. Law Society, 30 T.L.R. 179, 179-8 1

(C.A. 1 913).
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man right throug� precisely the opposite conclusion. Absent a specific
statement by Parliament regarding the acceptability of s lavery, common
law prohibited it.333
The legal historian Nicolaus Benke identifies this kind of intellec

tual behavior

as

one of his "Basics of the Patriarchal Program."334 These

"basics" include:

5. Be irrational . Establish some issues beyond rational discourse.
Create your myths. 6. Be irrational. Create your logic, but break your
own rules occasionally to assert your overwhelming power.

7. Immu

nize your fundamental concepts against critical attack by calling these
concepts "natural" or "essential," thus disguising norms as phenom
ena or some physical reality and pretending they are valid regardless

8. Whenever you express your concept of na
335
exercise a monopoly in interpreting it.

of historic conditions .
ture,

By deciding as it did, the court of appeals followed Benke' s patterns of
patriarchy. In interpreting the relevant statutes as requiring denial of
Bebb' s request for admission, the court followed rules 5, 6, and 7, thus

mandating its adoption of rule 8 .336 To do otherwise seemed to relinquish

the power over who could speak in English courts, thus relinquishing
control over whose speech was official and legitimate. In denying admis
sion to women, the court of appeal demonstrated that it believed the only
official and legitimate speech was exclusively male, modelled on shared
nonns of education, experience and expectation. In Benke 's analysis, the
court's power created truth. It "express[ed] . . . truth and power as if they
were crucial for the existence and welfare of society

as

a whole."111

Contemporary reaction ranged from great support for the Bebb deci
sion to great criticism of it, both for its reasoning and for its result. One
commentator noted with disapproval the introduction of legislation into
Parliament but conceded that the profession as a whole was very unlikely
to admit women sua sponte:
We venture to think that the majority of the Benchers in the Inns
would be opposed to the innovation, and that, even among those who
are in favour of it, there would not be many who would interpret their

333.

For an analysis of the meaning of the Somerset decision, particularly

with regard to
and

ttadition of slavery in American common law, see William R. Cotter, The Somerset Case

the
the

Abolition of Slavery in England, 79 HlsTORY 3 1 (1994). After examining the various texts of the
decision and the application of Somerset in the English courts through the first third of the

century,

ninetttnth

Cotter agrees that the opinion effectively ended de jure slavery in England. Id. at 54-56. For

other discussions of the meaning of Somerset,

see

id. at nn.5-8; Edward Fiddes, Lord Mansfield and the

Somerset Case, 50 L.Q. REv. 499 (1 934); Jerome

Nadelhaft,

The Somerset Case and Slavery: Myth,

Reality and Repercussions, 51 J. NEGRO HIST. 193 (1966); William Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield

and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 43 U.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Benke, supra note 195, at 201.
Id.
Bebb, 30 T.LR. at 179-81 .

Benke, supra note 195, at 201.

CHI. L REv. 86

(1974).
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powers as justifying a course which is generally tak.cn to be c�n trary
.
to the common law. The claim of women to be admitted as sohc1tors,

so far as it is founded upon the common law, has now been rejected

definitely both by the English and the Scottish Courts. The Inns of

Court claim absolute discretion as to whom they w i l l call to the Bar,

subject to a somewhat nebulous visitatorial authority of the judges, by

whom the discretion to call to the Bar has, in theory. been delegated

to them. The Benchers would probably, much as they dislike interfer
ence by the Legislature, refuse to make an innovation so entirely

contr� to precedent except under the authority of an Act of Parlia
ment.

Making a sly allusion to Lord Robert Cecil 's historical argument in favor
of his client' s position, this writer went so far as to suggest that even
should women be admitted to the Law Society, this admittance might
still not be sufficient to guarantee them a place in the profession:
Throughout the controversy it seems to be fairly generally assumed

that if once the doors of the Law Society are thrown open to women,

their demand to be called to the Bar must be admitted. We venture to

suggest that such an assumption is unwarranted, and that few mem

bers of either branch would admit that the same qualities are required
in each. Speaking for ourselves, we are still among the unconverted.

Even the fact that a woman has acted as Constable of England, as
sexton, or as churchwarden, leaves us cold.339

On the other side was a writer for the Green Bag,34{) the U.S. journal
of legal comment, who suggested that the court of appeal had ducked the

real issue, and in addition was guilty of extremely poor legal reasoning in
coming to its decision.341 Quoting the Master of the Rolls, the writer sug
gested a failure to acknowledge the importance of at least some of the
facts presented:
"We have been asked to hold," said Cozens-Hardy, M.R. in Bebb v.
,
Th� Law Society, "what I for one quite assent to, that in point of in
telbgen�e and education and competency, women-and in particular
the apphcant here, who is a distinguished Oxford student-are at least
ual to a grea� many, and probably far better than many of the can
�
didates who wdl come up for examination. But that is not really for
us to consider." This fact, though not for the court to consider, might
�erefore be �ufficiently significant to be judicial noticed if not con
ly
side�ed. But 1t w�uld n�t have been a fact of sufficie importanc e for
nt
passmg remark if a high standard of
professional attainments for
�om�n ha� not become a commonplac
e of modern society , a nd if a
situation did not exist in England to-day
the character of which is at
tested by the fact that a considerabl
e body of professional and lay
338. Notes · Women and the profl
ession, 26 1URID. REV. 1 30, 130-31 (19 14) (citations omitted).
339. Id. at
340. Editorial The Adm·ission
· °if w,omen as Solicitors, 26
GREEN BAG 298, 298 (1914).
341. Id.

i3t.
'

·
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o �inion-i � would be �ufficient to cite Lord Haldane, Mr. Asquith,
Sir John Simon, and Sir Stanley Buckmaster-favors the admission
of women as solicitors. 342

This commentator came close to suggesting that women' s intellectual
attainments were in fact commonly so much higher than men's in similar
situations that this fact in itself had become custom:
[I]nstead of holding that the mental qualifications of women are not
for the court to consider, the Court of Appeal, without going far out
of its way, might properly have devoted some attention to contempo

rary conditions, with a view to determining whether the position of
women in the modem world constitutes a situation to · which the
c ourts must give heed. The decision in this case was based on the
"usage of the realm." But the "usage of the realm" is not simply a
mass of ancient precedents which have come down from the earlier
common law; it is made up of the vital, contemporaneous customs of
an actual world. The entrance of women into innumerable pursuits to
which they were formerly denied access has become, it would appear,
one o f those existing usages which a court may carefully consider in
attempting to ascertain what the "usage of the realm" really is.343

To bolster this contention, the writer, like the advocates in the Bebb case,
appealed to a learned writer, although his choice is the American Roscoe
Pound:
The common law consists of positive rules and remedies, of general
usages and customs, and of elementary principles, and the develop
ments of applications of them, which cannot now be distinctly traced
back to any statutory enactments, but which rest for their authority
upon the common recognition, consent, and use of the state itself . . . .
In truth, the common law is not in its nature and character an abso
lutely fixed, inflexible system, like the statute law, providing only for
case s of a determinate form which fall within the letter of the lan
guage i n which
expre ssed.344

a particular

doctrine

or legal proposition is

For this writer the Bebb case illustrates an exchange of the tradi
tional roles of the s atutory and the common law. Instead of inflexibility

�

and immutability, statutes such as the acts of 1 87?345 and 1 888346 repre�ent

the new, that is, the opportunity of admitting women to the �rof�ss1on.
.
.
The common law, for the judges involved, becomes the JUStif
1c�t1on for

�

en its gre a�
.
est strength-its flexibility and ability to accommodate social and pohtl

the old, and loses the very character that has traditionally



cal change when codified law cannot. Even so, suggests the Green Bag

342. Id. (citation omitted).
343. Id.
344. Id. at 298-99.
345. Id. at 299.
346. Id.
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author, had the judges wanted to give the proper effect to chang ing cus
tom, they could have done so and still have ruled against Bebb:
The altered relation of women to trade and the professions does un
questionably constitute a new modem u sage or custom which the law
cannot ignore. It need not follow, however, that this custom has so
fully established itself as to affect the legal profession as it has some
other professions, and the Court of Appeal, if it had chosen to give it
consideration, would not have had to decide in favor of the admission

of women as solicitors. It could have said: "We are not led, by a sur
vey of the situation now existing, to conclude that there has been any
definite change in the custom of the realm with regard to the relation
of women to the legal profession, notwithstanding certain tendencies
that seem to be in that direction; these tendencies, in our judgment,
have not had such an unmistakable result that we should deem our
selves at liberty to affirm the right of women to practise law; by doing
so we should be substituting a custom of our own choosing for one
already existing, and that we have no power to do." Thus the court
could have come to the same result as that actually reached, by a
sound process of judicial reasoning; and probably a greater number of
people would be satisfied with the decision, as it would have demon
strated more cogently why this is a question for Parliamentary action

and not one with which the courts are called upon to deal. 347

The Green Bag further faulted the court for relying on a "casual dictum
of Lord Coke which he may have borrowed from the Mirror of
Justices"343 and criticized it for bringing the system of justice into disre
pute.349
So long as the employment of such reasoning survives, courts will
continue to subject themselves to the danger of having their conclu
sions discredited when reached by crooked paths, even though the re
sults may be intrinsically sound, and would be accepted if they were
3
approached along a straight line of argument. .so

In spite of the suggested line of reasoning that would have preserved the

result, the implication is clear: the court could not legitimately reach a

347. Id. at 298.
348. Id. at 299.
Pleaders are serjeants wise in the law of the realm who seive the commonalty of the
people, stating and defending for hire actions in court for those who have need of them.
E�ery pleader who acts in the business of another should have regard to four thing s:
Fust, that he be a person receivable in court, that he be no heretic nor excommunicate,
nor criminal, nor man of religion, nor woman, nor ordained cle above the order of
subdeacon, �or be�eficed clerk with the cure of souls, nor infant under twenty-one years
of �ge, nor Judge m the same cause, nor open leper, nor man attainted of falsification
against the law of his office.
THE MIRROR OF JUS'rICES 47 (The Publications of the Selden
Society;' William Joseph Whittaker ed.,
189S) (emphasis added).
349. Editorial, supra note 340, at 299.
350. Id.

rk
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conclusion that would endure for any length of time, regardless of refer
ence to statutory or common law.
V.

CHANGES IN THE POLmCAL AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

Supporters of women' s admission were undaunted by an abortive
attempt to pass a bill, introduced by Lord Wolmer, overruling the Law
Society' s actions in 1 9 1 2.351 After the decision of the court of appeals in
the Bebb case, various women's rights advocates as well as the Commit
tee for the Admission of Women to the Solicitors' Profession352 requested
support from

the Lord Chancellor and the Prime Minister, Lord

Haldane,353 for a bill to admit women. The Committee consisted of such
luminaries

as

Lord Robert Cecil, Sir Frederick Pollock (the historian),

Mrs. Humphrey Ward, Mrs. Garrett Anderson (the physician) and other
notables, as well as the four women involved in the Bebb case.354 One

member quoted Edward Bell ' s comment that 20,000 women were law
yers in the United States355 and reminded the Lord Chancellor that all the
in England admitted women except Oxford and
universities
Cambridge.356 Other arguments advanced included those of emotion
(women should have the opportunity of hiring solicitors of their own
sex),357 and positivism (women should be allowed to do anything not
strictly prohibited).358 The Lord Chancellor was sympathetic but cautious:
"When he was in the other House he used to bring in a Bill for the re
moval o f disabilities from women going far beyond that which they
asked, and he still held to the principle of that . . . . Personally he was
. "359 However. as a mem
entirely in favour of the principle of the Bill .
.

.

ber of the House of Lords, the Lord Chamberlain could not predict what
might happen in the Commons,360 but he pronounced His Majesty's Gov
ernment generally in favor of the bill.361
A few days later the City of London Solicitors • Company passed a
resolution to request the Law Society to oppose the bill,362 and eventually
it failed to pass,363 undoubtedly because of the active opposition of both
professional societies.

35 1 .

BRIAN ABEL-SMITH

& ROBERT STEVENS,

STIJDY OFTHE ENGUSH LEGAL SYSTEM 1750-1965,
352.
353 .

LAWYERS AND THE

BIRKS, supra note 18, at 277.
NINETEENTII CENWRY: THE
ELIE HAI.EVY, A HISTORY OF TIIE ENGLISH PEOPUl IN THE

Ruu: OF DEMOCRACY 1905-1914, at 505 (2d ed. 1 96 1 ).
354.

COURTS: A SOCIOLOGICAL

at 193 (1967).

The Admission of Women as Solicitors, 5 8 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 418,

355.

Id.

356.

Id.

357.

Id.

358 .

Id.

359.

Id.

360.

Id.

361.

Id.

362.

Id.

363.

BIRKS, supra note 18, at 277.

418 (1914).
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The bill's defeat simply exacerbated tempers on both sides. One
correspondent to the

Solicitors' Journal suggested that the issue ought to

be further debated in the magazine: "One contributor, I notice, has

grounded his objections upon considerations of the hann it will do us
and, if you will allow me, I will endeavour to shew why such a view, in

the special circumstances of the case, should not be allowed to prevail."364

After pointing out the economic advantages of allowing women to pur
sue careers for which they were suited, he blasted the profession for
failing to do

as

much for women as had physicians:

The doctors, as a community, have set a chivalrous example in wid
ening the field of women's opportunities. The lawyers should do the
same. If women are left to realise that their only hope lies in them
selves, they should at least be able to count upon men to put no obstac1es m
' way.365
' therr

However, he objected to the admission of married women: "[l]n an over
stocked profession in which there is barely enough work to go round, it is
unfair that any home, through the joint contribution of husband and wife,

should, as it were, enjoy double rations."366
Lord Buckmaster made additional futile attempts to reverse the
1 9 1 7 and 1 9 1 8 ,367 but was defeated
by the Law Society's letter-writing campaign.368 The First World War put

Bebb decision through legislation in

further action on the issue on the back burner. By the end of the war, the
amount of significant political opposition to the admission of women had

dwindled to the point that the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Bill
aroused much less comment.369

Ultimately two factors caused the change in the attitude of most
members of the bar, most members of the government, and most mem
bers of the public. One was women' s full participation in the war effort
during the period from 1 9 1 4 to 1 9 1 8 . Though proponents of women's
entry into the legal profession might reject the notion as demeaning, the
fact remained that women' s contribution in every sphere of life and
death310 demonstrated that they understood and were willing to uphold the

364. Douglas M. Gane, The Admission of Women to the Law, 58 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 468,
468 (1914).
365. Id. at 469. But see the comments of Helena Nonnanton asserting the contrary in Barristers
and Solicitors (Qualification ofWomen) Bill, 63 Souc. J. & WKLY.
REP. 500, 501 (1919).
366.
367.
368.

Gane, supra note 364, at 469.

ABEL-SMrrn & STEVENS, supra note 351, at 193.

Id. On the Law Society's opposition, see LAw Socmrv, ANNuAL REPoRT 26-27 (191 7);
LAW SOCIE1Y, ANNuAL REl'oRT 36-37 (1919).
369. ABEL-SMITII & STEVENS, supra note 351, at 194.
370. &ii� Cavell, an English nurse, was executed in Belgium by the Germans as a spy. This
n:age galvaniz.ed even more willingness on the part of the British, if that were possible, to win the war

ou

agamst the arrogant Hun. See ROWLAND RYDER, Eorrn: CAVEU.. 223 ( 1975).
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notions of duty and sacrific e. This participation seemed to answer the
question of women' s willingness to accept responsibility satisfactorily.

!he second fac�or was the ent:�ce of women into the legal profes

.
sion

m other countnes whose trad1t10ns and standards of living seemed
or at least comprehensible, to the English, and the resulting
valent,
equi
commentary over the desirability of giving qualified women the same

opportunity. In France, as in many of the United States and provinces of
Canada, women had already been admitted, so that their wartime contri
butions, while valued, were more expected.311 Likewise, their presence in
the law was no longer quite such a disturbance.

There are probably only a few women, comparatively speaking, to
whom the practice of law is congenial or fitting; the same to but a
slightly less extent is true of men. It is but rarely that any other type
will seek admission. The number of women in active practice will
probably never be large. But we have passed the period when only a
few especially qualified women braved the difficulties of securing
admission. 372

To the British, the contributions of its female citizens were a great,
and p leasant, surprise. As a contributor to the Solicitors' Journal and
Weekly Reporter noted, not only had many men died in various wars
over the past century, so that the numbers of persons who traditionally
populated the professions had diminished greatly, but the very lack of
available men to support women and children meant that women needed
to be able to earn their own livings.373 Thus, the entry of women into the
legal profession was a temporary necessity.
[S]ituated as men now are, with their numbers diminished and their
careers thwarted, the support of women collectively . . . is probably
outside their competence, and the sole alternative left to them is to
admit women to all those centres of activity whence the means of
subsistance is derived by the individual's own effort. The demand is
upon every guild and body of men, and the profession of the law is
.
no t an exception.374

The author advocated a short experiment, allowing women to enter �he
solicitors ' branch for a period of time and then projecting an evaluation
'
J7S
of their success to see if they should be encouraged to contmue.
•

This writer was not willing to countenance the complete equ�Iity of
men and women in the profession for various reasons, most of which are
late in the
371 . The question of women 's fitness for the bar was not settled until relatively
1 7 Pa
Kilgore,
re
In
See
then.
nineteenth cenrury however and it was a matter for judicial opinion until
(1923).
124
NOTES
U.w
21
Bar,
the
at
W.N.C. 563 (1 886); In re
ll. 39 Wis. 246 ( 1 875); Women
372. Women at the Bar, supra note 371, at 1 24.
REP. 782, 782 0918)
373. Women
Emergency Measure, 62 Souc. J. & WKLY.

�

as Solicitors: An

[hereinafter Emergency Measure].
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discussed in this article. Among them were serious doubts as to the abil
ity of women to represent their clients as zealously as possible and the
ability of men to represent their clients' interests in the face of such at
tractive distractions as a female adversary.m However, he (and this arti
cle was probably written by a man) found himself in agreement with the
writer for the Bench and Bar,m a U.S. legal journal, that women could
certainly perform many of the less "unfeminine" duties of the solicitor.378
Like other commentators of the period, he used the military analogy to
explain women's physical and intellectual shortcomings and to justify
any inequality of treatment:
[T]he profession of law, like the profession of anns, has a strictly
polemical basis, the sole difference lying in the choice of weapons.
Litigation is warfare in which the property , the liberty, and even the
life of the individual is at stake; as, in the case of war itself, the pos
sessions, the freedom, and the very exi stence of the State are in
volved. The qualities called for in the defence of the individual are
just those required for the protection of the community, only they op
erate through a different medium. Fundamentally, they reside in
force, and it remains to be seen whether women are competent to ex
ercise force in competition with men in one sphere when they have
been shewn incapable of exercising it in another. . . . These consid
erations, however, apply only to the contentious side of professional
life. Happily there is much that is pacific . . . . [C]onveyancing and the
wide range of practice falling under the Solicitors ' Remuneration Act
is well within the moral and intellectual competence of women, and it
would be better that they should apply themselves to this side of pro
fessional work. 379

Even in the 1 980s, this attitude was still prevalent: "Associated with
this 'club ' analogy is the 'masculinity' of the law and legal practice. This
serves to make more difficult the successful performance of the occupa
tional role by women."380 Further, unlike E.A. Bell, many male barristers
and solicitors in the 1 970s and 1980s overtly or quietly blocked women's
efforts to join their chambers:
[T]he main stumbling block is simply prejudice, and this reveals itself
most strongly at the crucial stage in a woman 's career, when she is
looking for a tenancy. Many chambers openly admit a "no woman"
policy, and continue to do so despite the Sex Discrimination Act

1 975

(which does not apply to the Bar, since sets of chambers are not part
nerships and tenants are not employed). One particular set of cham
bers which has always been known to have a no woman policy
(amended to a "no other woman" policy after the daughter of the

376.

Id.

377.
378.
379.

Editorial, Woman in the Law, 17 BENCH & B. 7 (1900).

380.

Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19 at 30 (fOOlnote omitted).

Emergency Measure, supra note 373, at 787.

Id.
,
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Head of Chambers was admitted) has blatantly refused a woman ap
38
plicant on the grounds of her sex. 1

The situation was similar in Canada:
For almost all the years before

1970

legal education was dominated

by the Law Society of Manitoba. Its essential feature was practical

training: students were required to find a law office which would
agree to admit them as articling clerks. It was advantageous for stu
dents to have contacts, generally through a family member or close

family friend, within the number of established lawyers. Someone
who had no ready-made contact would have difficulty finding a law

firm to take her or him at the age of 20 or 21 . The law firm would be
testing the clerk as a potential long-term colleague. For women this

system was more of a problem than for men. Because there were so
few women already in the profession, there was no regular network.

Women were regarded as a risk and widely expected to abandon the
investment made in their training upon marriage 382
.

Women who were members of minority groups had an even more diffi
cult time.383 Those firms which eventually did agree to take on women
clerks tried to limit their careers by offering them positions with little
possibility of advancement.384
One American commentator attempted to turn the suggestion that
women did not have as much reasoning ability as necessary to their ad
vantage in the debate:
We are told that women are not logical, not analytical; that they jump
at conclusions. Well, sometimes it is a good thing to jump-you get

there quicker. After you get there you can reason backwards and in

variably find you are right, just like proving an example in arithmetic .
Again, i t is all a question of habit, w e haven ' t been trained i n those

lines. Is there any difference between the brain of the average woman

and the brain of the average man, and is the gray matter in a man ' s

brain so different that he alone can take u p the profession of medicine
8
or law?3 5

However, this approach is not particularly persuasive. To suggest that
legal reasoning can be created after the fact is the kind of result-driven
decision-making that women themselves found objectionable.
A.

Attempts to Legislate Admission

In order to address the question of the inequality of women's politi
cal rights, the post-war government prepared a series of legislative ini-

381.

Kemiedy, supra note 158, at 151.

382.

Kinnear, supra note 85, at 423.

383.

Id.

384.

Id. at 425.

385.

Women in the Law, supra note 15, at 1 34.
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tiatives which removed the most crucial disabilities: the right of women
to stand for election, the right of women to vote and the right of women
to enter into the practice of law. Not all of these initiatives were unquali
fied successes. For example, initiatives limited the right to vote to
women over the age of thirty ,3"" although men were entitled to vote when
"of full age and not subject to any legal incapacity" in addition to other
residency requirements.
1.

111

The Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act of 1 9 1 8388

The Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act attempted to enfran
chise women by allowing them to participate in the making of law as part
of the House of Commons: "A woman shall not be disqualified by sex or
marriage for being elected to or sitting or voting as a Member of the
Commons House of Parliament. "389 The Act thus addressed the concerns
of a worried

little article in the

Solicitors' Journal

and Weekly

Reporter,390 which rehearsed the history of women in public offices, and

opined that:
Lord Esher' s dictum as to the common law disqualification of women
for the exercise of any public functions . . . is obviously much too
wide. Women may hold the sovereignty, and have done so. They may

hold certain lay offices in the Church . . . and, of course, may be pa
tronesses of livings. But these are scarcely public offices in the State.

They may be impanelled on a jury of matrons and not very infre
quently this i s done. There are also records of historical cases in
which ladies h ave acted as sheriffs, returning officers, parish consta
bles, overseers of the poor, and even commissioners of sewers. But it
is doubtful whether their tenure of those offices was ever lawful. All
the recorded instances occur in troubled times-between the Wars of

the Roses and the conclusion of the Civil War, when every manner of
illegality was occasionally committed by the powerful. It is probably
the true constitutional view that, except as regards the succession to
the throne, no right to hold any of these offices was really possessed
by women at common law. The right to inherit the Crown is peculiar.
It is wholly the result of the mediaeval doctrine that the King was
paramount lord of all land in the kingdom, and therefore the rules of
inheritance which applied to land applied also to the Crown. To-day,
of course, the succession to the throne is regulated by a parliamentary

386. Representation of the People Act of 1918, 8 Geo. 5, ch. 64, § 4 (1) (Fng.).
A woman shall be entitled to be registered as a parliamentary elector for a constituency
(other than a university constituency) if s�a) has attained the age of thirty years; and
(b) is not subject to any legal incapacity; and (c) is entitled to be registered as a local
government elector in respect of the occupation in that constituency of land or premises
. . or is the wife of a husband entitled to be so registered.
·

Id.

387.
388.
389.
390.

Id. §§ (1 )(a), (3).
8 & 9 Geo. 5, ch. 47 (Eng.).
Id. §1.
The Eligibility ofWomen For Parliament, 62 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 532 (191 8).
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entail, the Act of Settlement, and the limitations which govern an or
dinary tail general are applied to the Crown by the terms of that stat
ute.
It may be assumed, then, that women were at common law dis
qualified from sitting in either House of Parliament. Such a funda
mental rule of the common law cannot be altered by the judges; it is
not one of those minor principles-mostly existing in the realm of
commercial law and the law of torts--which are capable of undergo
ing expansion and development by mere judicial decision. Therefor
an Act of Parliament is required to remove this disqualification. . . .
[And t]here must be an express enactment in clear terms conferring
the privilege claimed.391

2.

The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919392

Parliament may have intended the Sex Disqualification (Removal)
Act to address all remaining questions on the disparity between the civil
inequality of men and women. Apart from specifying that women could
not be prevented from holding public office, it also addressed the ques
tion of women who wished to be admitted to the bar, but who had at
tended universities not conferring degrees on women. This was a com
mon enough occurrence for older students who had pursued legal studies
before education, let alone admission to the profession. The Act contem
plated the following for females:
A woman shall be entitled to be admitted and enrolled as a so
licitor after serving under articles for three years only if either she has
taken such a university degree as would have so entitled her had she
been a man, or if she has been admitted to and passed the final ex
amination and kept, under the conditions required of women by the
university, the period of residence necessary for a man to obtain a de
gree at any university which did not at the time the examination was
passed admit women to degrees.393

The Act also applied to Scotland394 and lreland395 through alteration of
statutes governing local practice,396 and Parliament intended it to be read

391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

Id. at 532-33 (citations omitted).

9 & JO Geo. 5, ch. 7 1 (Eng.).
Id. § 2.
Note its immediate effect. See Paterson, supra note 69, at 93.
IRlsH L TtMEs, March 15, 1919,at 66.

In the case of Scotland, the Act affected statutes such as The Local Government (Scotland) Act

of 1894, 57 & 58 Viet, ch. 58 (Eng.); The Qualification of Women (County and Town Councils)

(Scctland) Act of 1907, 7 F.dw. 7, ch. 48 (Eng.); The County, Town and Parish Councils (Qualification)

(Scotland) Act of 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 39 (Eng.).

In the case of Ireland, it affected The Juries Act (Ireland), 1871, 34 & 35 Viet, ch. 65 (Eng.); The

Local Govcmrnent (Ireland) Act of 1898, 61 & 62 Viet, ch. 37 (Eng.); The Local Authorities (Ireland)

(Qualification of Women) Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 35 (Eng.).
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with the Solicitors Act of 1 843.397 The relevant text of the Act reads
follows:

as

A woman shall be entitled to be admitted and enrolled as a solicitor

after serving under articles for three years only if either she has taken
such a university degree as would have so entitled her had she been a
man, or if she has been admitted to and passed the final examination
and kept, under the conditions required of women by the university,
the period of residence necessary for a man to obtain a degree at any
university which did not at the time the examination was passed ad.
398
rrut women to degrees.

3.

Barristers and Solicitors (Qualification of Women) Bill399

The Law Society met on March 28, 19 1 9, to discuss the implica
tions of the Barristers and Solicitors (Qualification of Women) Bill
drafted by Lord Buckmaster, one of the lawyers who had represented
Bebb, and backed by the Lloyd George Government. 400 The President of
the Society suggested that the contributions of women in wartime (al
though they had been dismissed by some detractors as being of little evi
dence that women were intellectually capable of the demands of legal
practice) were a great impetus toward the support of the bill by many
members of the profession, who might not have been so inclined at the
time of the Bebb decision:
H the Bill had been introduced five years ago he did not believe such
a meeting as this would have been held, but since then a great deal
had happened and the war, which had made so many changes in the
country, had made few changes so great as that in the relationship of
women to the economic work of the country. He thought it was no
exaggeration to say that, had it not been for the women of the country
and the services they had rendered, the war might never have been
won-it certainly would have been very much protracted.401

Even Sir Homewood Crawford, a solicitor who opposed the bill,
wrote that,
provided the Bar will by statutory enactment be as free to women as it
is sought to make our branch, we ought not to place any further ob
stacle in the way of women attaining the object of their ambition. It
should, however, be most clearly provided for by statute that both

397. See Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & l O Geo. 5, ch. 7 1 , § 2(3) (F.ng.).
398. Id. § 2.
399. See Women as Barristers and Solicitors, 53 IRISH L. llMES & Souc. J. 66 (19 19). This
bill docs not seem to have passed, but the enactment of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act
accomplished the same end. Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & IO Geo. 5, ch. 71, § 1
(Eng.) .
400. The Law Society: Admission of Women as Solicitors, 146 1..AW TIMES J. & RF.c. 400 (1 919)
[hereinafter Law Society: Admission].
401. Id.
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branches are open for the admission of women, and Lord Buckmas
ter's Bill in that respect requires strengthening.402

Samuel Garrett, who spoke in favor of the bill, pointed out that to
deny women entrance into the profession of solicitor reflected
the want of touch, between their Profession and the public. That want
of sympathy and want of touch was, in his view, at the root of most of
the evils from which the Profession suffered, and he could not imag
ine anything more calculated to accentuate that want of sympathy and
of touch than that they, in this moment of the country's history, when
the large body of women had just been enfranchised and had taken
part in a general election and had made their political opinion and still
more their influence felt, that at this moment the society should pun
ish to the world that they were going to seek to maintain an obstacle
in the way of women earning their livelihood, if they choose to do so,
in the solicitor profession. The whole sympathy of the country would
be against them. . . . They could not stop the Bill, any more than a
bumble bee could stop an express train, and the choice before them
was whether they would welcome it and receive it with open arms, or
whether they would be dragged at its tail, struggling and screeching
like an angry child . . . . He begged them to remember that this was a
matter which vitally affected the good name, the credit, and the repu
tation of the Profession.40)

Garrett's pragmatic argument was not the only one advanced in favor of
the bill. Sir Walter Trower, another supporter, sidestepped the question
of women's intellectual ability by characterizing the opening of the Pro
fession as "a question of equality of opportunity.''404 For him the possible
complications brought on by a woman's lack of intellect or physical
stamina, or marital status, would eventually disappear:
Whether women were better or worse than men, morally, physically,
or intellectually, did not concern them. The question whether they
would be hampered by matrimonial ventures did not arise. All these
questions would be dealt with and tested by competition and experi
ence. If women proved themselves to be as good at business as men,
they would succeed; if not, they would fail. Men had no more to say
on the subject; he hoped that in any case they would afford the
.
women a cordial welcome. It had been said in that hall on previous
occasions that the Profession was overcrowded, and that solicitors
dreaded the competition of women in the field in which they were
engaged. He did not think there was any man present who � �uld
venture to say personally that he objected to women's compeutton;
that he was afraid of any woman competing with him.�

402.
403.
404.
405.
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Id. at 41 0.
Id.
Id.
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E.A. Bell, the solicitor who had agreed to accept Gwnyeth Bebb as a
clerk, suggested that women would have an uplifting effect on the at
mospheres of court and law office.406 Finally, a Mr. Braby suggested that
although it might be true that women might not be suited to the practice
of law, they would never have the opportunity to learn the profession if
they had no access to it:
[P]eople could never learn to govern themselves, or to do the work
they wanted to do, until they were given the opportunity of learning
how to do it. Women must be given the opportunity of showing what
they could do. He was quite sure that in a very short time, when they
found the necessity for doing this class of work as it should be done,
they would fit themselves for doing it as well as had the men. He be
lieved there was one country, Thi bet, where the entire government
was in the hands of women; they even acted as policemen, and men
were not allowed out after eight o 'clock in the evening.407

One speaker with the unfortunate name of G.B. Crook announced
himself against the bill, finding the objections to female solicitors over
whelming:
He was very sorry to have to say it, but the proposer and also the sec
onder of the motion had entirely failed to make out any case. The first
argument which had been put forward was that the ladies had helped
to win the war. Let that be admitted; if they had not done so would
they have been worthy of companionship in any sense whatever? Was
it not their hearths and their homes that the men went out to defend?
Were not they as interested in the success of the war as were men? . .
. Were [the ladies] anxious to become soldiers, or sailors, or police

men, or to do anything to support by force that law which they were
seeking to administer? If ladies were to come in equally with men in
the administration of the law and they were then to put upon men the
· enforcement of that law, would that be equality? No, it would be a
case of privilege, and he understood that in these days privilege was
to be abolished and not established.-

Crook' s objection that women ought not to be solicitors until they
showed themselves willing to take on the same roles as men was viewed
as spurious by his listeners, who pointed out that as soon as women were
allowed to do so, they did.409 He finally attempted to justify his fallback
position, the differentiation of the law as a profession completely separate from any other, by asserting that
·

All honour to Miss Nightingale and those nurses who had been Miss
Nightingales during the war, but a nurse was one thing and a lawyer

406.
407.
408.
,

409

.

Id.
Id.
/d. at 410-l l .

I�' at 41 1 . Note that in the matter of militacy language, for example, women lawyers now tell
.

_
'war Stories, that 1s,
accounts of their experiences, as readily as their colleagues who are men.
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was another. Everyone present, as lawyers, knew that the business of
the c �untry came ultimately to the advice of the lawyer. . . . Parlia

ment itself would have to s ut u � to-morrow if there were no lawyers
.
ere . . . . Unless the ad�101strat10n of the law was in the highest pos
sible hands, how could 1t be expected to continue? If ladies were to be

�

tJ:i

admitted to the membership of the Bar, of course it would follow that
be open to them, and there would be lady judges.
.
How would the 1d10syncrasy of the sex be got over in that case?4'0
the Bench woul

�

For Crook, as for a dwindling number of opponents, pleasing differ
ences of dress symbolized frightening differences in quality of thought."'
Unable to demonstrate the truth of his assertion that the quality of the
female thought process is deficient, Crook categorized it as different,
therefore inadequate, and presented misreadings of history and his own
opinion of divine intent as evidence:
Let them consider for a moment whether they would abandon allure
ments of dress. If ladies abandoned these and other allurements pecu
liar to them and depended upon their brains and not their bodies, then,
of course, they would be equal persons with men. But ladies would
never do so. There would be in the administration of the law all kinds
of mixed motives, and how that would work out he would leave to the
judgment of his hearers. It was certain it would not work out to the
dignity of the law. When Queen Mary was on the throne she could
not keep her axe off the neck of Lady Jane Grey, nor could Queen
Elizabeth keep the axe off the neck of

Mary Queen of Scots, any

more than Eve could keep her hand off the apple. The judicial factor
was not a part of woman; the Almighty never intended to instil it in
her.412

A returnee from the Great War, Lieutenant Wood, responded that if
women were poor lawyers they would have no clients,413 a point also

410. Id.
41 1 . Id.
412. Id. Crook's representation of the acts of these two queens of course misstated both the facts
and the law in these cases. Mary had originally stayed Lady Jane's execution even though a coon of law
had condemned her for treason. Only after a second rebellion in her name (though admittedly without her
knowledge or consent) was mounted to dethrone Mary had she agreed to the execution. As for Eli7.8bcth,
she had ample proof that the Queen of Scotland had plotted against her and had delayed for years
agreeing to her execution, even though her counselors and Parliament urged her to do it We �Y agree
with Crook that neither Jane Grey nor Mary Stuart should have been executed, but the Queens mvolved
were not more bloodthirsty, and arguably much Jess vengeful than their father Henry VID, or coldly
calculating than their grandfather Henry VII, or any number of male monarchs before them, who
executed hundreds without even the semblance of fair trials. On Mary's relationship with Jane, see G.R.
ELTON, REFoRM AND REFoRMATION: ENGLAND 15@-1558, at 373-75 (19n). On Elizabeth and Mary,
OF
see, for example, CAROlLY ERICKSON, THE FIRST ELJZABETII (1983) and ANTONIA FRAsf.R, QUF.EN
Scars (1969).
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On the question of professional dress, see infra Part Vl.B. Mona Harringto
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made by Normanton414 and by the American lawyer Gertrude Handrick.4 's
"If women as solicitors turned out to be incapable, he was sure the gen
eral public would not consult them . . . . The public said they believed in
equality of opportunity; they believed that women should have equal

rights with men, therefore that they s hould be allowed to enter the Pro
fession."416 Neither Lieutenant Wood nor any other speaker found accept
able the suggestion that women should be admitted as a "reward" for
their service and support during the Great War:

[T]hey ought not to speak of their willingness to give the privilege to

ladies of coming into the Profession as a war bonus. He abhorred the

thought that it was giving something as a reward. He wanted women
to have the privilege because he believed they had an inherent capac
ity and ability equal to that of men, and he could not see any possible

valid reason why they should so long have been debarred from earn
ing their living, as probably they were well able to do, in the same

way as the other sex. . . . Why because a human being was born a

woman should she be compelled to retire into oblivion and be de
barre d from exercising the gifts and talents with which she had been
endowed?411

Some supporters of the bill nevertheless questioned whether women
were generally capable of performing the duties neces s ary. W.A. Sharpe,
Vice-President of the Law Society, while voicing support, admitted that
like Mr. Crook he "criticised the sphere and the powers and the abilities
. . "•1s However,
of women. Those criticisms seem to be true
.

.

he thought that, whatever women might be, they had never been

given the opportunity of trying how they could develop themselves
and improve and expand their powers in the practice of the law. He

was not an advocate for a woman becoming a solicitor, because in

many respects he did not think the solicitor's a suitable occupation for

a woman, any more than he thought a woman would make a good

soldier. But he was not in the position of the man who would never
go into the water until he could swim and therefore never learned to
swim at all. He wanted to find out what those abilities were . . . .4 1 9

Neither Sharpe nor R.W. Dibdin, a member of the Society's gov
erning council and an opponent of the bill, believed that many women
20
would avail themselves of the opportunity of entering the profession.4
Dibdin, furthermore, rearticulated the idea of a "reward" for women who
had participated in the war effort, and suggested that perhaps women

414. Admission ofWomen, supra note 186, at 429.
415. Women in the I.Aw, supra note 15, at 134.
416. Law Society: Admission, supra note 400, at 41 1 .
417. Id. (stat.ementofH. Monger).
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 41 1-12.
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would now want to be soldiers and a great many other things that they
were no more suited for than for the practice of law:
What they had to decide upon, as being eminently acquainted with
the needs and duties of the law, was either that women were suitable
to be members of the Profession or they were not. . . . Personally, he

believed they were quite unfit-for many reasons. This was saying
nothing against them. They were quite unfit to serve in the army as
soldiers, but many of the arguments ought to go as far as to say that if
they wanted to go into the army we should be compelled in the same
way to let them go. It was quite absurd . . . . They were all agreed that
women should have equal opportunities with men in matters which
they could manage equally well; but he did not think it would be to
the interest of the country, to the interest of the Profession, or to the
interest of women themselves, that they should become members of
21
the solicitor branch . . .4
.

Neither was evidence that women, who had already entered the medical
profession successfully, particularly persuasive. Sharpe pointed out that
few women actually practiced medicine422 and Charles Mackintosh, an
other speaker, asserted that
the evidence of the medical profession would go to prove that women
would not be likely to do better in the solicitors' profession, and that
it was not likely that the solicitor's profession would attract them.
The council had considered the matter, and they .were satisfied that
women would raise the tone of the Profession as a whole and that
they would not be litigious when they had the opportunity. The so
licitor's was a contentious profession, the medical profession was not.
Women, as a rule, did not shine as litigants, and probably would not
shine as advisers. 423

With these comments, Mackintosh c ombined the "moral uplift"
argument with the argument that women simply did not understand legal
thinking, particularly in litigation, and thus found himself in a quandary.
He could not conceive of a legal profession in which disputes might be
resolved other than through the traditional (read: "male") means of ar
gumentation and discussion. That a woman lawyer might approach a
dispute differently and offer alternatives to litigation was not within his
understanding. Indeed, such alternatives may not actually have existed at
the time, since their origins would have been nurtured by lawyers who as
yet did not exist. This lack of empathy with the possibility that the law as
practiced by women might afford new and innovative methods of dispute
resolution prevailed among the leaders of the profession forty years later.
As expressed by the Bar Council in 1 969, " ' [t]he fact has to be faced . . .
that the profession of barrister requires the masculine approach (however

421 .

Id. at 412.

422.

Id. at 41 1-12.

423.

Id. at 412.
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fallacious it may be) to reasoning and argument, and women only suc
ceed in such activities if they have a masculine disposition. ' "424 The Bar
Council thus asserted its belief in a flawed but traditional legal argument
than an attempt to reconfigure or reinterpret law to create new political
and social opportunities.

H. Westbury Preston, the final speaker, agreed that most women
would not prove to be capable of law practice and that the very require
ments of entrance to the profession would keep them o u t .m His objection
to the bill was that it did not go far enough . To him it was more logical
that the bill be an

omnibus Bill. It was asked why should women be admitted to the Le
gal Profession and not to the profession of the architect, the account
ant, or the Churoh [sic], and he failed to understand why it should be
so. If there was any right behind the proposal it should apply to all
professions . . . . Women in the past had been forced into one or two
channels. It was very desirable in the interest of the country that the
26
channels should be increased . . .4
.

The debate ended with a vote of 50 for the admission o f women and 33
against, including two members of the Council of the Law Society, R.W.
Dibdin and W. Melmoth Walters.427
Certainly, English solicitors w ere not alone in their concern over
women's abilities in the traditional area of litigation. The U.S. publica
tion Bench and Bar noted that

[t]here may be some women who are adapted to advocacy, but we
believe that the majority of those who obtain admission to the Bar are
not, and further, that the time is hardly ripe for the entrance of many
women into this particular department of practice. It still savors of the
incongruous and jars upon what are called the "conservative" sensi
bilities, to see a woman plead in court, however ably she may per
428
form her part.

424. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 158 (quoting BAR COUNCIL, SUPPlEMENfARY MEMORANDUM 4
(1969)).
425. Law Society: Admission, supra note 400, at 412.
426. Id. Mr. Preston proposed an amendment to that effect. Id. Apparently, the first woman to
receive the doctorate in architecture was Marie Frommer in 1 9 1 9. See Spotlight on Women
Architects, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRm., Oct. 1 8, 1987, at F28. Women were admitted into the
priesthood of the Church of England, not without controversy, in 1994. See Bells Ring as Church 01
England Ordains Women Priests: Ceremony Follows Long Debate
Opposition, ST. Loms POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 1 3, 1 994, at l lA.

and

Sometimes Bitter

427. Societies: The Law Society: Admission of Women as Solicitors, 63 Souc. J. & WKLY. RFJ'.
414, 418 (1919).
428. See Editorial, supra note 3n, at 8.
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However,
[i]n the other departments of legal work . . . women may find a wide
field for usefulness, where they can easily compete with, and in some
of which they may perhaps excel, the men. We refer especially to the
field or fields of legal writing. These, as it seems to us, offer a splen
did opportunity at the present time to the talents of the trained women
lawyers . . . . Women lawyers, also, could hold their own with men,
and might perhaps surpass them, as brief-writers. Large offices would
find bright, reliable young women lawyers of great service in prepar
ing lists of authorities and briefs of cases at all stages, and independ
ent women practitioners could undoubtedly obtain much employment
of this nature from busy lawyers with smaller establishments.429

Even some supporters of women lawyers, both in England and in
the United States, believed that they ought to be channelled into areas of
practice that made the most of their traditional image of femininity, just
as supporters of women physicians believed that they were best suited to
the practice of obstetrics, gynecology and public health. Some women
attorneys even voiced this uncertainty:
One would suppose . . . that the majority of a woman lawyer's clients
would be women. This has not been my experience, nor apparently
the experience of most women lawyers. The average woman seems to
prefer the legal advice of a man. Not infrequently she will ask the
·

woman lawyer of her acquaintance for her opinion as to the matter in
which she is interested and for hints as to how to proceed, but when it

comes to taking definite legal action, she will retain a man .
.

.

.

In my

opinion, there are certain branches of legal work which men are better
equipped to handle than women, and this sphere should not be in
vaded by the latter. For instance, the vast majority of our criminal
cases, and, more especially, general trial work and political litigation.
But there is one field which, while it does not distinctly offer women
a choice for legal practice, yet finds its most patent appeal among
women lawyers. I refer to campaigns for and against legislation
which directly affects the welfare of women and children, both in
430
their legal status and their economic rights.

Others, however, asserted that there were n o essential differences be
tween the capacities of men and women.
B.

The Admission of Women to the Legal Profession

Ivy Williams, a graduate of the Universities of Oxford and London,
was called to the Inner Temple, May 10, 1 922, as England's first female
barrister.431 Williams "surpassed all previous records in the Bar Examina-

429.
430.

Id. at 8-9.
Jean H. Norman, Increasing Opportunitiesfor Women Lawyers, 12 OHIO L REP. 255 (1914).

43 1 . Occasional Notes, 1 5 3 LAW TIMES 336, 337 (1 922). American leg al journals of the period
also heralded her admission. See English Notes: Women Learned in the Law, LAW NOTES, July
1922, at 76.
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tions,'�2 and had been active in the fight to gain women' s admission.433
yet even the excellence of women advocates could not overcome lan
guage that implied that women could adequately represent only certain
types of clients:
In the ten years following the enabling Act we read of women suc

cessfully pleading cases and on December 3rd., 1926, a woman advo
cate appeared with a brief in the Privy Council. To indicate the atti
tude towards women in Law we quote from an article in the Man
chester Guardian (Weekly) of February 4th, 1 927: "It is gratifying to
find that so much of the work of the ordinary practising barrister is
suitable for women. Some cases, indeed, involving the interests of
women and children m� be more sympathetically and successfully
conducted by a woman.' 34
Shortly after Williams' s admission, Carrie Morrison was admitted

as a solicitor, after she passed all appropriate examinations and com
pleted her clerkship.43� She profited from the "reward" aspect of women's
participation in the war. "Miss Morrison, in virtue of d istinguished serv
ice in the Intelligence Department during the war, has been treated as an
'ex-service' student, and has had the term of her articles reduced to two
years. "436
Gray 's Inn, which had tossed Bertha Cave 's application aside nearly
twenty years before, recognized the inevitability of admitting women on
January 28, 1920 after the passage of the Sex Disqualification (Removal)
Act. Francis Cowper enthusiastically stated:
Mrs. M.E. Share-Jones, the first woman student, joined the Inn . But
the distinction of being the first woman was not to be hers. That was
to be achieved by Miss Edith Hesling, admitted in October, 1 920, and
called on June 1 3, 1923. She became Mrs. Bradbury and her daughter
Anne was herself admitted in 1948 and called on June 6, 1 95 1 . At
Gray's Inn, more than any other Inn, women established themselves
as part of the community on a footing of unembarrassed equality and
a day came in Trinity Term, 1 937, when the Treasurer, Lord Atkin,
called to the Bar his daughter Mrs. Rosaline Youard.437

That the climate surrounding the question of female admiss ion to
the bar had changed to a certain extent was evident from a rather rueful
editorial in the Law Times which compared Williams to a woman equally
learned in the law who did not have the opportunity to practice.438 The

432. Ruby M. Wigle, Sisters in law, 6 CAN. B. REv. 419, 420 (1927).
433. As early as 1904, Williams had objected loudly to the exclusion of women from the
profession. See supra note 1:13 and accompanying text
434. Wigle, supra note 432, at 420.
435. The First Woman Solicitor, 86 JUST. PEACE 647 (1922).
436. Id.
437. COWPER, supra note 161, at 126.
438. Occasional Notes, supra note 43 1, at Jn.
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Honourable Charlotte Sugden, daughter of Lord St. Leonards, "assisted
her father in the writing of the well-known text-books in which opinions
find their expression which are scarcely less authoritative than the judg
ments of Lord St. Leonards.""39 Miss Sugden appeared as a witness in the
proving of Lord St. Leonards' s will, and "proved herself fully conversant
with all legal technicalities and niceties, [and] in large measure deter
mined the issue in the establishment of the will and of an important prin
ciple of the law of evidence . . . . "440
The question of married women at the bar continued to be a sticky
one.
Until recently, women had to sacrifice marriage as well as mother
hood to become solicitors: in 192 1 , 1 8 per cent of women solicitors
were married compared with 74 per cent of men; in 195 1 , the propor
tions were 24 and 70 per cent; and as late as 1 966, only a third of all
.
women 1awyers were marned.441

As Theresa Doland (Cornelius), an American lawyer of the period,
noted, when she eventually married:

[I] had been practicing law about four years and I had accumulated
somewhat of a practice, and I thought the name "Theresa Doland"
was just as much stock in trade as anything I had and I was loath to
give it up. I have looked up the subject very carefully and have stud
ied the law upon it and I am of the opinion, if I understand it, that
there is only one person in the state of Michigan that can stop me and
442
that is Mr. Comelius.
VI. CONTINUING DEBATE
A.

Women as Members of Circuit and Session Messes

The "'old boys' network" in the English legal profession extended
to the circuit and session messes, which were both professional and so
cial organizations allowing members of the profession to join together in
congenial surroundings and share conversation, meals and experiences.""3
These messes were described as "primarily social clubs,'"""' and partially
served the same function as does membership in a private country club
today .445 As one American lawyer explained:

439. ld.
440. Id.
441. ABEL, supra note 18, at 174.
442. Theresa Doland, Remarks at w Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Michigan Bar
Association, 6 MICH. ST. BJ. 44, 45 (1 926).
443. Women Barristers and Bar Messes, 155 I.Aw 'TIMES 151 (1923) [hereinafter Women
Barristers and Bar Messes /}.
444. Id.
445. "It's hard to imagine that a woman could have been pushed out of her job in favor of a man
who could golf, but that's what happened to Susan Nichols in the early

1980s in a Philadelphia suburb."
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Every London barrister, early in his career, joins a circuit. He usual ly
selects one where he may be somewhat known to the solicitors, and
where, perhaps, his family have property or associations. Formerly
and, in fact, long after the advent of steam, judge and counsel "rode
the circuit"-as was done in the early days of our own county Bars . . .
. Each circuit has its "mess" with interesting traditions of midnight
carousels and records of fines of bottles of port inflicted upon mem

bers for various delinquencies. The modem mess, besides procuring

special rates at the hotels, constitutes a sort of itinerant club; render
ing possible a discipline for breaches of professional propriety by ex
pulsion or denial or admission, which i s the most drastic punishment
short of disbarment.446

Membership in a circuit was both restricted and exclusive. 447 In order
to maintain control of their members, the circuits increasingly imposed
practices, including a type of blackballing, that allowed them to regulate
appearances in particular courts and by particular barristers.448
Women barristers quickly realized that exclusion from these socie
ties meant exclusion from a very important part of the routine activities
of their colleagues.449 Thus the question of women's entrance to these
dining halls and reception areas became of great concern both to them
and to their male colleagues.4so
Immediately the limitations of legislation became apparent. The Sex
Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1 9 1 9,451 which required formal profes
sional acceptance of women, could not mandate their personal or social
acceptance by the vocal minority of men who did not want them there.
The debate began almost immediately and writers waged it enthusi
astically in the pages of the nation' s legal journals. Intoned the Law
"The Law Society has admitted women members to all the privi

Times:

leges of membership and so have the Inns of Court. It is to be regretted
that Circuit and Sessions Messes have not so far shown themselves

Carolyne Zinko, Los Altos Hills Company Helps Put Women on Par,

S.F.

(discussing the role of country clubs to enhance business relationships).

446.

.

CHRON., May 16, 1997, at Pl

THOMAS l£ARNING, A PHILADEI..PHIA LAWYER IN TIIE LoNOON COURTS 1 7 1 -72 (191 1 ).

448.

ABEL, supra note 1 8, at rr!.
Raymond Cocks, The Bar at Assizes: Barristers on Three Nineteenth Century Circuits, 6

449.

Kinnear, supra note 85, at 41 1.

450.

Exclusion was a problem for some Canadian women students at exam time.

447.

KINGSTON L. REV. 36, 40 ( lrr76).

One woman who graduated in the 1950s recollected that when the final examinations

came to be written, the women were separated from the other students lest the men be

distracted. "I was told by the Dean that . . . their whole lives depended on their success in
the exams . . . . It would have been funny if it hadn't been so sick. Creating a stink would
have done no good at all."

Id. at 433 . At my own law school, "ladies' clay," an occasion during the school year when only wom�n
were called on (or harassed , depending on one's view),

the early 1980s.

45 1.

9 & IO Geo. 5, ch. 71 § l(b) (Eng.).
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tradition in
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equally generous."452 However, it pointed out that women would find it
difficult to join a group that did not want them as members.453 It sug
gested a compromise: women should not have to pay for circuit sub
scriptions if they cannot be admitted into the mess, but they might want
to wait until more men were comfortable with the idea of their presence
before pressing the issue.454 After all, they lost little by so doing except
"the doubtful pleasure of dining in inadequate numbers at what is a
men's dinner.'"'55
Like the suggestion that women were incapable of understanding
the "rules of the game," attitudes that echoed these comments were still
in evidence fifty years later.
The atmosphere of legal practice is strongly coloured by attitudes in

dicative of male arrogance. . . . [M]ale condescension is expressed
through archaic courtesy and banter and by a refusal to take women ' s
ideas and actions seriously. This phenomenon may b e a generalised

feature of our society, but it is emphasised by the club-like character

and mannered quality of the legal profession and by the absence of

women in positions of power within it. By all accounts the manners

that maketh the legal man can in certain circumstances be most op
pressive to the legal woman.456

The Solicitors' Journal
Times' s correspondent:

and

Weekly Reporter agreed with the

Law

[T]here are privacies of mess life which render it inconvenient to mix

the sexes. On the other hand, it is obviously not equitable to exclude
women altogether from the opportunities of gaining experience thus

afforded to the Common Law Bar, and no one has proposed to do so.

Various circuits and sessions are adopting slightly different plans, but
the general scheme seems to be the admission of women to full rights

of membership, but without the right · to attend mess, and conse

quently without any subscription or a reduced subscription. In this

way women receive all the usual benefits as regards notice of sittings,
postal arrangements, attendance in court, court briefs, admission to

the poor persons' defence list, and the like; while the seclusion of the

masculine mess is preserved. Women, of course, can form a mess of
their own and adopt a Bar hotel of their own in each circuit town; al
though, except perhaps on the Home Circuit, their numbers are not

likely to justify such a plan in the near future. On the whole, the pro

posed compromise-which falls [sic] to be considered by most Bars
at an early date-seems fair and liberal.457

Women Barristers and Bar Messes I, supra note 443, at 1 5 1 .
Women Barristers and Bar Messes, 155 L.Aw TIMES 196 ( 1 923) [hereinafter Women
Barristers and Bar Messes II]. Not being Groucho Marx, the ladies insisted on exclusion.
452.
453.

454.

Id.

455.

Id.

456.

SACHS & Wll.SON, supra

457.

Women Barristers and the Circuits, 67 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 179 ( 1922).

note 3, at 179.
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The suggestion that women barristers ought to be satisfied with the
idea of either limited membership in an existing order or full member
ship in a new order is a traditional one familiar to any minority group.

Limited membership in the existing group consisted of privileges which
the women were due in any case as full members of the profession. It
carefully did not include those intangible but real benefits of membership
that enhance professional relations through social interaction and nourish
a career in a profession built on shared values and the ability to reach
compromises through congenial and ongoing relationships. Likewise,
creating a barristers' group consisting only of women members, while
minimizing the problem of difficulties with males who did not want to
associate with them, did not address the very question of the creation of
and nurturing o f professional and social relationships. Women barristers
might very well get along famously, but they did not, to begin with, have
the personal and professional connections that they needed to advance in
the profession. Either suggestion . required nothing more from the men
involved than that they tolerate the existence of women in the profession,
and that they grant only those privileges that a majority might well feel
were not sufficient, but that a significant minority felt were far and away
the most that women could expect. Both journals implicitly recognized
this fact.
Neither the Law Times nor the Journal suggested that women might
band together with like-minded men and start a mess which included
both sexes, a suggestion that would have addressed the problem admira
bly and would have sent a clear signal to the holdouts. Further, it negated
the impression that a separate women ' s mess would simply be the result
of childish pique at not being included in an exclusive club. Eventually,
one mess admitted women and breached the social wall:
[A]t a Grand Night of the Bar Mess of the South-Eastern Circuit, held
at Lewes on the 2nd inst., the question of admitting women barristers
to the mess was discussed, and decided by a majority in favour of

their admission. The election of two women candidates-Miss Bright
Ashford and Miss Llewellyn Davies-was then proceeded with, and
both candidates were elected.4.18

Some restrictions continued until 1964, including exclusion from
activities other than meetings and some meal functions.4.19 In that year, the
Midland Circuit still banned women from all activities, presumably be
cause they '"inhibit[ed] the atmosphere' and 'completely alter[ed] the
character and nature' of the messes•'460 and amazingly disapproved of
female participation in the mess "because they felt ' that in so doing [the

458.

Women Barristers and Bar Messes II, supra
note 453, at 196.
Kennedy, supra note 158 , at 156; see also ABEL-SMITH & STEVENS, supra not.e 5 1 , t
3
a 43l 32 (noting that some circuits only allowed
women to attend meetings and some dinners).
460. ABEL-SMrrn & STEVENS, supra
note 351 , at 432.
459.
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women] are in some way advancing their professional chances. "'461 The
Northern Circuit allowed women into meetings and
selected dinners.462
This combination of bad faith and misogyny resulted in the excoriation
and expulsion of one young female who secreted herself in the hall dur
ing a males-only concert at Gray' s Inn during which

vulgar jokes and songs combine[d] with large quantities of drink. . . .
This kind of episode typifies the traditional flavour of the Bar which,
with few exceptions, is an echo of the public school, the military
mess and the gentlemen's club. Women are just not "chaps"; and the
men are certainly not prepared to make any concessions to make
463
women feel more welcome.
Podmore and Spencer note, however, that even in the 1980s women
solicitors and barristers continued to suffer from exclusion and hence,
exclusion from the intangible but real advantages that membership in a
profession dependent on social interaction could provide:

In some professions-particularly in the law, but in medicine also
the nature of social interaction is modelled on that of exclusive men's
clubs. This "clubbable" atmosphere, which permeates the courts, bar
risters' chambers, solicitors' practices and local law societies, is a
considerable barrier for women to overcome. . . . Exclusion from full
participation in the "club" and its activities is certain to inhibit the ca
reers of women lawyers.464
B.

The Issue ofWomen's Dress in Court

The obvious symbolism inherent in allowing women to take meals
with their male colleagues while riding the circuits was only one of the
gender-related issues that confronted the profession. The garb of the
English lawyer is one of the most distinctive symbols of that walk of life.
The debate over whether women called to the bar should either be re
quired or allowed to affect the robe and wig of the English barrister was
somewhat heated.465 For male opponents, the traditional barrister's dre
.
symbolized exclusivity both through gender and through profession.
The traditional dominance and power of the male was reinforced �ough

�

his control of the legal apparatus.467 To allow women to practice law
might have become a necessary evil. It did not follow that ey should
also be permitted to wear the costume of the law, thus creatmg an �

�

drogynous look that made it more difficult for onlookers to determme

46 1 .
462.
463.
464.
465.
466 .
467.

Id.
Id. at 43 l .
Kennedy, supra note 158, at 1 56-57.
Podmore & Spencer, supra note 19, at 29-30.
Wig Debate, BARRISTERS & S ouc. J., Apr. I, 1922, at 81 .
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Id.
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which of the barrister class were legitimate and which were recent inter
lopers.
In Ireland, women wore the traditional wig, apparently without any
comment, an outcome which the Justice of the Peace found "ludicrous. .
. . It is generally assumed that no such outrage will occur here, and that
women practitioners will be required to substitute for the wig a black
biretta. The principle is clear. A women [sic] in Court as in church
should have a head-covering, which technically a wig is not.''468 Entrusted
with the duty of making this momentous decision was a committee of
five "eminent judges," including the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of
the Rolls.469 Citing the Daily News, the Barristers' and Solicitors' Jour
nal continued:
The five judges have so far had no feminine adviser to assist them at
their deliberations.

One of the proposals

made by the Judges'

Committee is that women barristers should wear a cap similar to that
worn by the women graduates aild undergraduates at Oxford, but the
women students who are reading for the Bar are said to be in favour
of wearing wigs, and it is probably that they will be asked their
opinion before the judges' decision is made absolute. Some definite
rules will also have to be laid down in regard to the dress to be worn
under the gown. As it is against etiquette for barristers to wear light
suits, it is probably that women will be prohibited from wearing
coloured blouses and skirts, low necks, and short sleeves, when in the

courts .

..

.470

The editor of the Irish Law Times and Solicitors' Journal added that
"[t]he question has not created any difficulty in Ireland, where lady bar
risters wear the same style of wig and bands as men. The effect is cer
tainly far from ludicrous. It is regarded as very becoming to the lady
wearers. "411 In the early 1990s, barristers were still debating the wig
question:
The Commercial Bar Association, representing 500 commercial
lawyers, argues that many consider wigs to be uncomfortable and
outmoded, and that they can alienate and intimidate people in court.
They have backing from the highest echelons of the legal pro
fession. In an interview with the BBC yesterday, the new Lord Chief

!ustice,

Baron ?"aylor of Gosforth, admitted that the " 1 8th century

unage enshrouding the law is one of the factors which makes us seem
out of touch."
He added: "I do not believe we are really out of touch, but I
have made no secret of the fact that I believe we should probably

468.
469.
470.
47 1 .

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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shed wigs and robes. However, I would not fire into doing that with

out consultation and without seeing what we are going to do, which is

not quite as simple as it may seem.

"One could just have ordinary suits or one could have the kind

of gown they have in the United States, or various other alternatives
which we have to look at closely .'9472

However, some male barristers now find a female colleague's wig an
incredible attraction:
But for many the wig is an evocative and inseparable element of

the practice of law, with all its faults. One male barrister said: "It's

about the sexiest thing a woman can wear. There is something about
the severity of a wig that makes any woman look attractive."

Woman lawyers, understandably, wish to distance themselves

from such antediluvian attitudes. Helena Kennedy, one of the coun

try's best-known female QCs, said: "I feel strongly that part of the
mystification of the law is added to by the wearing of the garb which
alienates many people from the legal process.

"I want to see the wig go, particularly in criminal courts, where

people can be very fearful. I think the majority of people in the pro

fession are confident of their own success and don 't need the prop of

fancy dress."473

The

Committee of Judges and Benchers of the Inns of Court ended
by recommending the same dress for both men and women barristers,
which upset some people in the legal press:
The Committee of Judges and Benchers of the Inns of Court

who have been considering what would be the appropriate robes for

women to wear in court after their call to the Bar have "expressed a
wish" that the dress of women barristers in court shall conform to the
following

rufos:--( 1 ) Ordinary barrister's wigs should be worn and

should completely cover and conceal the hair. (2) Ordinary barrister's

gowns should be worn.

(3) Dresses should be plain, black or very

dark, high to the neck, with long sleeves, and not shorter than the
gown, with high, plain white collar and barrister's bands; or plain

coats and skirts may be worn, black or very dark, not shorter than the
gown, with plain white shirts and high collars and barrister's bands.474

472.

Gervase Webb, The Law Wants a Verdict on Wigs in Court, EVENING STANDARD (London),

Apr. 28, 1992, at 14.
473.

Id. Sexuality as an undercunent in the relationship of (male) lawyers to their chosen

profession should be obvious from the traditional saying that the law is a jealous mistress. "I will not
say, with Lord Hale, that 'The Law will admit of

no

mistress, and requires a long and constant courtship. It

rival . . . ' but I will say, that it is a jealous
is not to be won by trifling favors, but by lavish
.

homage." Joseph Story, The Value and Importance ofLegal Studies, in MlscELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF
JOSEPH STORY 503, 523 (William W. Story ed., 1852).
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�

olicitors'
rom ise, the
After reporting this unsatisfactory comp
the tra
m
n
�
wom
of
ight
th
Journal and Weekly Reporter objected to � �
cov
head
s
man
ionally a
ditional barrister's garb.415 The wig was tradit
much out of place �n a
ering, not a woman 's, sniped the Journal, and ."as
we forbear to particuwoman 's head as any masculine article of attirelarize-on her body."416

This disapproval was as much a function of its unwill ingne� s t? deal
with the niceties of the wig ' s p ositioning on the head as .its objection to
this change in custom. Sir Herbert Stephens' concerns about the manner
of wearing the wig evoked the Journal to fuss:
The wig must "completely cover and conceal the hair." How shock
ing should a stray lock emerge ! Sir Herbert says it cannot be done
when the hair is "bobbed"; but how does he know what that means?

And with other modes the w ig will give a "hydrocephalous, ungainly,
and

ludicrous appearance."

"Hydrocephalous"
m

sounds

forcible,

though we are glad it is not of our using.

The Journal defensively concluded:
It may be said that our criticism is destructive. . . .What have we to
say constructively? But that is really for the Committee when the
matter is referred back to the them-as it ought to be-for re
consideration. At any rate, they need not encourage the women to ape
the men in their dress. B oth Sir Herbert Stephens and Lieut-Col.
Hawkes. . . offer suggestions-a biretta, or toque, or coif. But, no
doubt, the best solution would be just his or her own natural hair for

everybody .478

By contrast a New York judge objected to female hat-wearing in his
court.419 As one legal reporter pointed out, women traditionally wore hats
even in places of worship; to fixate on the headgear, rather than on the
thoughts coming out of the head it covered, seemed inordinately petty.480
Indeed, the traditional garb associated with the English Bar dates
only from the 1 7th century.481 B efore that, the long gown seems to have

475 .

Women Barristers and Wigs, 66

476.

Id.

477 .

Id.
Id. (citation

Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 40 1 , 40 1 ( 1922).

omitted). Hair seems to be a continuing concern for critics of women attorneys .
Note the inane discussions of Marcia Clark's new hairstyle during the OJ. Simpson trial. See
CNN &
478.

Company (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 12, 1995). See also Charles J. Ogletree
, Jr., Johnnie Cochran

& Marcia Clark: Role Models?, in PoSTMORTEM: THE OJ. SIMPSON CASE
1 17, 121, 124. (Jeffrey
Abramson ed., 1996) (discussing undue attention given Clark's hairstyle
and clothing throughout trial).
479. Women Lawyers at the Bar with Hats On, 14 1..Aw NOTES 122, 1 22
( 1 910).
480. Id. Virginia Drachrnan quotes nineteenth-century U.S. attorney
Lelia Robinson

as remarking
a. tremendous tacti� proble f?r a woman lawyer: "Shall the woman
�
attorney wear
her hat when argumg a case or making a motton m court . . . or shall she
remove it?" Drachman supra
note 255, at 2414.
that � hat

was

•

481.

J.H. Baker, The Origin ofthe Bar Gown, 49 1..AW GUARDIAN
1 7 ( 1 969).
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been worn traditionally by both "learned" persons and the male lay
population.�2 Further, it seems that lawyers in general wore simple long
gowns of various colors.43 The familiar black robe seems to have gained
favor only after the reign of Henry VII ( 1 485- 1 509).484 After the reign of
Charles II (1660- 1 685), when it represented mourning for the dead king,
the profession finally formally adopted it

as

official lawyers' garb.�s

Wigs seem to have come into fashion after the Inns of Court prohibited
benchers, particularly the ebullient young adventurers of the Tudor and
Stuart courts, from wearing "hats, cloaks, boots spurs, swords, daggers
and long hair'- which symbolized the aggressive practices antithetical to
a dispassionate and nonviolent dispute resolution regime. Because those
so regulated were male, we may postulate that wigs became more associ
ated with that sex than with the other, thus the argument that wigs are a
male and not a female "head covering." Such an argument smacks of the
contemporary assertion among French male avocats that a decree of the
Paris Parlement of 1 540 forbidding lawyers from sporting facial hair is
proof that women should continue to be barred from the profession, since
women have none.�'
Once the committee made the decision that women and men barris
ters should dress alike, the bar discouraged women from retaining any
mar.ks of female attire:
Meticulous rules are imposed and their strict interpretation endlessly
discussed. To be the very model of a perfect lady barrister means
looking as indistinguishable as possible from one's male colleagues.
Warnings are given at an early stage in one's career to remove dress
rings and nail polish when appearing before a certain lady judge.
"Dresses or blouses should be long-sleeved and high to the neck. . . .
Wigs should, as far as possible, cover the hair, which should be
drawn back from the face and forehead, and if long enough should be
488
put up.' ,

Clearly the "sex kitten" or "siren" look is out of place.

482.
483.

J.H. Baker, The History of the Gowns Worn at the English Bar, 9 COSTUME 15 (1975).

Id.

484.

Id.

485.

Id.

486.

Baker, supra note 481 , at 17.

487. The argument states:
On invoqua serieusemenl

un

a"ete du Parlemenl de 1540 qui 'in1erdit

aux

avocats de

porter la barbe et la moustache. ' C' etait done que les femmes ne peuvent etre avocates. Et
cette objection nous etonne; l'a"ete suppose au contraire que lesfemmes on1, par avance,

respecte le texte, puisqu' elles ne portent ni la barbe ni la moustache.
[They cite seriously a decree of the Parliament from 1540 that "prohibits lawyers from
having a beard or a moustache." This meant that women could not be lawyers. And that
objection astounds us; the decree assumes on the contrary that women have in advance
complied with its words, because they wear neither beards nor moustaches.)
CORCOS, supra note 1 34, at 1 9 (translation by author); see Corcos, supra note 37, at 455.
488.

Kennedy, supra note 158, at 159 (citing Notes for Guidance on Dress in Court, in BAR

CouNC:n:s ANNUAL STATEMFNJ' 52 (1973)).
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These rules are sacred to the heart of the older woman practitioner,
going back to the days when admission to a man ' s world w� sue� a
9
privilege that women confonned even in their mode of dress. To �ts
credit the Special Committee refused to act as a watchdog of skirt
.
lengths and referred the question of �ess straight back !O the B�
.
.
Council. It is extraordinary how much time is waste! on tnv1a of this
kind while the real problems continue to be ignored.

�� � yond the literal.

Like dress, language did and does carry mean

The arrogance of the male lawyer continued to d1m1msh the efforts of
women attorneys into the 1 970s and 1 980s:
One County Court judge in Berkshire who had a notorious reputation
as a misogynist used to refer to women barristers in open court as
.

"chorus girls" and "silly girls". During a road acc1d�nt case, �here
the woman driver was represented by a woman hamster, the Judge
gratuitously gave the court the benefit of �is jaundiced view . of
.
_
women drivers. The male counsel for the plamtiff obsequiously
m
quired if the judge held the same views of women barri sters. This sort
of male togetherness is frequently used in a competitive way to un
dermine the professional confidence of women practitionerS.491

VD. THE ENTRY OF WOMEN INTO PROFESSIONS RELATED TO LAW
In general, the objections to women' s entry or full participation in

the legal profession paralleled objections to their entry or full participa
tion in other professions.

489.

Kennedy, supra note 158, at 159-60. To a great extent this seems to continue to be true

in court and in law school.

Christine Farley tells the story of a male colleague who

modify her style of dress in

order

counseled

both

her to

not to convey the wrong impression to students concerning her

expectations for class performance.
As he saw it, I either needed to in fact be nice, or, alternatively appear not to be nice. I
explained to him that I had already decided that it was not my goal to be nice, and I
wondered why students would draw the contrary conclusion when my actions had not
betrayed my intentions. lben he commented on my appearance. Noting that I was
wearing a sweater, he told me that as a young woman I could not afford to wear anything
"soft." He suggested instead that I wear dark, "severe-looking" suit jackets.
Farley, supra

note 1 1, at 344.

During a break from a winter 1995 CIE session a female Cleveland Heights judge admired my
deep purple wool coat, then told me she hoped I reali7.ed I could never wear that color in court. On
another occasion, a male colleague at my fonner law school and I were discussing dress with a Jaw
student My colleague pointed out that my turtleneck sweater, blazer and wool skirt were quite
appropriate and attractive for an academic environment but "of c ourse" would never do in court, and
that his own dark suit was marginal for a court appearance, but gave him
a somewhat more severe
image than he would have liked for classroom teaching.

490. Kennedy, supra note 158, at 1 59-60. However, some women as well
as men regretted the
loss of women's special, protected status. Mary Lathrop, the first woman admitted
to the American Bar
Association, commented: "I'm rather tired of rights. I'd love to have
a few privileges." Virginia G.
Drachman, � New Woman Lawyer and the Challenge ofSexual E
quality in Early Twenlieth-Cennuy
America, 28 IND. L REV. 227, 2'1:/ ( 1995).
491 .

Kennedy, supra note 158, at 1 57. &e also Delfs, supra note 15 (discussing
gender bias in the

courtro)om .
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A. The Judicial Branch
The horror that solicitors such as G.B. Crook felt at the thought of
females on the bench492 and the ambivalence that J.A. Symmonds ex
pressed493 were only two of the reactions to the thought of female magis
trates. The English legal journal Justice

of the Peace

observed that the

reception accorded the recently introduced Justices of the Peace

(Qualifi

cation of Women) Bill

justifies the anticipation that this refonn in our judicial system may
be looked for at an early date . . . . The principle which is thus to have
legislative effect given to it is an important one, although its adoption
into the law of the land would not be likely to have anything like the
direct result which followed from the recent concession of the par494
.
franch"1se to women.
11amentary
In its discussion of the proposed legislation, the journal pinpointed the

problem with much of the long tenn parliamentary attempt to grant
women equal civil and political rights.495 The legislation drafted suffered
from one of two flaws.496 Either it was ineffectively written, so that those
so inclined could find, with the assistance of like-minded judges, ways to
circumvent the intended application of the statute,497 or it was written so
that it granted women a severely limited scope of participation.498 Thus,
Parliament often needed to revisit questions it had alre.ady considered:

[W]hile there is in theory no limit to the number of justices who may
be appointed in any county, in practice the number is adjusted to what

are likely to be the demands on the time of the holders of the office,
and new members are appointed only as and when the step is neces
sary to keep the roll at its normal strength. The Bill merely provides
that in making a selection to fill up such vacancies the claims of a
woman to selection shall not be ignored because of the fact that she is
a woman. The removal of the disqualification of women to sit as jus
tices where they would but for their sex become justices ex officio is
all the more notable that the common law disability of women in this
respect has been so recently affirmed by Parliament. The Qualifica
tion of Women (County and Borough Councils) Act, 1907, section 1,
when granting admission to local offices to women provided that a
woman if elected as chairman of a county council or mayor of a bor
ough should not by virtue of holding or having held that office be a
499
justice of the peace.

492.
493 .
494.

Admission of Women, supra note 186, at 429.

495.
496.
497.
498.
499.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Law Society: Admission, supra note 400, at 410- l l .
Women on the Bench, 83 JUST. PEACE 246 (1919) .
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The journal predicted that women wo�ld, by v ue of ne��r legislation
_
written to remove impediments to therr occupation of JUd1c1al seats, de

u:

cide cases before they argued them, although it expressed this thought in
language that could be taken either as admiration or as disapproval: "It
would not be out of keeping with their traditional disregard for common
place paths of progress if women attained to the bench before reaching
the bar...soo
B. Juries
While participation on a jury is not a professional occupation, it
does serve as a basic part of the English legal system. Thus, female par
ticipation on juries was a matter of continuing debate throughout the
period. The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act allowed the excuse of
women "because of the character of the issues involved or the evidence
to be given. "501 Some men apparently went to great lengths to avoid jury
duty themselves, even putting their property in their wives' names.502
C. The Legislature
1.

House of Commons

The right of women over the age of thirty to vote for members of
the House of Commons was granted through the Representation of the
People Act of 1 9 1 8501 and their right to be elected to the Commons was
established through the Parliament Act of 1 9 1 8,504 even though it was
"not a fit place for any respectable woman to sit in."505 In 1 9 1 9, Nancy,
Viscountess Astor,506 became the frrst woman to be elected to that branch
of the legislature, succeeding her husband, who had been elevated to the
House of Lords.507 The L<iw Times noted that in Lady Astor' s case,

500.

Id.

501. Sex Disqualification (Removal) Bill, 83 Jusr. PEACE 330 (1919). See Sex Disqualification
(Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, Ch 7 1 , § l(b) (Eng.) (stating women may be exempted "by
reason of the nature of evidence to be given or the issues to be tried''). The Jurors (Scotland) Act was
amended in 1920 to allow women to serve as jurors. See The Jurors (Scotland) Act of 1 920, 10 & 1 1
Geo. 5 , ch. 53, § 1 ( 1 ) (Eng.).
502. See Barristers and Solicitors (Qualification o/Women) Bill, 63 SOuc. J. & WKLY. REP. 500,
501 (1919).
503. Representation of the People Act of 1918, 8 Geo. 5, ch. 64 (Eng.).
5 . The Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act of 1 918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5, ch. 47 (Eng.). As one
American commentator pointed out, while women under 30 could not vote,
they could be elected to the
Commons at any age, which was also true of the Netherlands. See Women Members of Parliament, 13
AM. Pot.. So. REv. 1 14, 1 1 5 (1919) [hereinafter Women Member
s) .
505. See Women Members, supra note 504, at 1 14.
5_06. lady Astor was the fonner Nancy Langhorne, a
member of an old, established Virginia
family. See DicnONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, 1961-1970,
at 43 (Supp. 1981).
507. See Occasional Notes, 148 LAW TiMEs 218, 219 (1919)
[hereinafter Lady Astor]. The custom
of w� succeeding their husbands to a legislative
position has since become somewhat notorious in
the Urutcd States. In 1972, Lindy Boggs of
Louisiana succeeded her husband, the late Hale Boggs, in

�
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the personal equation invests her presence in the House of Commons
with surroundings absolutely unique and unparalleled. The first
woman member . . . who has been elected to that assembly for the
discharge of Parliamentary duties was not, strange to say, born a
British subject. Lady Astor is by birth an American citizen, and has
become a British subject by marriage. She is accordingly qualified for
election and sitting and voting in the House of Commons under the
provisions of recent legislation by the fact of her marriage with a
British citizen.508
That Lady Astor would not have been eligible for her seat had she
not been married was an ironic circumstance not lost on the article ' s
author. Further, her husband was the son of a naturalized British subject
who only obtained his right to sit in the Lords upon the passage of the
Naturalization Act of 1 870,SO'J which allowed naturalized citizens not born

See Lindy Boggs to the Vatican, THE HCYJUNE, Apr. 1 8, 1997, at
142. Muriel Humphrey was named to her late husband's Senate seat on January 25, 1978. See Patricia
Grice, FYI: Time Capsule, STAR·l'RIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 20, 1997, at 18. Lurleen Wallace was
elected governor of the state of Georgia in 1966, succeeding her husband George who could not
succeed himself. See The Associated Press, Jan. 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4408437 (listing key
the U.S. House of Representatives.

dates in the life of fonner Alabama Governor George C. Wallace). Much earlier, Rose McConnell Long
finished out her dead husband's Senate tenn. See Jane McKee, The Roll Call Quiz, ROLL CALL, July

17,
1995. Later, another Long widow, Cathy, succeeded her husband, U. S. Representative Gillis Long. See
Mitchell Locin, Clout Southern Style: When It Comes to Politics, Chicago Ain't Got Nothin' on the
Pelican State, Cm. TRIB., June 2, 1985, at Cl8.
Some of these women were undeniably able, and had simply put their husbands'

careers

ahead

of their own political ambitions, as women have traditionally been expected to do. The jury is still out
on others.

One commentator wrote:
rrJhe United States, in a strange and sentimental nepotism, prefers widows. Perhaps it is
our idea that the American woman is a kind of clinging ivy to her husband's oak; that
they are two minds with but a single thought, and that a constituency which has found
itself admirably represented by a husband, unfortunately deceased, can have equal and
identical perfection by electing his widow to take his place. Perhaps it takes a particular
kind of ability to live with one of our masculine representatives at Washington; the
characteristic of being a good mixer, say; of being able to deal with refractory and wilful
personalities; and any one who survives that association may have durable and excellent
personal qualities. Or perhaps we merely wish to pay a sentimental tribute, of the kind we
offer when we subscribe to a memorial window: something to please the family.

Alzada

Comstock,

(1926). At least

Women Members of European Parliments, 20 AM. PoL. Sa. REV. 379, 383-84

one

influential contemporary commentator interprets this tendency more cynically,

calling it the "Aashdance" phenomenon, after the popular film· of the

same name

in which an aspiring

dancer has her way to the top smoothed by a sympathetic, attractive, and wealthy suitor (a late-twentieth
century retelling of the Cinderella story, CHARLEs PERRAULT, CINDERELLA, OR TIIE UITLE GLASS
SUPPER (1954)).

See FARREL,L supra note 15, at 91-100 ( 1 988).

In real life, almost all of America's one hundred wealthiest women made their
personal fortunes on their husband's' or father's death, and many women with power
flashdanced to it on their husband 's death, such as Helen Copley, who quit her job as a·
secretary when she married the president of Copley Enterprises on her husband's death,
or female U.S. Senators such as Muriel Humphrey, elected with no prior experience upon
the death of Hubert Humphrey; or Margaret Chase Smith, elected after the death of
Senator Smith; or Katherine Graham of the
McDonald's.

Washington Post, or Joan Kroc of

Id. at 58-59. While parts of Farre ll's book appear to be special pleading, he docs point out many of the
critical areas in which men's and women's socialization tend to promote misunderstanding.

508. Lady Astor, supra note 507, at 219.
509. The Naturaliz.ation Act of 1 870, 33 Viet., ch. 14 (Eng.).
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of English parents to sit in either House.51° Further, as e wife o a peer
and a member of the aristocracy, Lady Astor could be tned for crunes by
the Lords by virtue of her sex, and yet she could not occupy a seat there.
Her membership in the Commons, coupled with her husband 's seat in the
.
Lords, made legal nonsense of the old idea that husband and wife
were
"one person in law: "
A statute of Henry VI. declares the law to be that peeresses in their
own right or by marriage shall be tried before the same judicature as
other peers of the realm. . . . It would be an interesting question
whether a peeress by marriage who was also a member of the House
of Commons would, on a charge of felony, be of trial of nobility or
trial as a commoner by a judge and jury. A wife in the House of
Commons with a husband in the House of Lords upsets absolutely

and completely the old idea of the rights and obligations involved in

the marriage status. From the earliest times it has been laid down as a
fundamental principle of law, a principle upon which the whole law
relating to husband and wife . . . has depended, that by virtue of the

marriage a husband and wife become one person in law . . . . Viscount

Astor in the House of Lords and Lady Astor as the occupant of a seat
in the House of Commons . . . are, though husband and wife, not one

person in law. . . . The election of a married woman to the House of
Commons may be regarded as a death warrant to all the disabilities

entailed by coverture on the persons, the property, or the transactions
of married women.51 1

An American observer of the period quoted Lady Astor's wry commen

tary on her political style and that of a female colleague:
Lady Astor's own description of her own methods is given in the
following words by Marjorie Shuler in the American Review of Re

views for January 1 924: "I get very keen on a thing and go after it.

The men say 'There' s that terrible woman' ; and they run away from
me. They tum to Mrs. Wintringham and say, ' There' s that good, kind,
homely women; let' s talk to her' . And Mrs. Wintringham just smiles
and smiles, and skins them alive-but they don ' t know it."'512

510.
5 1 1.

Id.

Lady Astor, sup�a

note 507, at 2 1 9 (citation omitted) . Nancy, Viscountess Astor,
was the
woman, who once told W111Ston Churchill, "Winston, if you were my husband I
should flavor your
" "Madam " ChurchilI replied, "if I were your husband I should
·
coftiee WJ"th poison.
drink I"t" Cathenne
·
Fitzpatrick, Well Equipped, MILWAUKEE J. SEN"11NEL, July 1 3 , 1 997, at I .
5 1 2. Comstock, supra note 507, at 380. Comstock also discusses women members o
f the Gennan,
·
Swedish, C""""
_._
uos1ov akian, FIJlllish, Hungarian U S. , Dutch.' and Norwegian
I
I
e
g
1
s
a
tures
,
noting
·
that
·
·
There is something odd. about the geographical
position of the countries in which these
women members, deputies and senators, are to be found. They
exist in a fringe around the
no� and east of Europe.
Italy, Spain, and the other countries along
the
·
Mediterranean are out of It entirely
To fi10d the group o f women Ieg1slato
rs of longest
standing, rth
one must go up ���nd the Scandinavian countr
ies, to the Finns, who Jive
f;arther no . than any other c1v1hz.ed people
in the world.
·
What 1s there about the barren
north which stimulates women to go
.
into law,
and pol"ti
medicme,
·
1 cs?· And what is there about blue Medite
rranean skies which keeps
•

_

.

'

�ranee,
·

·

·

·

·
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Lady Astor soon had a third colleague, Mrs . Clara Phillipson. Political

wags nicknamed the three female members of the Commons "Society"
(Lady Astor), "Sobriety" (Mrs. Wintringham) and "Variety" (Mrs. Phil
lipson, who had been an actress).513 The 1 9 24 Labour Government

brought in Margaret B ondfield, a former shop assistant whose interests
were workers' rights and who became the first woman member of a
British govemment.514
2.

House of Lords

After the passage of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act,515 the

question arose concerning women's eligibility for the House of Lords as
well. The Solicitors' Journal pointed out that the Sex Disqualification
(Removal) Act was "framed in very general and wide terms"516 and
agreed that Parliament had only envisioned election to the House of
Commons .511 It may have seemed that the spirit of legislation like the
Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act518 and the Sex Disqualification
(Removal) Acf 19 which seemed to confer on women the same political

rights as men should have addressed the problem of peeresses like Vis
countess Rhondda,520 but discussion in the Lords resulted in a decision to
consign that issue to a specific enabling statute.
A committee appointed in 1922 found that no existing piece of leg
2
islation, including the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1 9 1 9 ,5 1

specifically removed the disability. In its eyes, membership in the House
of Lords was neither a civil or judicial office or post, nor a profession or
vocation:

them out of the professions and out of politics, and induces them to spend their days
running little shops?
Id. at 379. Weather may have something to do with it, but the religious and political orientations of
these countties also encourage or discourage the recognition of and respect for women's achievements
to varying degrees.
5 13. Id. at 380.
514. Id. at 380-81.
515. Sexual Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71, § l(b) (Eng.).
5 16. Alteration of Women's Legal Status, 64 Souc. J. & WKLY. REP. 250 (1 920).
5 17 . Id. The journal further clucked that a very similar piece of legislation passed in New South
Wales did not correspond exactly with the British statute. "This question of sex-equality legislation
seems to be one of those in which uniformity throughout the Empire would be desirable." Id.

5 1 8.
519.

The Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act of 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5, ch. 47 (Eng.).
Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 1919, 9 & 1 0 Geo. 5, ch. 71, § l(b) (Eng.).
520. Regarding peeresses, Francis Palmer stated:
Peeresses, whether they be peeresses by birth, by creation, or by marriage, are
entitled to the same privileges as peers, but if a peeress by marriage should afterwards
intermarry with a commoner, she forfeits her privileges. By the Lords' Standing Orders,
No. 53, it is ordered and declared by the Lords that privilege of Parliament shall not be
allowed to minor peers, noble women, or widows of peers, saving their right ofpeerage.
FRANCIS BEAUFORT PALMER, PEERAGE LAW IN ENGLAND 152 (1978). Peeresses could, however, be
tried in the House of Lords. Id. at 1 8 (citing 20 Hen. 6, ch. 9 (Eng.); 6 Geo. 4, ch. 66, § 12 (Eng.)).
521. 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 7 1 , § 1 (Eng.). Viscountess Rhondda commented rather sourly that the
word "removal" "had never succeeded in getting outside its brackets." SHIRLEY M. EoFF, VISCOUNTESS
RHONDDA: EQUALITARIAN FEMINIST 87 (1991 ).
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The committee's procedure in reaching its decision was met with some
derision:
[N]o report, however ably drafted, can alter the fact that the proce
dure adopted is open to grave objection. At the first hearing the then
Attorney-General intimated that he could not dispute the soundness of
Lady Rhondda 's construction of the statute, and the Committee re
ported accordingly, whereupon the House recommitted the matter in
order that a full Committee might hear the present Attorney-General
argue against a submission that his predecessor in office had pro
nounced unassailable ! Naturally the proceedings wore a certain air of
3
unreality.52

Apparently, the committee also made the suggestion that legislative
history was necessary to determine the exact intent of Parliament with
regard to the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act.524 Since the Interpreta
tion Act was intended to address just such questions, appeal to parlia
mentary debate was unusual and probably illegitirnate.m Early in the
debate over the 1 9 1 9 Act, however, the Justice of the Peace sniffed that
the press had misunderstood the intent of the bill and addressed itself
particularly to the question of Viscountess Rhondda and other women
holding titles in their own right:
If we may judge from the Press notices, clause 2 seems to be a good
deal misunderstood. It merely provides that in the patent of any peer
age granted in the future there may be a valid limitation authorising
the holder, if a woman, to sit and vote in the House of Lords. The po
sition of women who are now peeresses in their own right is not in
tended to be affected.526

It also noted that the Government might legitimately continue to close
2
the civil and foreign services to women.5 7
Th� House of Lords proved the Justice of the Peace right in its in
terpretation. The Committee of Privileges of the House of Lords did not
read the wording of this statute to include a peeress • s right to sit as

522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.

9 & IO Geo. 5, ch. 71, § 1 (Eng.).
IAdy Rhondda's Case, 86 JUST. PE.A.CE 255, 255 (1922).
9 & IO Geo. 5, ch. 7 1 , § 1 (Eng.).
IAdy Rhondda's Case, supra note 523, at 255.
The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Bill, supra
note 501 , at 330.
Id.

an
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equal among that body.'28 While Viscountess Rhondda could both vote
for and serve in the House of Commons, she could not take her seat as a
peeress of the Realm. For the Committee, the Sex Disqualification (Re
moval) Act of 1919, was "not sufficient to carry out so momentous a
revolution in the constitution of the House of Lords."'29 For the Law
Times this result was understandable but regrettable:
When such acknowledged experts [as Lord Haldane and Lord Birk
enhead] differ, it is difficult to express any opinion, but it must now
be taken that the House of Lords is the only place where women are
forbidden to exercise any public function, and where men alone have
"a seat, place, and voice." In this country we have no Salic law, and a
woman may fill the highest place in the Empire. Women as common
ers may give their services to the State in the House of Commons,
and no logical or other reason exists why a woman, a peeress in her
own right, should be excluded from the other estate of the realm.s30

In 1 925, Lord Astor attempted to remedy the situation with a bill, which
was defeated by a two-vote majority,'3' even though backers attempted to
m ake a strong historical argument in support:
Ladies of birth and quality sat in council with the Saxon Witas. In
Wightred's great council at Beconcild, A.D. 699, the Abbesses sat
and deliberated, and five of them signed the decrees of that council
along with the king, bishops, and nobles. In Henry m and Edward I's
time four Abbesses were summoned to Parliament, viz.: of Shaftes
bury, Berking St. Mary, of Winchester, and of Wilton, In the 35th
[sic] of Edward m were summoned by writ to Parliament to appear
there by their proxies Countess of Norfolk, Countess of Onnonde,
Countess of March, Countess of Pembroke, Countess of Oxford, and
Countess of Atholl. These ladies were called ad colloquium et tracta
tum: "The old prerogatives of the Crown have not perished, nor can
they become obsolete through desuetude. Nullum tempus occurrit
Regi." Mr. Bagehot on one occasion recommended a persual of the
pages o f Comyn's Digest, or any other such book, under the title Pre
rogative; and Mr. Freeman has observed that it is hard to see how, ex
cept when they have been taken away by Act of Parliament, any p�w

ers which were exercised by Edward I (among them the summonmg
of women to the House of Lords) could be refused to Queen Victoria.
If writs of summons to peeresses in their own right were issued in the
exercise of the prerogative, the House of Lords would hav� n� power,
and probably no desire, to prevent the entry of these ladies mto the
s32
Gilded Chamber.

528.

Id.

529.

The Law and the lawyers: Peeresses andParliament, 154
Id. Note the reference to the French, who admitted women

5 32.

Id.

�W TIMES �· I (1922).

devotes
m 1900. Shirley M. Eoff
530.
several pages to the fight to enter the House of Lords. See IloFF, supra note 52 1 , at 81 -88·
53 1 . Peeresses in the House ofLords, 29 LAW NOTFS 'fl (1925).
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Note the rejection of the argument advanced in the Chorlton and Bebb
cases, that a sort of latches barred women 's rights in this area.
D. The Police
In February 1 920, the Home Secretary established a committee to
inquire into the entry of women onto the police force.'" Its report ap
peared on July 24, l 920.s34 Commenting favorably on the performance of
women during the war, the committee recommended that they be used
particularly in cases of violence against women or children.''� In a com
ment that seems to reiterate the suggestion that women simply "did not
get it," the committee believed that w omen police officers should be
strongly impressed, as indeed all police officers should be, with the
necessity of getting the victim' s story unadulterated with the sugges
tions of the statement taker. Specializing in work of this kind is apt to
give the latter a subconscious desire to get a statement so com plete
that it will exclude the defences which his or her experience teaches

are usually set up, with the unhappy result, at least in the case of a
child, that by the time she comes to give evidence in court, she is no
longer telling her experience, but reciting a statement �.1{)
.

It is tempting to see in this caution a suggestion that w omen police offi
cers would be more sympathetic, thus less objective and less profes
sional, in obtaining statements from young victims of abuse or violence.
If this inference is accurate, was the committee also slyly suggesting that
women police officers are not as intellectually or psychologically capa
ble as male officers overall?
Certainly at least some of the members of the committee thought
that women police officers were not as physically able to carry out all
duties required of an officer. "The committee think [sic] that police
women should not be required to perform duties which necessarily in
volve e exercise of physical force and exposure to physical danger, and

�

upon this they base a recommendation that, normally, the pay of police
�o�en should be l ?wer than that of policemen."537 But, "[t]hey will find

�

.

1t tfficult to convmce the women of the justice of their view on this
_
pomt. The women will probably argue that while men are fitter for some
duties, they are fitter for others, and that both kinds of fitness should be

533.
534.
535.
536.
537.

Women Police,
Id.

84 JUST. PEACE 355 360 (1920).
,

Id.
Id.

Id. Apparently women did not eat
as much as men, or pay
as much in rent, or care for as
many children. This attitude was current among
opponents of the avocates
as well . See Corcos, supra
note 37, at 468•
.

1 998]

PORTIA GOES TO PARLIAMENT

413

equally remunerated."538 Indeed, such women would find support for that
argument in the pages of the committee' s own report.
The

Justice of the

Peace pointed out another contradiction in the

committee's report regarding the responsibilities of women police offi
cers:
The committee recommend [sic] that women employed to perform
police duties should make the declaration of a constable in the same
form as men, and that they should be invested with the legal powers
and status of constables, but that regulations should be made in each
force clearly defining the duties they will and will not be primarily
expected to perform. It is a little difficult to see how constables sworn
"to act as constables for preserving the peace, and preventing robber
ies and other felonies, and apprehending offenders against the peace,"
can be dispensed from the performace of part of their vow by regula
tions made to save them from the danger of carrying it out in its in
tegrity. However, probably no one will quarrel with the practical
S39
comprormse.
•

vm. CONCLUSION
Like movements to admit women to the legal profession in other
European countries, the English movement represented a natural out
growth of the increasing demands of half the population for admittance
to a system that both creates and reflects the political and social envi
ronment. The arguments for and against the admittance of women to the
bar greatly resembled those advanced in other societies. Yet some argu
ments were more forcefully put forward because of the reliance on advo
cacy by the common law legal system. For example, the suggestion that
the naturally aggressive stance of the English barrister and solicitor was
not one that the English woman could easily replicate or understand. Yet
proponents of women ' s participation countered this by asserting that
women could add their own particular brand of kindness and under
standing to the mix, an argument was also made in other instances,540 and
that is still heard today.541

538.
539.
540.

Women Police, supra note 533, at 360.
Id.
See Corcos, supra note 37, at 455 .

541. Many new "self help" books dramati:ze the differences in male and female thinking. See
generally FARRELL, supra note 15; JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARs, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS
(1992); SHAPIRO, supra note 1 3 1 ; TANNEN, supra note 204; DEBORAH TANNEN, TuAT'S NOT WHAT I
MEAN: How CONVERSATIONAL STYLE MAKF.s OR BREAKS RELATIONSHIPS (1986); DEBORAH
TANNEN, You Jusr DoN'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION (1990). That some
men continue to translate their wish to dominate into workplace behavior is documented in such serious

but never solemn books as EMn..Y Torn, Ms. MENTOR'S IMPECCABLE ADVICE FOR WOMEN IN
ACADEMIA (1997), which includes a description of a phenomenon which she calls "peacocking": the

tendency of males to "show off' at academic conferences by asking "questions" of female speakers that
actually have nothing to do with the subject.
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The English legal profession furiously disc � ssed the issue of the
admittance of women for over fifty years, and this resulted from both a
lack of support at the governmental level for fem i nist causes and the
power of the organized English Bar.542 Wh i le wom� n in the

� nited Stat�s

and Canada had only to convince one state or prov mce at a time to adnut
them (no easy task), admission in one state was still, in a sense . t?tal
.
victory. While they had several routes open to them fo� . adm1ss1on,
.
women in England still needed to convince an already sensitized major
ity of the nation 's legal profession, including the most influential mem
bers of the legislature, the Inns, and the Law S oc iety. In the end, what
convinced a majority of the profes sion, i f not to support, at least not to
oppose the admission of women, was their contribution in the war effort
and their clear willingness to share the burdens that men had heretofore
formally recognized as theirs alone .
The battle for women's admission to the bar in England was harder
longer
than in France. Two factors were crucial to its success. The
and
performance of women during the war was

an

obvious justification, even

though some male and female supporters maintained that political rights,

in particular admission to a profession, should not be a reward for doing
one 's civic duty. As one analyst points out with regard to the suffrage:
The effect of the war was, however, precisely the opposite of that ex
pected. Within two years and a half the conflict brought the suffra

gists an advantage which n o amount of agitation had ever won for

them, i.e., the official support of the government, and a few months
more carried their cause to a v ictorious conclusion which would
hardly have been reached in a full decade of peace. There were two
main reasons for this tum of events. One was the necessity which the
war imposed of undertaking a wholesale revision of the electoral
system, leading to the decision to base the franchise upon personal
right rather than property relationship, and inevitably suggesting an
equality in rights, as individuals, of women with men. But the funda
mental reason brought forward b y the war for enfranchising women
was the great variety and value of women 's services to the nation
during the conflict. This was the thing that won over thousands of

former opponents, from Mr. Asquith down.543

For many men, including lawyers, actions speak louder than words .
Even more impoi:tant were the decades of debate, during which all
arguments for and agamst were trotted out and examined, and the weaker
�guments against admission finally though quietly dismissed as insuffi
cient t? deny women an opportunity that equally qualified men had for

cen�es. The government which shepherded through the Sex Disquali
fication (Removal) Act had a much easier job than it would have had
542.
543.
(1918).

;LIE ffALEVY, 2

� HISTORY OF� ENGLISH PEoPLE 478-48
2 (1 934).
.
.A.O., The Bntish
Representation of the People Act, 1 AM.
2
POL. SCI. REV. 498, 500
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�enty or ten years before because �ore of the �entiment of the profes

sion, as well as the mood of the pubhc, was behind women's admission.
Some women thus began to think of the law as a possible career even
though some social and professional barriers remained to be removed
and when the opportunity presented itself had readied themselves to
advantage of it.

talc�

In France, by contrast, the liberal government had no difficulty in
righting what it considered to be a grievous wrong three years after it
occurred . Yet the opinion of the majority of members of the profession
was not yet in sympathy with the government' s policy. Questions about
wome n' s competence lingered and fewer women pursued the possibility
of a legal career during the first twenty years that it was open to them.
The arguments advanced against women's ability to practice law
seem intuitively to mitigate against the equal ability of women to prac
tice law, and to lend a semblance of legitimacy to the idea of "separate
but equal." But this impression is mistalcen. That women practice law
differently from men is not an indictment, but a recognition of the differ
ences of biology, gender, and socialization, and is particularly apt in the
practice of the common law.
Facts and interpretations matter at common law. Thus is old law
rethought and new law made. That the arguments used against the admis
sion of women to the profession were so similar in England, the United
States and France demonstrates that the pervasive opposition based on
certain assumptions about the abilities and rightful place of women in
society had no geographical or political boundaries. Further, legislation
could not alter these shared societal assumptions any more than it af
fected the beliefs of male supporters of the women 's movement that fe
males should be allowed to practice law. In France, the debate took place
after the admission of women; in the United States, before and during the
admission, because it was accomplished jurisdiction by jurisdiction; and
in England, before the admission finally came about. But in each case,
the debate served as an emotional and psychological exercise necessary
to the maturation of the profession.
Women like Gwyneth Bebb in England and Jeanne chauvin in
. .
France, along with their male supporters, were ahead of their tllile by a
few years, but their efforts eventually made possible the entry of wom�n
into the legal profession. They defined the scope of the debate that still
goes on. Today's young women attorneys, who face the same

J?nd� of

pernicious arguments, may not recognize the danger f?� margmahz�d
groups who wish to participate in the ongoing legal, pohtical and social

discussion that shapes our society. Some contem� l�ti?n of the nature of
.
e recurring arguments over gender issues that tn�iali� e real d�feren� es
.
m thinking and conceptualizing legal concepts will yield additional m

�

sights into the interactions of male and female attorneys as well as men
and women in all spheres of life. The opponents of women lawyers may

[Vol.
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ron� , P �arily because
have been right, after all, and the supporters
.
that 1 � , 1t is pr� sume to
the law continues to be "constructed as male:
_
professional, mum1datmg,
be "rational, logical, dispassionate, objective,
and demanding."544

�

·

to attract
Further , the social skills that women cultivate in order
husbands serve them ill in the workplace.
"Time tested secrets for capturing Mr. Right," such as "don't call him
first," "be quiet and mysterious," or always "let the man take charge,"

are not time-tested strategies for attracting clients ' business and sen

ior lawyers ' admiration.

[T]his contradiction between feminist stereotypes and professional

success has long left women in a double bind. They risk seeming too

assertive or not assertive enough. The competitiveness and self

promotion that legal cultures reward are not the characteristics that
society most values in women or that many women value in them

selves.545

Until law, like society, finds a way to value the thought processes and
contributions of one-half of the population, it will continue to see women
as lesser partners if they maintain their "female" qualities and lesser
women if they adopt "male" characteristics in order to succeed.
As long as success in law is identified with those characteristics,
and women are not, women will continue to have difficulty in obtaining
recognition for their achievements as well as the right to be mediocre,
not superior, as practitioners . The double standard that dictated the ex
clusion of women from the legal profession in England and continues to
underlie evaluations of women attorneys by some of their male col
leagues is a standard that celebrates and condemns what we normally
term "masculine" values, those which women are necessarily lacking.
[A] woman can be criticized both for being too powerless as a

woman, and for being too forceful for a woman . . . . [W]hat is seen as

assertive in a man is seen a s aggressive in a woman. And even ag

gressiveness, which may be admired in men, is penalized in women.

Rather, women should be deferential and they should smile. They

should

544.

not tell people what they know . . . . They should be attractive

Farley,

supra note 1 1 , at 389.

"law" as a discipline

Frances

are

Olsen, The Sex

Kairys ed., 2d ed.

1990).

Farley points out that adjectives consistently used to describe
also consistently used to describe male law professors. Id. at 349-50. See also

of Law, in lim Pouncs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 453

(David

545. Deborah L. Rhode, Fluttering Eyes Won't Cut It with Clients, NAT'L LJ., June 23, 1997, at
A15 (quoting sociologist Cynthia Epstein). On continuing bias against female lawyers' styles
in the
worlcplace and its effect on their success, see JEANNE Q. SVIKHART, FAIR MEAsURE:
TOWARD
E'.FH!cnVE AITORNEY EVALUATIONS (1997).
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but not too pretty, agreeable but not too accommodating, assertive but
not too aggressive, and knowledgeable but not too erudite.5-46

Whether women are better suited than men to an active search for
alternatives to traditional means of legal dispute resolution than to the
angry advocacy that sometimes prevails, or whether they are simply ac
culturated to prefer outcomes other than "win or lose," whether these
alternatives are desirable, and which of them we can and should institu
tionalize are subjects which demand further exploration by both women
and men. Women, like all traditionally marginalized groups, necessarily
must change both the form and the substance of a profession they enter.
What evaluation and use we make of this observation will inevitably
shape the evolution of the law and of society.

546.

Farley, supra note 1 1 , at 339 (foomotes omitted).

